

WAR, PEACE, AND STRATEGY

Class: Mondays & Wednesdays 11:00-12:15

Betts Office Hours: Wednesdays 2:30-5:00,
or by appointment.

Teaching Assistants:

Adriana Lins de Albuquerque: aalbuquerque@gmail.com

Dianne Pfundstein: drp2109@columbia.edu

Professor Richard K. Betts

Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies

Room 1328

International Affairs Building

212-854-7325

rkb4@columbia.edu

Questions animating this course include: Why is force often used in international politics? What causes peace? How do wars, or competitions shaped by the lurking possibility of war, affect international relations and individual societies? How can governments best prepare to prevent wars or to win them if they occur? By what standards should resort to force, or strategic and tactical choices in combat, be judged legitimate or immoral? How are the prevention, outbreaks, processes, and outcomes of mass violence (or crises resolved short of combat) determined by politics, ideology, diplomacy, technology, economics, geography, military plans and tactics, intelligence, or arms control? What are similarities and differences among conflicts between states, within states, and between states and transnational groups (such as terrorists)? How important is terrorism? How do weapons of mass destruction coerce or deter? Is the world safer or more dangerous after the Cold War? Can war be made obsolete? The course emphasizes problems in the relation between political ends and military means. Students must grapple with the terms of reference in both dimensions. The course is organized thematically, not by cases, but illustrative examples are drawn from conflicts in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The course emphasizes issues in the 20th Century, and in U.S. national security policy.

Requirements: This is a graduate lecture course open to advanced undergraduates. It is designed to be demanding. Anyone who cannot or does not wish to read and ponder a heavy load of material should not take this course. All students must (1) complete assigned readings; (2) attend all lectures, arriving on time (seated NLT 11:00); (3) view two films (see p. 8 below; for those interested in additional films, see pp. 9-11); (4) take the final examination on the scheduled date (*make-up exams will not be allowed except for certified medical excuse or family emergency*). Undergraduates must also (5) take the mid-term examination (optional for graduate students) and (6) attend discussion sections (optional for graduate students). *Students must give full attention to lectures and discussion sections. Multi-tasking is not allowed in class.* Laptops may be used only for taking notes; students found to be checking E-Mail, surfing the Internet, or text-messaging will be asked to leave the class. At the final examination, students must leave *all* electronic devices except battery-powered watches (cell phones, laptops, i-pods, blackberries, and so on) at home or outside the examination room.

This is a survey course. To allow maximum time for reading there is no paper writing assignment. The reading load averages 210 pages per week, but is concentrated disproportionately in sections IV and VI-VIII. To help you plan reading time the numbers of pages in each item of reading, and for each section of the syllabus, are noted in brackets. The total number of pages of reading required for the course is 2,943. Required readings are on reserve in Lehman Library. Books ordered in the College Bookstore and Labyrinth Books should be purchased so that you can mark them up. Students may choose instead to do all the reading in the library, but will then have a harder time taking proper notes. Students who do the reading without marking or taking notes are fools, unless they have photographic memories and superhuman capabilities for mentally organizing a complex array of concepts, arguments, and historical examples.

Whatever the education system from which you come, understand that the purpose of this course is not to indoctrinate you with what the instructor believes to be the right answers. The purpose is to highlight crucial

questions and ideas and expose you to the main currents of debate about them. Performance on examinations is judged by how well you understand debates and exploit relevant readings and lectures in answers.

I. **Introduction: Nature and Functions of War**

[123 pp.]

Three Visions of Conflict: Does War Have a Future?
Concepts of National Security and Philosophy of War
Political Ends and Military Means: Rationality
War is Hell: Insanity and Obscenity
The Perspective Between Pacifism and Militarism

Richard K. Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War*, Third Edition (Pearson-Longman, 2008) [44]:
 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History"
 John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War."
 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?"

