Utility Maximization 2: Extensions

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GR6211 - Microeconomic Analysis 1

• We have now proved the following theorem

Theorem

A Choice Correspondence on a finite X has a utility representation if and only if it satisfies axioms α and β

- Great! We know how to test the model of utility maximization!
- However, our theorem is only as useful as the data set we are working with
- As discussed at the time, there are some problems with the data we have assumed so far

- What are some issues with this data set?
- 1 Observe choices from all choice sets
- 2 We allow for people to choose more than one option
 - i.e. we allow for data of the form

 $C(\{kitkat, jaffacakes, lays\}) = \{jaffacakes, kitkat\}$

3 X Finite

• So far we have assumed that the set of available alternatives is finite

Theorem

A Choice Correspondence on a finite X has a utility representation if and only if it satisfies axioms α and β

- However, this may be limiting
 - Choice from lotteries
 - Choice from budget sets
- Can we drop the word 'finite' from the above theorem?

- Remember we proved the theorem in three steps

 - 2 Show that if the preferences are complete, transitive and reflexive then we can find a utility function *u* which represents them
 - 3 Show that if the data has a utility representation then it must satisfy α and β
- Where did we make use of finiteness?

- In fact the problems relating choice to preference maximization are relatively minor
- The main issue here is that, if we want to define choice on **all** subsets of X we cannot guarantee that

$$C(A) = \{x \in A | x \succeq y \text{ for all } y \in A\}$$

is well defined

- Example?
- But we can get round this relatively easily
 - For example by demanding that we only observe choices from **finite** subsets of *X*
 - Even if X itself is not finite
 - As we shall see later we may be able to do better than this

- What about the relationship between preference and utility?
- Here in the proof we made heavy use of finiteness
 - Induction
- Are we in trouble?
- Just because we made use of the fact that X was finite in that particular proof doesn't mean that it is necessary for the statement to be true
- Maybe we will be lucky and the statement remains true for arbitrary X....
- Sadly not

• Some definitions you should know

Definition

The natural, or counting numbers, denoted by $\mathbb{N},$ are the set of numbers $\{1,2,3,\ldots..\}$

Definition

The integers, denoted by \mathbb{Z} , are the set of numbers

$$\{\ldots, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, \ldots\}$$

Definition

The rational numbers, denoted by \mathbb{Q} , are the set of numbers

$$\mathbb{Q}=\left\{rac{\mathsf{a}}{b}|\mathsf{a}\in\mathbb{Z},\ b\in\mathbb{N}
ight\}$$

Definition

A set is *countably infinite* if there is a bijection between that set and the natural numbers

- Here are some properties of Q and \mathbb{R} .
- ℚ is countable
- ${f 2}$ ${\Bbb R}$ is uncountable
- **3** For every $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ such that a < b, there exists a $c \in \mathbb{Q}$ such a < c < b (i.e. \mathbb{Q} is dense in \mathbb{R})

Lexicographic Preferences

$\begin{array}{l} \mbox{Definition} \\ \mbox{Let} \succeq \mbox{be a binary relation on } \mathbb{R} \times \{1,2\} \mbox{ such that} \end{array}$

$$\begin{array}{rcl} \{a,b\} &\succeq & \{c,d\} \text{ iff} \\ (i) & a &> & c \\ \text{or (ii) } a &= & c \text{ and } b \geq d \end{array}$$

You should check that you agree that \succeq is a complete preference relation.

Fact

There is no utility function that rationalizes \succeq .

Utility Representation with Non-Finite X

- So what can we do in order to ensure that preferences have a utility representation?
- First things first: how big is the problem?
- The counter example above made use of the fact that X was uncountable
- Does this mean the problem goes away if X is **countably** finite?
- It turns out the answer is yes

Utility Representation with Countable X

Theorem

If a relation \succeq on a **countable** X is complete, transitive and reflexive then there exists a utility function $u : X \to \mathbb{R}$ which represents \succeq , i.e.

$$u(x) \ge u(y) \Longleftrightarrow x \succeq y$$

Utility Representation with Uncountable X

- We know from the example of lexicographic preferences that we cannot replace 'countable' with 'any' X in the previous theorem
- In order to guarantee that we have a utility representation of a preference relation on an uncountable X we need another condition



- One way to go is to insist that preferences are **continuous**
- Broadly speaking, this means that if we change the items a little bit the preferences also change only a little bit
- i.e. they don't 'jump'

