The Amateur
Computerist
Spring 2013 Netizen Journalism and the Crisis in Syria Volume 23 No. 1
Table of Contents
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 1
SC Vote Challenges Hidden Agenda on Syria. . . . . . . . . Page 2
Lessons from SC Implementation of RES 1973 . . . . . . . Page 7
AL Observer Report Corrects Media Narratives . . . . . . Page 10
Defending UN Charter by Use of Veto.. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Using UN GA to Endorse Regime Change.. . . . . . . . . . Page 15
UN Charter and Kofi Annan’s Role in Syria . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Struggle against Parallel Track to Annan Plan . . . . . . . Page 21
SC Approves 90 day Observer Mission .. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
“We Need Eyes and Ears on the Ground”. . . . . . . . . . . Page 26
UN and Houla: The Information Battlefield. . . . . . . . . . Page 27
Journalism in the Era of the Netizen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 31
Why is the UNSMIS Houla Report Missing?. . . . . . . . . Page 35
Introduction
“Each generation has to solve its own prob-
lems. The sit-down generation solved the
problem of organization. The postwar genera-
tion solved the problem of pensions and
inflation. Not entirely, but a good start was
begun. The present generation is faced with
the greatest problems of all. They are Auto-
mation, Peace and Politics.”
(from The Searchlight (newspaper of UAW
Local 659, Flint, MI), April 21, 1960, p. 2).*
This is what one of the pioneers of the American
labor movement Jack Palmer wrote when he retired.
Significantly, this issue of the Amateur Computer-
ist is the 50
th
issue of the publication which was started
25 years ago in 1988. The current issue is dedicated to
exploring the nature of netizen journalism and its
potential to provide for a more accurate consideration
of situations in the news.
This issue includes a number of articles covering
how the UN Security Council has responded to the
conflict in Syria in the time period beginning on
October 4, 2011 through September 28, 2012. The
significance of the set of articles covering this time
period is to provide some perspective on the actions of
the Security Council in connection with Syria.
The mainstream western media narrative claims
that two permanent members of the Security Council
have impeded cooperative activity to stop the killings
and violence in Syria.
The set of articles in this issue presents a very
different picture of the actions of the Security Council
with respect to Syria. A more accurate narrative
emerges from considering the actual activities of the
Security Council during this period. By October 4,
2011, two draft resolutions had been introduced into
the Security Council. One resolution encouraged the
Syrian government to implement reforms and it
condemned extremist violence against the Syrian
government and people.
The second resolution condemned the actions of
the Syrian government without also seeking to stop the
foreign intervention by other nations sending weapons
and mercenaries into Syria and thereby encouraging
attacks against the government, civilians and infra-
structure of Syria. This second resolution portrayed the
government of Syria as the whole problem and gave
support to extremist violence.
Only the second resolution was brought to a vote
by members of the Security Council, leading to a veto
of this resolution by two permanent members of the
Security Council. Had this second resolution been
passed it would have served to fan the violent attacks
on the Syrian government, people and infrastructure.
Such actions are contrary to the role of the Security
Council as provided for in the UN Charter.
A problem of the Security Council is demon-
strated by the way that the second resolution support-
ing violent attacks against the sovereignty and people
of a member nation of the UN was put to a vote. It was
Webpage: http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/
Page 1
clear there was disagreement with the resolution and
that it would be vetoed but was put to a vote for
political purposes rather than the Charter purpose of
peace and security.
Support for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in
Syria which is in accord with the UN charter requires
condemnation of foreign intervention into the internal
affairs of a member state. The problem, however, is
not merely those nations fueling the armed insurgency
and who are trying to overthrow the government of
Syria. The problem is also that there is a mainstream
media that broadcasts the false narrative of an alleged
evil Syrian government. This false narrative is pre-
sented by the NATO members of the UN Security
Council and aids their quest to carry out regime change
in Syria despite what the majority of the Syrian people
desire, or what the principles of the UN Charter
require.
The mainstream media which broadcasts this false
framing is essentially a media supporting a NATO
dominated restructuring of the Middle East. A nation
like Syria which provided a challenge to the Israeli and
NATO domination of the region is henceforth a target,
both as a warning to other nations not to object to the
geopolitical designs of the NATO powers, and as an
encouragement to the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) nations for their goal of replacing a secular
Syria.
