Gkokge Louis Beer
 

istered by the victorious powers. Beer soon man¬
aged to gain the trust of important members of the
British, French, and Italian delegations, and
became one of the few insiders whose influence
rivaled that of some of the foreign ministers of the
major Allied powers. Shotwell, comparing his own
"rather desultory" work at Versailles on interna¬
tional labor legislation with that of Beer, had writ¬
ten to his wife injanuary 1919 that "Beer is really
playing a very important role. He was in a position
to do what I could never have got through. He is
in the secret sessions, and I see him after each one,
and we talk of the weather. He is really quite dis¬
creet."

Beer was already well-known as a prize-winning
historian and a commentator on British-American
relations, when the United States entered World
War I in April 1917. From the outbreak of the war
in Europe in August 1914, Beer abruptiy shifted
his interest from British colonial policy before the
American Revolution to the promotion of British-
American cooperation during the current crisis
and thereafter He never considered himself a pro¬
pagandist; rather, he believed that the long-stand¬
ing antagonism between Britain and the United
States had begun out of a historical misunder¬
standing of the British colonial system and the sub¬
sequent willingness of American politicians to
"twist the lion's tail" whenever it suited them.

Like many historians of his day, he thought he
had reached his conclusions "scientifically," that is,
through the most rigorous examination and inter¬
pretation of original documents. Then, at
Versailles, he saw the opportunity for the two great
English-speaking nations to serve as trustees of the
native peoples of Africa and the Middle East com¬
mitted to their care. Lord Milner, his British C(mii-
 

lerpart at Versailles, considered Beer one of the
few Americans who understood the sincerity and
complexity of modern British imperialism.
Indeed, there were great risks and responsibilities
assumed by the mandatory powers as they assisted
less developed regions toward eventual self-gover¬
nance. Beer refused to embrace the American ten¬
dency to idealize small nations. Small nations
threatened petty wars and petty wars could quickly
become great ones. These were the practical con¬
sequences of excessive concern for sovereignty.
Besides, the League of Nations would ensure that
the mandator)' powers adhere to the terms of their
mandates. It all made sense to Beer, regardless of
what the critics of British imperialism or the new
mandate system might say.

The Covenant of the League of Nations that
emerged from Versailles was not exactiy what Beer
had in mind. It failed, mainly, to include a provi¬
sion for automatically recurring conferences to
deal with specific issues, such as the arms and alco¬
hol trade in Africa and the atrocities in the Belgian
Congo. For Beer, the conferences were more
important than the idea of a world parliament,
which would soon experience either the problem
of minor countries blocking action or domination
bv the major powers. Shortcomings notwithstand¬
ing, the League was still the agency to extend the
principles of British-American civilization to the
obscure corners of die world.

Sir Eric Druniniond, first secretary general of
the League, wasted no time in appointing Beer as
commissioner of the mandate section of the
League. A renowned scholar, a man of affairs who
had  successfully managed  his father's  tobacco
 

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