Definition

We say that a preference relation \succeq on a **metric space** X is continuous if, for any $x, y \in X$ such that $x \succ y$, there exists an $\varepsilon > 0$ such that, for any $x' \in B(x, \varepsilon)$ and $y' \in B(y, \varepsilon), x' \succ y'$

- Examples of preferences that are not continuous?
 - Lexicographic preferences
 - 'The price is right'

• An alternative characterization of continuity:

Lemma

A preference relation \succeq on a metric space X is continuous if and only if, for every $x, y \in X$ and sequence $\{x_n, y_n\}$ such that $x_n \to x$ and $y_n \to y$ then $x_n \succeq y_n \forall n$ implies $x \succeq y$

- i.e. the graph of \succeq is closed
- You will prove for homework that these two definitions are equivalent



• One thing that is relatively easy to prove is that continuity of utility implies continuity of preference

Theorem

If a preference relation \succeq can be represented by a continuous utility function then it is continuous

Debreu's Theorem

• One of the most famous theorems in mathematical social sciences is that continuity guarantees the existence of a continuous utility representation

Theorem (Debreu)

Let X be a separable metric space, and \succeq be a complete preference relation on X. If \succeq is continuous, then it can be represented by a continuous utility function.

• Proving this in all its glory is beyond us, so we are going to prove something weaker

Theorem

Let X be a convex subset of \mathbb{R}^n and \succeq be a complete preference relation on X. If \succeq is continuous, then it can be represented by a utility function.

- So now we have a method of dealing with utility and preferences in uncountable domains
- What about choice?
- Here we now have two issues
 - We need to guarantee that maximal elements exist in all choice sets
 - **2** We would like to make sure the preferences that represent choices are continuous

- To deal with problem 1 we will restrict ourselves to **compact** subsets of *X*
- Notice that if we can guarantee continuous preferences then this solves the first problem
 - Continuous preferences are equivalent to continuous utility functions
 - Continuous functions on compact sets obtain their maximum
- So how can we guarantee choice can be represented by continuous preferences?
- We would like choices to be continuous!
 - Choice sets that are 'close' to each other give rise to 'similar' choices

- How can we make this formal?
- We need a metric on sets!

Definition (The Hausdorff metric)

Let (X, d) be a metric space, and cb(X) be the set of all closed and bounded subsets of X. We will define the metric space $(cb(X), d^h)$, where d^h is the Hausdorff metric induced by d, and is defined as follows: For any $A, B \in cb(X)$, define $\Lambda(A, B)$ as $\sup_{x \in A} d(x, B)$. Now define

$$d^{H}(A,B)= ext{max}\left\{\Lambda(A,B),\Lambda(B,A)
ight\}$$

The Hausdorff Metric

• We can use this to define a **continuous choice correspondence**

Definition

Let X be a compact metric space and Ω_X be the set of all closed subsets of X and $C: \Omega_X \to 2^X$ be a choice correspondence. If $S_m \to S$ for $S_m, S \in \Omega_X, x_m \in C(S_m) \forall m \text{ and } x_m \to x$, implies that $x \in C(S)$, then we say C is continuous.

• It turns out that continuity, plus α and $\beta,$ is enough to give us our desired results

Theorem

Let X be a compact metric space and Ω_X be the set of all closed subsets of X and $C : \Omega_X \to 2^X$ be a choice correspondence. C satisfies properties α , β and continuity if and only if there is a complete, continuous preference relation \succeq on X that rationalizes C.

- Imagine running an experiment to try and test α and β
- The data that we need is the choice correspondence

$$C: 2^X / \emptyset \to 2^X / \emptyset$$

- How many choices would we have to observe?
- Lets say |X| = 10
 - Need to observe choices from every $A \in 2^X / \emptyset$
 - How big is the power set of X?
 - If |X| = 10 need to observe 1024 choices
 - If |X| = 20 need to observe 1048576 choices
- This is not going to work!

- So how about we forget about the requirement that we observe choices from all choice sets
- Are α and β still enough to guarantee a utility representation?

$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\} C(\{y, z\}) = \{y\} C(\{x, z\}) = \{z\}$$

- If this is our only data then there is no violation of α or β
- But no utility representation exists!
- We need a different approach!

A Diversion into Order Theory

- In order to do this we are going to have to know a few more things about order theory (the study of binary relations)
- In particular we are going to need some definitions

Definition

A transitive closure of a binary relation R is a binary relation T(R) that is the smallest transitive binary relation that contains R.

- i.e. *T*(*R*) is
 - Transitive
 - Contains R in the sense that xRy implies xT(R)y
 - Any binary relation that is smaller (in the subset sense) is either intransitive or does not contain R
- Example?
- Question: is this always well defined?