The western media claims of nonexistent weapons
of mass destruction in Iraq in the period leading up to
the March 2003 U.S. and British invasion of Iraq
paved the way for the invasion. The false claims of
alleged weapons also demonstrated that along with a
military invasion of a country, there will be the false
media claims demonizing the government of the nation
to be invaded. To have a more peaceful world, there is
a need to be able to effectively and conscientiously
counter not only the military acts of aggression but
also the false media misrepresentations of the aggres-
sion.
The articles in this issue of the Amateur
Computerist are an effort to propose examples of
netizen journalism to help to not only expose the false
narratives being presented, but also to establish what
is the accurate narrative that is being hidden by the
military maneuvers and its manipulative media cover-
age.
In the article in this issue, “The United Nations
and Journalism in the Era of the Netizen” there is a
reference to a talk by the current Prime Minister of the
Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, describing the
media campaign against the government of Syria.
Medvedev sees that the “mass media manipulation of
public opinion” has become a “tool in international
relations.” This is a problem that he explains poses a
serious security dimension and it must be recognized
and provisions made to counter this danger.
While Medvedev discusses the problem, we
recognize the importance of creating a netizen media
that will provide a means to help solve this problem.
The goal of the Amateur Computerist is not only to
expose the problem of the false narratives and media
manipulation, but to help demonstrate the kind of
netizen media needed as a counter narrative.
-----------
* http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/text/article_from_vol_1.txt
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Oct 27, 2011 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/10/27/security_
council_veto_on_syria/]
UN Security Council Vote
Challenges Hidden Agenda
on Syria
by Ronda Hauben
I – Introduction
On Tuesday, October 4, the UN Security Council
announced it would take up a draft resolution on Syria.
This meeting was to be an instance, when the lessons
some Security Council members had drawn from the
experience with the resolutions on Libya could be
reflected in their action on a draft resolution against
Syria.
Several weeks earlier, journalists had been told
that there were two different draft resolutions about
Syria tabled at the Security Council.
One draft resolution on Syria had been proposed
by Russia and China. Russia and China said their
resolution had been designed to encourage a peaceful
process to help the Syrian government deal both with
its stated desire for reforms and with the extremist
violence against the Syrian government that was
making such reform difficult.
Page 2
The other draft resolution was tabled by four of
the European members of the Security Council –
France, U.K., Germany and Portugal.
1
This draft
condemned the actions of the Syrian government. It
did not oppose foreign intervention into Syria’s do-
mestic affairs. The European draft called on all states
to deny the Syrian government arms, but made no such
call to deny weapons to the armed opposition.
The European draft framed the problem as the
Syrian government, similar to how Resolution 1973
framed the problem in Libya as being due to the
government guided by Muammar Gaddafi.
Coming to the stakeout area where the journalists
were congregated, the four European Security Council
members informed journalists that they had called for
a vote on their resolution that evening at a meeting
scheduled to start at 6:00 p.m.
II – The Security Council Vote on the
European Draft Resolution
At 6:20 p.m., the Nigerian Ambassador U. Joy
Ogwu, as the President of the Security Council for the
month of October, opened the meeting.
2
Under Rule 37
of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security
Council, she invited the Syrian UN Ambassador
Bashar Ja’afari to participate in the meeting.
3
The Security Council President called for a vote
on the European draft resolution. No members spoke
before the vote.
There were nine votes in favor of the resolution,
two votes opposed and four abstentions. Voting in
favor of the draft resolution were Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Colombia, France, Gabon, Germany, Nigeria, Portu-
gal, the U.K., and the U.S. Voting against were China
and Russia. Abstaining were Brazil, India, Lebanon
and South Africa. The ‘no’ votes by China and Russia,
as permanent members of the Security Council,
represented a double veto of the European draft
resolution. The European draft resolution failed to
pass.
III – Comments by Nations Voting ‘No’ on
the Resolution
What was different in this situation from the vote
on Security Council Resolution 1973 about Libya, is
that instead of the two permanent members Russia and
China abstaining, as they had done on the Libyan
resolution in March, this time they both voted ‘no’.
Russian Federation UN Ambassador Vitaly
Churkin explained his vote. He said that working with
China, Russia had prepared a draft resolution which
was supported by Brazil, India and South Africa. The
fundamental philosophy of the draft resolution he had
worked on, he explained, was to support a respect for
the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
Syria, and the principle of non-intervention in its
internal affairs. These are key principles of the UN
Charter. Such an effort, he argued, necessitated the
need to refrain from confrontation. There should be no
threats, ultimatums, or sanctions against the Syrian
government.
