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would have suggested that, because, as far as I recall, everybody in the Pentagon from the top down, or McNamara, was in favor of our going all out, as much as possible, escalation and bombing and all the super bombing. But not with the idea that that would lead to a nuclear confrontation.

Was there ever a point, say, after there were maybe unofficial reports in mid '65 or the fall of '65 that 100,000 troops were there -- Was there ever a point at which you did think that -- even considered thinking that withdrawal was the right thing to do, strategically?

In that?

Was there ever a point in which you thought that perhaps the U.S. troops should withdraw substantially?

Well, our position was fundamentally that we should not be increasing the numbers of American troops, combat troops, in Vietnam. Obviously, once they were there, in increasing numbers, it was very difficult to see any way to withdraw them without a negotiation, a negotiated peace with the Vietnamese. Now, of course, by this time, Johnson and [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk were arguing, that they were doing everything possible to achieve a negotiation. I didn't think -- and the people who felt the way I did didn't think -- that we were really doing nearly enough while recognizing that the Vietcong were getting harder and harder to negotiate with. But we didn't feel the administration was doing enough to reach a real negotiation. And we came to feel that we even, to achieve a negotiation, we, the U.S., had to face some things that at one time seemed extremely unpalatable, that is, recognition of North Vietnam as being absolutely a free state. But it's