• We can alternatively define the transitive closure of a binary relation *R* on *X* as the following:

Remark

Define R₀ = R
Define R_m as xR_my if there exists z₁, ..., z_m ∈ X such that xRz₁R...Rz_mRy
T = R ∪_{i∈ℕ} R_m

A Diversion into Order Theory

Definition

Let \succeq be a preorder on X. An **extension** of \succeq is a preorder \trianglerighteq such that

$$\succeq$$
 $\subset \trianglerighteq$
 \succ $\subset \bowtie$

Where

- \succ is the asymmetric part of \succeq , so $x \succ y$ if $x \succeq y$ but not $y \succeq x$
- ▷ is the asymmetric part of ⊵, so x ▷ y if x ⊵ y but not y ⊵ x

• Example?

• We are also going to need one theorem

Theorem (Sziplrajn)

For any nonempty set X and preorder \succeq on X there exists a complete preorder that is an extension of \succeq

 Relatively easy to prove if X is finite, but also true for any arbitrary X

- Okay, back to choice
- The approach we are going to take is as follows:
 - Imagine that the model of preference maximization is correct
 - What observations in our data would lead us to conclude that x was preferred to y?

• We say that x is **directly revealed preferred to** y (xR^Dy) if, for some choice set A

$$y \in A$$

 $x \in C(A)$

- We say that x is **revealed preferred to** y (xRy) if we can find a set of alternatives w₁, w₂,w_n such that
 - x is directly revealed preferred to w₁
 - w1 is directly revealed preferred to w2
 - ...
 - w_{n-1} is directly revealed preferred to w_n
 - w_n is directly revealed preferred to y
- I.e. R is the transitive closure of R^D

• We say x is **strictly revealed preferred to** y (xSy) if, for some choice set A

$$y \in A$$
 but not $y \in C(A)$
 $x \in C(A)$

- Is it always true that choosing x over y means that you prefer x to y?
- Almost certainly not
 - Think of a model of 'consideration sets'
- Only true in the context of the model of preference maximization

The Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference

- Note that we can observe revealed preference and strict revealed preference from the data
- With these definitions we can write an axiom to replace α and β
- What behavior is ruled out by utility maximization?

Definition

A choice correspondence C satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if it is never the case that x is revealed preferred to y, and y is **strictly** revealed preferred to x

• i.e. *xRy* implies not *ySx*

Theorem

A choice correspondence C on an arbitrary subset of $2^X / \oslash$ satisfies GARP if and only if it has a preference representation

Corollary

A choice correspondence C on an arbitrary subset of $2^X / \odot$ with X finite satisfies GARP if and only if it has a utility representation

• Note that this data set violates GARP

$$C(\{x, y\}) = \{x\} \\ C(\{y, z\}) = \{y\} \\ C(\{x, z\}) = \{z\}$$

- xR^Dy and yR^Dz so xRz
- But *zSx*

Choice Correspondence?

- Another weird thing about our data is that we assumed we could observe a choice **correspondence**
 - Multiple alternatives can be chosen in each choice problem
- This is not an easy thing to do!
- What about if we only get to observe a choice function?
 - Only one option chosen in each choice problem
- How do we deal with indifference?

• One of the things we could do is assume that the decision maker chooses **one of** the best options

$$C(A) \in \arg \max_{x \in A} u(x)$$

- Is this going to work?
- No!
- Any data set can be represented by this model
 - Why?
 - We can just assume that all alternatives have the same utility!

Choice Correspondence?

• Another thing we can do is assume away indifference

$$C(A) = \arg \max_{x \in A} u(x)$$

- for some one-to-one function *u*
- Is this going to work?
- Yes
 - Implies that data is a function
 - Property α (or GARP) will be necessary and sufficient (if X is finite)
- But maybe we don't **want** to rule out indifference!
 - Maybe people are sometimes indifferent!

Choice from Budget Sets


- Need some way of identifying when an alternative x is **better than** alternative y
 - i.e. some way to identify strict preference
- One case in which we can do this is if our data comes from people choosing **consumption bundles** from **budget sets**
 - Should be familiar from previous economics courses
- The objects that the DM has to choose between are bundles of different commodities

$$x = \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ \vdots \\ x_n \end{pmatrix}$$

• And they can choose any bundle which satisfies their budget constraint

$$\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}^n_+ | \sum_{i=1}^n p_i x_i \leq I\right\}$$

Choice from Budget Sets




- Claim: We can use choice from budget sets to identify strict preference
 - Even if we only see a single bundle chosen from each budget set
- As long as we assume something about how preferences work
- One example: More is better

 $\begin{array}{rrrr} x_n & \geq & y_n \mbox{ for all } n \mbox{ and } x_n > y_n \mbox{ for some } n \\ \mbox{implies that } x & \succ & y \end{array}$

• i.e. preferences are strictly monotonic

Monotonicity




• Claim: if p^x is the prices at which the bundle x was chosen

$$p^{x}x > p^{x}y$$
 implies $x \succ y$


• Why?

