LECTURE XXV

§ I. Connection of Affective States in Consciousness, § II,
Sensory Accompaniments of Compound Feelings. § III. Emo¬
tion.   § IV.  Intellectual Feelings.

§   I

OUR original plan in these lectures was to begin with the
examination of particular mental processes,—sensations
and ideas, feelings and voluntary actions,—and then to turn our
attention to the interconnection of all these processes in con¬
sciousness. But when we came to analyse complex states of
mind, it seemed better to take their components separately and
examine them as we examined the simpler phenomena of mind,
although their isolation was no more than an abstraction. We
have accordingly spoken in the preceding lectures only of the
ideational side of consciousness. We could not leave feeling
and will altogether out of account, because of their importance
for the apperception and association of ideas. But we said
nothing of the relation of feeling and internal voluntary action
to the other affective states of consciousness and to external
voluntary action. We will now glance briefly at the more
complex affective processes.

The sense-substrate of all the more complex affective states
we have found to be the common feeling. Like the particular
sense-feelings which give rise to it, this is either a pleasurable
or an unpleasurable feeling. Indefinite as these categories may
seem, they are characteristic for the mental nature of affective
activity in general. The physical excitations underlying the
sensations to which affection attaches differ only in in-tensity and
in the nature of the stimulus which arouses them. Sensations
as such, therefore, present only intensive and qualitative differ¬
ences. But when the physical excitation also gives rise to an
affective process, we find these two polar opposites of pleasure

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