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. (Princeton University Press, 1976): Book I, chaps. 1, 2 [24]. (NB: Only an unabridged German language edition is an acceptable alternative to this translation. Do not read a different translation. *Especially do not read the widely available Penguin edition of the Graham translation abridged by Anatol Rapoport.*)

Sun-Tzu, *The Art of Warfare*, Roger T. Ames, trans. (Ballantine, 1993), chaps. 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11 [25]. (The Sawyer, Griffith, or Huang translations are also acceptable.)

Paul Fussell, *Wartime* (Oxford University Press, 1989), chap. 18 [30].

II. **Causes of War and Peace**

[290 pp.]

Psychology and Anthropology: Instinct, Ritual, or Continuation of Sport by Other Means
Religion: Fighting for God
Main Paradigms: Realism and Liberalism
Autarky or Interdependence
Ideology and Fraternity
Feudalism, Capitalism, Marxism, Militarism

Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (Columbia University Press, 1959), chaps. 2-4, 6-8 [184].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [106]:

Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue"
 E. H. Carr, "Realism and Idealism"
 Geoffrey Blainey, "Power, Culprits, and Arms"
 Margaret Mead, "War is Only an Invention -- Not a Biological Necessity"
 Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace"
 John Mueller, "The Obsolescence of Major War"
 Norman Angell, "The Great Illusion"
 Geoffrey Blainey, "Paradise is a Bazaar"
 V. I. Lenin, "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism"
 Joseph Schumpeter, "Imperialism and Capitalism"
 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Causes and Economic Effects"
 Richard Rosecrance, "Trade and Power"
 Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics."

III. **Securing Peace:**

Balance of Power and Institutions for Cooperation

[188 pp.]

What is Stability? Equilibrium or Peace
Meanings of Balance of Power
Effects of Unipolarity, Bipolarity, Multipolarity
International Organization, "Regimes," and Collective Security

Inis L. Claude, *Power and International Relations* (Random House, 1962), chaps. 2-3 [82].

G. F. Hudson, "Collective Security and Military Alliances," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations* (Harvard University Press, 1968) [5].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [19]:
 Robert Gilpin, "Hegemonic War and International Change"
 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "Power and Interdependence."

Kimberly Zisk Marten, *Enforcing the Peace* (Columbia University Press, 2004), chaps. 2, 3 [72].

Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention" (Revised Version), in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds., *Turbulent Peace* (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001) [10].

IV. **The Choice of War or Peace:**

Conquest, Coercion, Crisis Management

[416 pp.]

The Spectrum of Choice: Concession, Compromise, Combat
Setting the Price of Peace: Political Stakes vs. Military Costs
Setting the Price of War: Blood, Treasure, and Risk
Deterrence, Reassurance, Crisis Management, and "Accidental" War
Cases: 1914, 1938, 1962
Theory and Practice of Coercive Force: Bombing and "Compellence"

Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (Yale University Press, 1966), chaps. 2-4 [154].

Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win* (Cornell University Press, 1996),¹ chaps. 2, 3, 7, 9 [134].

Gen. Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (PublicAffairs, 2001), chaps. 8-12 [128].

V. **Modern War: Constraints, Conditions, Conduct**

[140 pp.]

Geography: Natural Security and Vulnerability
Economy: Resources, Power, and Strategy
Combined Arms: Armies, Navies, Air Forces
Campaigns and Logistics

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [14]:
 Niccolò Machiavelli, "Money is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered"
 Alan S. Milward, "War as Policy."

Michael Howard, *War in European History* (Oxford University Press, 1974), chaps. 4-6 [62].

John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (Viking, 1976), chap. 4, pp. 210-237, 242-279 [64].

¹ Ph. D. students: For criticism see Barry D. Watts, "Ignoring Reality," and Pape's rebuttal, "The Air Force Strikes Back: A Reply to Barry Watts and John Warden," in *Security Studies* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1997/98).

VI. **Policy, Strategy, and Operations:
Integrating Political Ends and Military Means**

[448 pp.]

Three Levels of Analysis

Technology: Innovations and Interactions

Plans: Organization, Doctrine, Tactics, Obstacles

Military Effectiveness: What Produces Success in Combat?