Revealed Strictly Preferred



- Because x was chosen, we know $x \succeq y$
- Because p^xx > p^xy we know that y was inside the budget set when x was chosen
- Could it be that $y \succeq x$?

Revealed Strictly Preferred



- Because y is inside the budget set, there is a z which is better than y and affordable when x was chosen
- Implies that $x \succeq z$ and (by monotonicity) $z \succ y$
- By transitivity $x \succ y$

Revealed Strictly Preferred

• In fact we can make use of a weaker property than strict monotonicity

Definition

We say preferences \succeq are **locally non-satiated** on a metric space X if, for every $x \in X$ and $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists

 $y \in B(x, \varepsilon)$ such that $y \succ x$

Lemma

Let x^{j} and x^{k} be two commodity bundles such that $p^{j}x^{k} < p^{j}x^{j}$. If the DM's choices can be rationalized by a complete locally non-satiated preference relation, then it must be the case that $x^{j} \succ x^{k}$

- When dealing with choice from budget sets we say
 - x is directly revealed preferred to y if $p^{x}x \ge p^{x}y$
 - x is **revealed preferred to** y if we can find a set of alternatives w₁, w₂,w_n such that
 - x is directly revealed preferred to w₁
 - w_1 is directly revealed preferred to w_2
 - ...
 - w_{n-1} is directly revealed preferred to w_n
 - w_n is directly revealed preferred to y
 - x is strictly revealed preferred to y if $p^{x}x > p^{x}y$

Theorem (Afriat)

Let $\{x^1, \dots, x^l\}$ be a set of chosen commodity bundles at prices $\{p^1, \dots, p^l\}$. The following statements are equivalent:

- In the data set can be rationalized by a locally non-satiated set of preferences ≥ that can be represented by a utility function
- **2** The data set satisfies GARP (i.e. xRy implies not ySx)
- **3** There exists positive $\left\{u^{i}, \lambda^{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{l}$ such that

$$u^{i} \leq u^{j} + \lambda^{j} p^{j} (x^{i} - x^{j}) \forall i, j$$

There exists a continuous, concave, piecewise linear, strictly monotonic utility function u that rationalizes the data

Things to note about Afriat's Theorem

- Compare statement 1 and statement 4
 - The data set can be rationalized by a locally non-satiated set of preferences
 <u>≻</u> that can be represented by a utility function
 - There exists a continuous, concave, piecewise linear, strictly monotonic utility function *u* that rationalizes the data
- This tells us that there is no empirical content to the assumptions that utility is
 - Continuous
 - Concave
 - Piecewise linear
- If a data set can be rationalized by any locally non-satiated set of preferences it can be rationalized by a utility function which has these properties

• What about statement 3?

• There exists positive
$$\left\{u^{i},\lambda^{i}\right\}_{i=1}^{I}$$
 such that

$$u^{i} \leq u^{j} + \lambda^{j} p^{j} (x^{i} - x^{j}) \ \forall \ i, j$$

- This says that the data is rationalizable if a certain linear programming problem has a solution
 - Easy to check computationally
 - Less insight than GARP
 - But there are some models which do not have an equivalent of GARP but do have an equivalent of these conditions

Things to note about Afriat's Theorem

- Where do these conditions come from?
- Imagine that we knew that this problem was differentiable

$$\max u(x)$$
 subject to $\sum_j p_j^i x_j \leq I$

with *u* concave

• FOC for every problem *i* and good *j*

$$\frac{\partial u(x^i)}{\partial x^i_j} = \lambda^i p^i_j$$

Implies

$$\nabla u(x^i) = \lambda^i p^i$$

 where ∇u is the gradient function, pⁱ is the vector of prices and λⁱ the lagrnge multiplier • Recall (or learn), that for concave functions

$$u(x^{i}) \leq u(x^{j}) + \nabla u(x^{j})(x^{i} - x^{i})$$

- i.e. function lies below the tangent
- So

$$u(x^i) \leq u(x^j) + \lambda^j p^j (x^i - x^j)$$