

ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Political Science, G6403
Columbia University, Fall 2007

Time: Tuesdays 4-6pm
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COURSE OVERVIEW

This seminar exposes students to the main questions motivating research in comparative politics. This course is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the classic works in the field. Students are expected to read closely and are encouraged, both in class discussions and in their written work, to critically evaluate the literature and to think of ways to improve upon it.

This course is intended for PhD students preparing for their qualifying exams and enrollment is limited. Doctoral students will be given priority and the requirements of the PhD program will be considered if it is necessary to establish priority among them.

REQUIREMENTS AND EVALUATION

The requirements are as follows:

Class Participation – 10% of the final grade. Students are expected to read the assigned works closely and will be graded on both their knowledge of the material and their contributions in the seminar.

Response Papers – 10% of the final grade each - Two handed in before October 15th and two after. Due at 9am the Monday before class. Response papers will advance an argument related to one of the readings for the week. The best papers will make an original argument and present a critical summary of the existing research on a question raised in that week. The papers need not cover all the readings in a given week, but they do need to present an argument based on those readings. All research papers are due by 9am on the Monday before class and should be posted on the class website on Courseworks. Students will be expected to be familiar with their colleagues' papers.

Research Proposal – due 9am on December 11th – 30 % of the final grade. Students will write a research proposal addressing one of the questions raised in class. Proposals either offer an alternative theory or propose a new way of testing an existing theory.

Practice Comp – December 4th - 20 % of the final grade. In the final class session students will have an hour to answer one out of three questions posed. Students will not be able to consult their notes in order to answer this question.

READINGS

Session 1 (9/4): Introduction

Session 2 (9/11): Approaches to Study Institutions

- Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. *Political Studies* 44 (5):936–957.
- Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:69-404
- Weingast, Barry. 2002. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In *Political Science: State of the Discipline*, edited by I. Katznelson and H. Milner. New York: Norton.
- Grief, Avner, and David Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change. *American Political Science Review* 98 (4):633-652.
- Greif, Avner. 2006. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1 & 2.

Recommended

- Diermeier, Daniel, and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. Institutionalism as a Methodology. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 15 (2):123-144.
- Calvert, Randall. 1995. Rational Actors, Equilibrium, and Social Institutions. In *Explaining Social Institutions*, edited by J. Knight and I. Sened. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.
- Moe, Terry. 1995. The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy. In *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond* edited by O. E. Williamson. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. In *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*, edited by W. Streeck and K. Thelen. New York: Oxford University Press.

Session 3 (9/18): Approaches to Study Motivations

- Arrow, Kenneth. 1994. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *American Economic Review* 84 (2):1-9.
- Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1990. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. In *The Limits of Rationality* edited by K. Cook and M. Levi. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Grief, Avner. 1994. Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies. *Journal of Political Economy* 102 (5):912-950.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1988. The Renaissance of Political Culture. *American Political Science Review* 82 (4):1203-1230.
- Wedeen, Lisa. 2002. Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 96 (4):713-728.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2001. Class versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade. *International Organization* 55 (1):1-46.

Recommended

- Frieden, Jeffrey, and Ronald Rogowski. 1996. The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies. In *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, edited by H. V. Milner and R. O. Keohane. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Becker, Gary. 1993. Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior. *Journal of Political Economy* 101 (3):385-409.

Session 4 (9/25): The State

- Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion Capital and European States AD 990-1992*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, Chapters 1-3.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 9-96.
- Geertz, Clifford. 1980. *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 & 8.
- Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1, 3, & 8.
- North, Douglass. 1981. *Structure and Change in Economic History*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, Chapter 3.
- Barkey, Karen. 1994. *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Chapters 1 & 6.

Recommended

- Reno, William. 1997. War, Markets, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa's Weak States. *Comparative Politics* 29 (4):493-510.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. 1990. *The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Ch1 – 4.

Session 5 (10/2): Political Regimes

- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 & 2
- Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. Democratic Transitions. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (3):551-69.
- Acemoglu, Daron , and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Luebbert, Gregory. 1987. Social Foundations of Political Order in Interwar Europe. *World Politics* July 1987.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, Chapter 2
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1, 4 & 6
- Humphreys, Macartan., William A. Masters, and Martin E. Sandbu. 2006. The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in São Tomé and Príncipe. *World Politics* 58 (4):583-622.

Recommended

- Kuran, Timur. 1991. Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics* 44 (1):7-48.
- Rustow, Dankwart. 1970. Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics* 2:337-63.
- Weingast, Barry. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. *American Political Science Review* 91 (2 (June)):245-263.

Session 6 (10/9): Identity Politics

- Gellner, Ernest. 1964. Nationalism. In *Thought and Change*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Anderson, Benedict R. . 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, Chapters 1-3.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2.
- Posner, Daniel N. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 5 & 8.
- Fearon, James D., and David Laitin. 1996. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 90 (4):715-735.
- Laitin, David. 1998. *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, Chapters 1-3.