Attack and Defense: Aggressive, Preventive, Preemptive, and Defensive War

How Ends Determine Means, How Means Determine Ends

Clausewitz, *On War*. Book I, chap. 7; Book II, chap. 3; Book III, chap. 1; Book VI, chaps. 1, 3, 5; Book VII, chaps. 1-5 [31].

Stephen Biddle, *Military Power* (Princeton University Press, 2004),² chaps. 2, 3 [37].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [25]:

Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma"

Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology."

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels* (Ballantine, 1975) [355].

VII. **Ends and Means in Total War and Limited War**

[351 pp.]

Estimating Costs, Benefits, and Feasibility

Estimating the Culminating Point of Victory

Total War: World Wars I and II

Limited War: Korea and Kuwait

Total or Limited? Iraq II

Clausewitz, *On War*, Book VII, chap. 22; Book VIII, chaps. 1-3, 6 [32].

Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986) [70].

Samuel Eliot Morison, *Strategy and Compromise* (Atlantic/Little, Brown, 1958), Part I, chaps. 1-4, 6-7 [44].

Michael Gordon and Gen. Bernard Trainor, *The Generals' War* (Little, Brown, 1995), chaps. 18-20 [86].

Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (Penguin, 2006), chaps. 4-5, 7-8, 10 [119].

Wednesday, October 31: Mid-Term Examination

² Ph. D. Students: See criticisms by five scholars and Biddle's response in "*Military Power: A Roundtable Review*," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 3 (June 2005).

VIII. **Unconventional Warfare and Terrorism**

[347 pp.]

People's War, Counterinsurgency, and Incentives for "Asymmetric" Strategies
Linkages Between Conventional and Unconventional War
Stealth, Strength, and Advantages of Attack Over Defense
Secular and Sacred Motivations

Clausewitz, *On War*. Book VI, chap. 26; Book VIII, chap. 5 [12].

Col. C. E. Callwell, *Small Wars*, Third Edition (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1906), chaps. 3, 7 [19].

Harry G. Summers, *On Strategy* (Presidio Press, 1982), chaps. 1, 7-11, 15 [93].

Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1986), chaps. 1, 6-8, 10 [109].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [92]:

T. E. Lawrence, "Science of Guerrilla Warfare"

Mao Tse-tung, "On Guerrilla Warfare"

Samuel P. Huntington, "Patterns of Violence in World Politics"

Martha Crenshaw, "The Strategic Logic of Terrorism"

Mark Juergensmeyer, "Religious Radicalism and Political Violence."

Marc Sageman, "Jihadi Networks of Terror"

Osama bin Ladin, "Speech to the American People."

Osama Bin Ladin *et al.*, "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders: World Islamic Front Statement," February 23, 1998
 <<http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>> [3].

Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 3 (August 2003) [19].

Required Film: See *The Battle of Algiers* before the end of Section VIII. Refer to questions on p. 6.

IX. **Society, Polity, Culture, and Capability**

[223 pp.]

Nationalism, State Expansion, and Social Mobilization

Civil-Military Relations

Recruitment, Conscription, Organization

Culture and Combat Effectiveness

Combat Motivation: When Fighting Can Get One Killed, what Makes One Fight?

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [38]:

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War"

Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars"

Radha Kumar, "The Troubled History of Partition."

Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1948) [35].

Omer Bartov, *Hitler's Army* (Oxford University Press, 1991), chaps. 3-4 [119].

Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War* (University of Nebraska Press, 2002),³ "Conclusions and Lessons" [31].

³ Ph.D. students: See Risa A. Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay," *International Security* 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003).

X. ***When Is War Murder? The Moral Calculus of Killing***

[84 pp.]

Absolute vs. Utilitarian Criteria
Atrocities: Cold Blood and Passion
Are Some Lives Worth More Than Others?
Is Terrorism Ever Legitimate?

Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, Third Edition (Basic Books, 2000), chaps. 4, 6, 9, 16, 19 [84].

