36                                 Joseph H. Snrith

opinion in Beers v. Hotchkiss in 1931, declared that this action of
the Assembly, lacking the concurrence of the Governor or Coun¬
cil, was without the force of law and that the minutes of the Su¬
preme Court after 1691 showed resort to both the Dongan Laws
and the Duke's Laws. Since none of the collected laws of colonial
New York included either the Dongan Laws or the Duke's Laws
(lending credence to the contention that they were not in force
after 1691), Chambers would have had to rely upon a manuscript
copy. We can assume that Chambers would have had some use, if
not a great deal, for his copy of the Duke's Laws.

Two other matters require some mention. Under the Duke's in¬
structions to Governor Nicolls all laws not approved within one
year were to become void. Few, if any, appear to have received
such approval, yet we have found no challenge made to the validity
of the basic laws or any amendments or additions thereto. Sec¬
ondly, on at least two occasions Nicolls promulgated amendments
and additions to the laws of March i, 1664/5, without the concur¬
rence of the Court of Assize. Did the governor have authority to
make amendments and additions to the laws without confirmation
at the Court of Assize? We believe that Nicolls had such authority
but political expediency limited its use.

In closing we think it appropriate to set forth an evaluation of
the Duke's Laws made by George H. Moore, Librarian of The
New-York Historical Society in the 186os and an early smdent of
the Laws:

Their importance to the lawyer as well as the historian is obvious, for
they are the basis of all subsequent legislation in respect to the subjects
to which they relate. They tend to show the progressive state of our
laws, with the various changes they have undergone from the com¬
mencement, and serve to throw light on the hi,storical ttansactions of
the colonial period.