

Utility Maximization 2: Extensions

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- We have now proved the following theorem

Theorem

A Choice Correspondence on a finite X has a utility representation
if and only if *it satisfies axioms α and β*

- Great! We know how to test the model of utility maximization!
- However, our theorem is only as useful as the data set we are working with
- As discussed at the time, there are some problems with the data we have assumed so far

- What are some issues with this data set?
- ① Observe choices from all choice sets
- ② We allow for people to choose more than one option!
 - i.e. we allow for data of the form

$$C(\{kitkat, jaffacakes, lays\}) = \{jaffacakes, kitkat\}$$

- ③ X Finite

Choices from all Choice Sets?

- Imagine running an experiment to try and test α and β
- The data that we need is the choice correspondence

$$C : 2^X / \emptyset \rightarrow 2^X / \emptyset$$

- How many choices would we have to observe?
- Lets say $|X| = 10$
 - Need to observe choices from every $A \in 2^X / \emptyset$
 - How big is the power set of X ?
 - If $|X| = 10$ need to observe 1024 choices
 - If $|X| = 20$ need to observe 1048576 choices
- This is not going to work!

Choices from all Choice Sets?

- So how about we forget about the requirement that we observe choices from all choice sets
- Are α and β still enough to guarantee a utility representation?

$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\}$$

$$C(\{y, z\}) = \{y\}$$

$$C(\{x, z\}) = \{z\}$$

- If this is our only data then there is no violation of α or β
- But no utility representation exists!
- We need a different approach!

A Diversion into Order Theory

- In order to do this we are going to have to know a few more things about order theory (the study of binary relations)
- In particular we are going to need some definitions

Definition

A transitive closure of a binary relation R is a binary relation $T(R)$ that is the smallest transitive binary relation that contains R .

- i.e. $T(R)$ is
 - Transitive
 - Contains R in the sense that xRy implies $xT(R)y$
 - Any binary relation that is smaller (in the subset sense) is either intransitive or does not contain R
- Example?

- We can alternatively define the transitive closure of a binary relation R on X as the following:

Remark

- - ① Define $R_0 = R$
 - ② Define R_m as xR_my if there exists $z_1, \dots, z_m \in X$ such that $xRz_1R\dots Rz_mRy$
 - ③ $T = R \cup_{i \in \mathbb{N}} R_m$

Definition

Let \preceq be a preorder on X . An **extension** of \preceq is a preorder \trianglerighteq such that

$$\begin{array}{l} \succ \subset \triangleright \\ \succ \subset \triangleright \end{array}$$

Where

- \succ is the asymmetric part of \preceq , so $x \succ y$ if $x \preceq y$ but not $y \preceq x$
- \triangleright is the asymmetric part of \trianglerighteq , so $x \triangleright y$ if $x \trianglerighteq y$ but not $y \trianglerighteq x$
- Example?

- We are also going to need one theorem

Theorem (Sziplrajn)

For any nonempty set X and preorder \succeq on X there exists a complete preorder that is an extension of \succeq

- Relatively easy to prove if X is finite, but also true for any arbitrary X

- Okay, back to choice
- The approach we are going to take is as follows:
 - Imagine that the model of preference maximization is correct
 - What observations in our data would lead us to conclude that x was preferred to y ?

- We say that x is **directly revealed preferred to** y ($xR^D y$) if, for some choice set A

$$y \in A$$

$$x \in C(A)$$

- We say that x is **revealed preferred to** y (xRy) if we can find a set of alternatives w_1, w_2, \dots, w_n such that
 - x is directly revealed preferred to w_1
 - w_1 is directly revealed preferred to w_2
 - ...
 - w_{n-1} is directly revealed preferred to w_n
 - w_n is directly revealed preferred to y
- I.e. R is the transitive closure of R^D

- We say x is **strictly revealed preferred to** y (xSy) if, for some choice set A

$$y \in A \text{ but not } y \in C(A)$$

$$x \in C(A)$$

- Is it always true that choosing x over y means that you prefer x to y ?
- Almost certainly not
 - Think of a model of 'consideration sets'
- Only true in the context of the model of preference maximization

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference

- Note that we can observe revealed preference and strict revealed preference from the data
- With these definitions we can write an axiom to replace α and β
- What behavior is ruled out by utility maximization?

Definition

A choice correspondence C satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if it is never the case that x is revealed preferred to y , and y is **strictly** revealed preferred to x

- i.e. xRy implies not ySx

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference

Theorem

A choice correspondence C on an arbitrary subset of $2^X / \emptyset$ satisfies GARP if and only if it has a preference representation

Corollary

A choice correspondence C on an arbitrary subset of $2^X / \emptyset$ with X finite satisfies GARP if and only if it has a preference representation

- Note that this data set violates GARP

$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\}$$

$$C(\{y, z\}) = \{y\}$$

$$C(\{x, z\}) = \{z\}$$

- $xR^D y$ and $yR^D z$ so xRz
- But zSx

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference

- **Proof: GARP implies representation**
- First, note that R is transitive (and without loss of generality we can assume it is reflexive)
- Also note that, by GARP, S is the asymmetric part of R
- This means that, by Szpiłrajn's theorem there exists a complete preference relation \succeq such that

$$xRy \text{ implies } x \succeq y$$

$$xSy \text{ implies } x \succ y$$

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference

- All we need to show is that \succeq represents choice, i.e

$$C(A) = \{x \in A \mid x \succeq y \text{ all } y \in A\}$$

- Again, need to show two things

① $x \in C(A) \Rightarrow x \succeq y \text{ all } y \in A$

- This follows from the fact that $x \in C(A) \Rightarrow x R^D y \forall y \in A$
and so $x \succeq y \forall y \in A$

② $x \in A \text{ and } x \succeq y \text{ all } y \in A \Rightarrow x \in C(A)$

- Assume by way of contradiction $x \notin C(A)$, and take $y \in C(A)$
- This implies that $y S x$ and so $y \succ x$ and therefore not $x \succeq y$
- Contradiction