Recommended

- Bates, Robert H. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of Politics. In *State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, edited by D. Rothchild and V. A. Olunsorola. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2006. Counting Heads: A Theory of Elite and Voter Behavior in Patronage Democracies In *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by H. Kitschelt and S. I. Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Session 7 (10/16): Collective Action and Social Movements

- Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, *Harvard Economic Studies*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1, 2 & 6.
- McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 1997. Towards and Integrated Perspective on Social Movement and Revolutions. In *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, edited by M. I. Lichbach and A. S. Zuckerman. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Granovetter, Mark 1978. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (6):1420-1443.
- Franzosi, Roberto. 1995. *The Puzzle of Strikes: Class and State Strategies in Postwar Italy*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
- Scott, James C. 1976. *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* New Haven: Yale University Press, Chapters 2 & 8.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.

Recommended

- Popkin, Samuel L. 1988. Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam. In *Rationality and Revolution*, edited by M. Taylor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 8 (10/23): Political Violence

- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1.
- Goldstone, Jack A. . 2001. Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:139-187.
- Kalyvas, Stathis N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 7 & 9.

- Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97 (1):75-90.
- Brass, Paul. 1997. Theft of an Idol. In *Theft of an Idol: Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 2.

Recommended

- Wilkinson, Steven I. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Ellis, Stephen. 1999. *The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* New York, NY: New York University Press, Chapters 6 & 7.
- Horowitz, David L. 2001. *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Chapters 1 & 13.

Session 9 (10/30): Political Institutions

- Shugart, Matthew, and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 9-11.
- John Londregan. 2000. *Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., Chapters 1-3.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (3):289-325.
- Huber, John D. 2002. *Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2 & 4.
- Rodden, John. 2006. *Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.

Recommended

- Riker, William. 1964. *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance* Boston, MA: Little Brown, Chapters 1& 2.
- Cox, Gary, and Scott Morgenstern. 2001. Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents. *Comparative Politics* 33 (2).

No Session (11/6)

Session 10 (11/13): Parties and Elections

- Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count : Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapter 1.
- Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967. Cleavage Structure, Party System and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan. New York: Free Press.
- Boix, Carles. 1998. *Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conservative and Social Democratic Economic Strategies in the World Economy*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-2.
- Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Mary Stegmaier. 2000. Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes. *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:183-219.
- Murillo, Maria Victoria, and Cecilia Martínez-Gallardo. 2007. Political Competition and Policy Adoption: Market Reforms in Latin American Public Utilities. *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (1).

Recommended

- Manin, Bernard, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes. 1999. Elections and Representation. In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by B. Manin, A. Przeworski and S. Stokes. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. *Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Chapters 1, 3 & 4.
- Boix, Carles. 1999. Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93 (3):609-624.
- Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1 & 2.
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 1998. From Pulpit to Party: Party Formation and the Christian Democratic Phenomenon. *Comparative Politics* 30 (3).
- Shefter, Martin. 1994. *Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1 & 2.

Session 11 (11/20): Political Economy I: Advanced Industrial Countries

- Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 1.
- Alvarez, Michael, Geoffrey Garrett, and Peter Lange. 1991. Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance. *American Political Science Review* 85 (2):539-556.
- Iversen, Torben. 1996. Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics* 28 (4):399-436.
- Mares, Isabela. 2003. The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance: Sectoral versus National Differences. *World Politics* 55 (2):229-258.
- Hacker, Jacob. 2004. Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States. *American Political Science Review* 98 (2):243-260.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1.

Recommended

- Swenson, Peter. 1991. Bringing Capital Back in, or Social Democracy Reconsidered: Employer Power, Cross-Class Alliances, and Centralization of Industrial Relations in Denmark and Sweden. *World Politics* 43 (7):513-544.
- Pierson, Paul. 2001. Coping With Permanent Austerity Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent Democracies. In *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, edited by P. Pierson. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Session 12 (11/27): Political Economy II: Political Economy of Development

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91 (5):1369-1401.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 3 & 4.
- Bates, Robert H. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The political basis of agricultural policies*. Berkeley:

University of California Press.

- Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79 (2):447-468
- Keefer, Philip. 2004. What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development - and Vice Versa? *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:247-272.
- Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 101 (1).
- Frye, Timothy. 2002. The Perils of Polarization: Economic Performance in the Postcommunist World. *World Politics* 54 (3):308-337.

Recommended

- Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. *Political Economics : Explaining Economic Policy*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press., Chapter 14.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 7.
- Weinthal, Erika, and Pauline Luong Jones. 2006. Combating the Resource Curse: An Alternative Solution to Managing Mineral Wealth. *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (1):35-53.
- Hellman, Joel. 1998. Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions. *World Politics* 50 (2):203-234.

Session 13 (12/4): Summary & Practice Comp