Required Film: See *Saving Private Ryan* before lectures for Section X. Refer to questions on p. 19.

XI. ***The Nuclear Revolution: Theory and Practice***

[155 pp.]

Nuclear Weapon Effects
Deterrence and Compellence
Rationality, Uncertainty, and Credibility
Limited War and Escalation
Nuclear War Plans and Operational Doctrine
Cold War Crises

Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, Third Edition (Palgrave, 2003), chaps. 6-9, 12, 14-16, 19 [133].

Paul Fussell, "Thank God for the Atom Bomb" in Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (Summit Books, 1988) [22].

XII. ***Threat Assessment and Defense Planning***

[78 pp.]

Aggression or Security Dilemma?
Intentions and Capabilities
Deterrence and Provocation
Intelligence and Uncertainty
Strategic Assumptions and U.S. Force Planning

Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," January 1, 1907, and Thomas Sanderson, "Observations on Printed Memorandum on Relations with France and Germany, January 1907," in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, vol. III: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-6* (London: HMSO, 1928) (NB: Read pp. 399-405, 414-419 carefully; skim the rest.) [11].

Documents 551, 553, and 650 on the Munich crisis in E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., assisted by Margaret Lambert, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series, vol. II: 1938 (London: HMSO, 1949) [7].

Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen, "China: Can the Next Superpower Rise Without War?" in Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [12].

Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97) [48].

XIII. **Arms Control**

[40 pp.]

Political, Economic, and Military Rationales for Arms Regulation
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Cold War Negotiations
Conventional Forces: "Defense Dominance"?
Arms Trade
Costs and Benefits of Regulation
Regional Conflicts and Incentives for Proliferation
WMD After the Cold War: Biological, Chemical, Nuclear

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [40]:

Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results"

Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. and Abram N. Shulsky, "Arms Control: The Historical Experience"

Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better."⁴

XIV. **Conclusion: Evolving Bases of Conflict and Cooperation**

[60 pp.]

Religion
Power Without Force?
Information Warfare
Non-Lethal Weaponry
Theories, Experience, and Prediction
A "Revolution in Military Affairs"?
Environmental Sources of Conflict
Culture and Conflict

Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996) [17].

Biddle, *Military Power*, chap. 10 [18].

Betts, ed., *Conflict After the Cold War* [25]:

Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict"

Samuel P. Huntington, "Peace Among Civilizations?"

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http://sipa.columbia.edu/resources_services/student_affairs/academic_policies/deans_discipline_policy.html
 and http://sipa.columbia.edu/resources_services/student_affairs/academic_policies/code_of_conduct.html .
 Violations of the Code of Academic and Professional Conduct should be reported to the professor and, for SIPA, to the Associate Dean for Student Affairs.

⁴ For elaboration of this argument and rebuttals by Scott Sagan see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (W.W. Norton, 2003).

Required Film Viewings

Times and places of showings to be announced.

1. ***The Battle of Algiers*** (1967), directed by Gillo Pontecorvo, screenplay by Franco Solinas (2 hours, 5 minutes). For section VIII of the course. To understand the film you must know the essential story of the Algerian war of independence. Remember that the French did not consider Algeria a colony, but a part of metropolitan France (it had about a million European settlers). Although fiction, several characters are composites of real historical figures (one of the FLN leaders plays himself in the movie). The realism of this film is demonstrated by the fact that after early showings the producers had to insert a notice at the beginning that it was not a documentary. While obviously pro-FLN, the film is also unusual in the extent to which it does not demonize the French, but empathizes with them. (Interestingly, the actor who played Colonel Mathieu was a French Communist!)

- Were the tactics used on either or both sides illegitimate? Does the legitimacy or illegitimacy of terror or torture depend on the nature of the tactics or the justice of the cause they serve?
- By what criteria were tactics employed effective or counterproductive?
- Could either side have hoped to win without using those tactics?
- In what respects are the issues posed by Al Qaeda today similar and different from those in this case?
- Is Colonel Mathieu's character evil, admirable, tragic, or something else?
- How do the French and FLN strategies reflect Huntington's points about the "tripartite" nature of revolutionary war or Mao's points about guerrillas and population being "fish" and "sea"?
- Have U.S. intelligence services learned the wrong lessons from this film?

