In the sixth century B.C.E. Rome was still a small city-state on the banks of the Tiber River; yet, within a few hundred years the Romans were on their way toward creating one of the world's most extensive and comprehensive classical empires. Rome's rise to greatness was relatively slow and methodical compared with the achievements of the Athenians and Alexander the Great (356-323 B.C.E.). The Romans first gained control of the Italian peninsula, and later acquired extensive territories bordering the Mediterranean Sea through wars fought against the Carthaginians and the Hellenistic states of the eastern basin. By the late second century B.C.E., Roman political hegemony was firmly established. Polybius (205?-117 B.C.E.), the author of The Histories, hailed from the Greek city of Megalopolis where he had been active in political and military affairs until he was brought as a "hostage" to Rome in 168 B.C.E. While in the great city, he gained the friendship of many prominent Romans and grew to admire Roman political institutions. In the tradition of the Greek historian Thucydides (460?-400 B.C.E.), whose history of the Peloponnesian Wars is still considered a model of historical scholarship, Polybius attempted to understand why a state would succeed or fail as an imperial power. He focused his attention on the development, nature, and efficacy of public institutions. Within the context of his narrative detailing Rome's wars with Carthage, Polybius not only describes various republican institutions but also analyzes Roman virtus. Yet, the author fails to recognize that Rome's state institutions function primarily on the basis of clientage, patronage, and nepotism.

(The Histories of Polybius, Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, trans., Macmillan and Co. [London: 1889], Volume 1, pp. 459-61, 466-67, 468, 469-71, 472, 502-4.)

3. . . . Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds of constitutions, which they designate kingship, aristocracy, democracy. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to them, whether they name these as being the only ones, or as the best. In either guess I think they are wrong.Ý For it is plain that we must regard as the best constitution that which partakes of all these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a constitution--that of Sparta--on this principle. Nor can we admit that these are the only forms: for we have had before now examples of absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume and use, as far as they can, the title of king.Ý Again there have been many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from them as it is possible to be.Ý The same also holds good about democracy.

4.Ý I will illustrate the truth of what I say.Ý We cannot hold every absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the most just and wisest men selected in their merits.Ý Similarly, it is not enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where reverence to the gods, succor of parents, respect to elders, and obedience to laws are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government, the three commonly spoken of which I have mentioned, and three more allied forms, by which I mean despotism, oligarchy, and mob-rule. The first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and adjustment, comes kingship; which degenerating into the evil form allied to it, by which I mean tyranny, both are once more destroyed and aristocracy produced.Ý Again the latter began in the course of nature perverted to oligarchy, and the people passionately avenging the unjust acts of their rulers, democracy comes into existence; which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer mob-rule. No clearer proof of the truth of what I say could be obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis, and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to recur. . . .

9. This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and return again to their original state. If a man has a clear grasp of these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to natural causes will owe its decay. . . .

10.Ý For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject. That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in its nature. For just as rust is the natural solvent of iron, wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves, so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; in aristocracy it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence; and to these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have lately shown, inevitably transformed. . . .

11. As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy or democracy or despotism. And no wonder! For if we confine our observation to the power of the consuls we should be inclined to regard it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a clear case of a democracy. . . .

13. The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and regulates the receipts and reimbursements alike. For the quaestors cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls. The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every lustrum for the repair or construction of public buildings. This money cannot be obtained by the censor except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or willful murder, are in the hands of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed, help or protection to be afforded,--all this is the province of the Senate. Or again, outside of Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty, or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their submission, or finally to proclaim war against them, this too is the business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them, are decided by the Senate. With such business, the people have nothing to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the consuls were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they had with Rome was settled by the Senate.

14.Ý After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has these various functions, especially the control of theÝ receipts and expenditure of the exchequer; and when the consuls, again have absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an absolute authority over the field. There is, however, a part for the people, and it is a most important one. For the people are the sole fountain of honor and of punishment; and it is by these two things and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human society are held together: for where the distinction between them is not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking can be properly administered--as indeed we might expect when good and bad are held in exactly the same honor. The people then are the only court to decide matters of life and death; and even in the cases where the penalty is money, if the sum be assessed is sufficiently serious, and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving special commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at Rome, while sentence is being voted upon--if even only one of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not voted--have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples, Praeneste, or Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement has been duly ratified on oath.

Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which are the most honorable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute power of passing or repealing laws; and, most, important of it all, it is the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or treaties, it is the people who ratify then or the reverse.

These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief power in the state was the people's, and that the constitution was a democracy.

16.Ý As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and it cannot put into execution the penalty for offenses against the republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first ratify its decrees.Ý Similarly even in matters which directly affect the senators--for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate's traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and offices, or even actually cutting down their property--even such cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law. But most important of all is the fact that, if the tribunes interpose their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and above all things to have regard for their wishes: therefore, for all these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot neglect the feelings of the people.

52. The Romans rely on the valor of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that even if the Romans have suffered a defeat, they renew the war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For, as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the Romans, owing to the valor of their men. For although nautical sciences contribute largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favor of victory. The fact is that the Italians as a nation are by nature superior to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but still their habits do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a reputation in their country for valor.

53.Ý Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his funeral the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum to the rostrum, as a raised platform is called there, and sometimes is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely, is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son, if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one of his relations, mounts the rostra and delivers a speech concerning the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes, not only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also who were not; and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a public one affecting the whole people.Ý After the burial and all the usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a wooden canopy or shrine.Ý This likeness consists of a mask made to represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and color. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies, they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple; if he had also celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga embroidered with gold. These representatives also ride themselves in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the dignity of the rank in state enjoyed by the deceased in his lifetime; and on arriving at the rostrum they all take their seats on ivory chairs in their order. There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For we can conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were living and breathing?Ý Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

54.Ý Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die; and the renown of those who have done good service to their country becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the heritage of prosperity.Ý But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare, in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide a whole battle by a single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with their nearest and dearest. There are indeed many stories of this kind, related to many men in Roman history.