2. ***Saving Private Ryan*** (1998), directed by Stephen Spielberg, screenplay by Robert Rodat (2 hours, 49 minutes). For section X. Look at the first 25-minutes (the assault on Omaha Beach) as one of the least unrealistic of Hollywood portrayals of combat. (Paul Fussell, of all people, approved heartily of this sequence.) Look at the rest of the film as an evocation of dilemmas about risking, deliberately spending, or wrongfully taking lives in wartime.

- How should decisions to spend lives be made? By what criteria?
- Whose decisions to spend lives in this venture were right or wrong?
- Did the Americans who shot surrendering Germans in the overrunning of the bunkers on Omaha Beach commit a war crime that should have been prosecuted?
- Was Upham right or wrong about whether to kill the prisoner the first time the question arose? The second time?

Optional Films

Cinema has done little to illustrate processes of peace, in the sense of depicting diplomacy, non-forcible instruments of foreign policy, or institutions of conflict resolution. In contrast, there are many films about war. Most war movies are superficial action fantasies or wartime propaganda, or reflect typical Hollywood vices of melodrama, sensationalism, caricature, jingoism, romanticization of combat, and either antiseptic lack of realism about carnage or grotesque surrealism. In short, there is a handful of classics, but few war movies that qualify as artistic or instructive masterpieces. Among those with typical Hollywood limitations, however, are many that effectively illustrate important aspects of war having to do with military sociology, moral dilemmas encountered in combat or preparing for combat, leadership, tactics, and other subjects.

Experience indicates that many people born since 1970 are resistant to old movies, especially ones in black and white, or treatments that reflect mid-20th century sensibilities and lack the lavish special effects of the later era of astronomical budgets for filmmaking. Students who can get over the generational difference and Hollywood limitations are encouraged to see and think about films listed below, for which showings will be arranged. Attendance is not required, but there will be an optional question or questions drawn from these films worth one point of extra credit on the final examination.

1. **Zulu** (1964), directed by Cy Endfield, screenplay by John Prebble and Cy Endfield (2 hours, 19 minutes). Relevant to sections VI and IX. The cinematic version of the famous defense of Rorke's Drift in 1879. Ignore the subplot about the missionary and his daughter, inserted to help market the movie. Also, distinguish questions about military effectiveness from questions about political legitimacy (the British soldiers are portrayed as heroes in the film, but were in the service of an imperial land grab). Focus on the linkages among organization, doctrine, tactics, technology, professionalism, and combat effectiveness on both sides in the engagement.

- Why and how was the small force of British regulars (fewer than 100 functioning riflemen) able to defeat 4,000 Zulus, some of whom also had rifles?
- How was this brought off by two junior officers whose records were not distinguished?
- Why did this small force succeed at Rorke's Drift when the British force of 1,500 was completely destroyed at the Battle of Isandhlwana earlier on the same day? (Betts will summarize what happened at Isandhlwana in class. Hint: The over-confident British at Isandhlwana departed from standard tactics while those at Rorke's Drift adhered to them.)
- How does this case illustrate the importance of force-to-space ratios, training, and fire discipline?
- Is the film racist?
- Is today's disparity in military capability between the USA and Third World militaries (such as Iraq's) comparable to the disparity between Europeans and locals in colonial wars of the 19th century?

2. ***Paths of Glory*** (1959), directed by Stanley Kubrick, screenplay by Stanley Kubrick, Calder Willingham, and Jim Thompson, from the novel by Humphrey Cobb. (1 hour, 27 minutes.) Relevant to Sections I, IX, and X. The vast distance between high command and battlefield, and the contrast between collective mission and individual justice.

- The fictional events are a twist on the actual French army mutinies of 1917. If the attack on the “ant hill” portrayed in the middle of the film reflects the reality of battles like Verdun, how could troops *not* have mutinied much earlier than they did?
- The Adolphe Menjou and George MacCready characters are caricatures, but what considerations could make more realistic versions of their behavior plausible?
- Are the conflicts driven primarily by military imperatives, bureaucratic politics, class, venality, or stupidity?

3. ***All Quiet on the Western Front*** (1930), directed by Lewis Milestone, adapted by Maxwell Anderson, screenplay by George Abbott, from the novel by Erich Maria Remarque (2 hours, 12 minutes, including restored footage). Relevant to sections I and IX. This is *the* classic anti-war novel and film of the interwar period, banned in several countries. Star Lew Ayres famously became a conscientious objector in World War II.

- How and why does the literary or artistic sensibility see war differently from the perspective of politicians or social scientists? Reflect back on Paul Fussell’s “ ‘The Real War Will Never Get in the Books’ .”
- If you have the opportunity sometime, compare this film with (a) movies, like John Wayne’s or Errol Flynn’s, that glorify combat; (b) grotesque or surreal anti-war films such as *Apocalypse Now* or *The Deer Hunter*; and (c) another famous interwar film, *Grand Illusion* (1937).

4. ***Twelve O’Clock High*** (1949), directed by Henry King, screenplay by Sy Bartlett and Beirne Lay, Jr. (2 hours, 12 minutes.) Relevant to Sections IV, VII, and IX. The problem of achieving military effectiveness at the price of driving men to their limits in the development of the U.S. “precision” bombing campaign in 1943-44.

- Through what mechanisms does operational effectiveness depend on organization, discipline, and morale?
- What is the distinction between effective leadership and command? How do social distance or fraternization between leaders and led affect unit effectiveness?
- Recall Shaara’s Lee telling Longstreet: “Soldiering has one great trap.... To be a good soldier you must love the army. But to be a good officer you must be willing to order the death of the thing you love.... No other profession requires it. That is one reason why there are so few good officers. Although there are many good men.”
- How do the strategic and operational problems of using air power effectively in World War II compare to those in the current era of *real* precision targeting?

5. ***A Gathering of Eagles*** (1963), directed by Delbert Mann, screenplay by Robert Pirosh (1 hour, 56 minutes). Relevant to Sections IV and XI. Before watching, get over the fact that this has more standard Hollywood saccharine aspects than the other films mentioned here. In its glitzy way it presents social and organizational issues in elite unit command, personnel management, and operational combat readiness, and provides insight into the most important U.S. military organization of the Cold War era: SAC. The film is in many respects a nuclear-age echo of *Twelve O'Clock High*.

- What does the story show about the Cold War in general, about deterrence and military strategy, and about issues in linking political objectives and strategy to military operations?
- In earlier decades, this film reportedly was used in training programs for Israeli army officers, although they did not have any mission comparable to that of SAC. Why was the film deemed useful for officer development?
- What does the film suggest about the cliché of “the loneliness of command”? Particularly, what does the surprise twist at the end say about this?
- Was the ORI genuinely vital, or excessively obsessive? Why was this fixation greater in SAC than in any other military organization? (Pay attention to details; for example, whenever Col. Caldwell walks in the door at home, why does he make a phone call to report this before doing anything else?)

6. ***Fail Safe*** (1964), directed by Sidney Lumet, screenplay by Walter Bernstein, based on the novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler. Relevant to Sections IV and XI. The non-comedy counterpart to Dr. Strangelove (which it is assumed that most students have seen) as a scenario of accidental nuclear war.

- What if the system of peacetime deterrence illustrated in *A Gathering of Eagles* had gone wrong?
- Is the Walter Matthau character Kissinger, Kahn, Wohlstetter, or Schelling?
- Is the President's decision at the end plausible? If not, what else should he have done?
- Does the plot seem plausible for the Cold War but not after? If so, see *Crimson Tide* (1995).