“The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the
Council separately from the Libyan experience,”
Ambassador Churkin said. (Transcript, p. 4) He
referred to the alarm expressed in the international
community at NATO statements that Security Council
resolutions on Libya provided a model for future
actions by NATO.
Churkin specifically pointed to how the language
of Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya was turned
into its opposite by some members of the Council. The
language calling for a quick cease-fire, he said was
turned into a full-fledged civil war. The provision of a
no-fly zone, he explained, “has morphed into the
bombing of (Libyan) oil refineries, television stations
and other civilian sites.” (Transcript, p. 4) The arms
embargo was used as a pretext for a naval blockade
affecting humanitarian goods. The call to prevent a
tragedy in Benghazi led to a tragedy in Sirte and Bani
Walid, observed the Ambassador.
Though Churkin did not present a specific descrip-
tion of this tragedy, NATO bombing campaigns were
being waged against civilians in Bani Walid and Sirte,
even as the Council met. “These types of models
should be excluded from global practices once and for
all,” said Churkin.
One of the reasons Churkin gave for voting
against the European draft, was that those writing the
resolution had refused to build in a prohibition against
foreign intervention into the Syrian conflict. “Our
proposals for wording on the non-acceptability of
foreign intervention were not taken into account and,
based on the well-known events in North Africa that
can only put us on our guard,” Churkin told the Coun-
cil.
While the Russian Ambassador condemned Syrian
government repression of non-violent demonstrations,
he also pointed to the need to condemn the extremists’
violent actions against the Syrian government taken
Page 3
outside the law and aimed at gaining foreign sponsors
for their actions. Churkin offered to continue to work
on the Russian-Chinese draft resolution to support a
process toward a peaceful resolution of the internal
Syrian conflict.
China’s UN Ambassador Li Baodong, explaining
his own vote against the European draft resolution,
called on all parties in Syria to avoid violence.
Whether the Security Council takes further action on
the question of Syria, he said, should depend on
whether such action would facilitate the easing of
tension in Syria, help to defuse differences through
political dialogue, and contribute to the maintenance of
peace and stability in the Middle East.
Important for China was whether the Security
Council’s efforts comply with the UN Charter and the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
states, “which has a bearing upon the security and
survival of developing countries, in particular small
and medium sized countries,” Ambassador Li told the
Security Council.
China’s Ambassador reminded the Council that
there were two draft resolutions, one of which China
supported because “it advocates respect for the sover-
eignty of Syria and resolving the crisis through politi-
cal dialogue.” The other draft, the one that was voted
down, focused “solely on exerting pressure on Syria,
even threatening to impose sanctions,” he explained.
IV – Nations Abstaining Explain their Vote
The four nations that had abstained also spoke to
the Council about the reasons for their votes.
The Indian Ambassador, Hardeep Singh Puri,
explained that states have an obligation “to respect the
fundamental aspirations and respond to the grievances”
of their people. (Transcript, p. 6) “At the same time,”
he said, “states also have the obligation to protect their
citizens from armed groups and militants.” Clarifying
his concern, he said, “While the right of people to
protest peacefully is to be respected, states cannot but
take appropriate action when militant groups – heavily
armed – resort to violence against State authority and
infrastructure.”
He saw the need for “the international commu-
nity” to give “time and space for the Syrian govern-
ment to implement far-reaching reform measures they
have announced.” For this to happen, he proposed, it is
necessary “that the opposition forces in Syria give up
the path of armed insurrection and engage construc-
tively with the authorities.”
The Indian Ambassador cautioned that the interna-
tional community should “not complicate the situation
by threats of sanctions, regime change, et cetera.”
Ambassador Basu Sagqu of South Africa ex-
plained his nation’s abstention. He observed, “We
have seen recently that Security Council resolutions
have been abused, and that their implementation has
gone far beyond the mandate of what was intended.”
(Transcript, p. 11)
He questioned whether the plans of the European
sponsors of the draft resolution were not part of “a
hidden agenda aimed at once again instituting regime
change which has been an objective clearly stated by
some.” He referred to the rejection by the European
Security Council members of “language that clearly
excluded the possibility of military intervention in the
resolution….” He proposed that, “the Security Council
should proceed with caution on Syria lest we exacer-
bate an already volatile situation.”
Lebanon’s Ambassador Nawwaf Salam said his
country had abstained to defend Syria’s right to
sovereignty and “the integrity of its people and land”
and in protection of Syria’s unity and stability. (Tran-
script, p. 9)
Explaining why her nation abstained from voting
for the draft resolution, Ambassador Maria Luiza
Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil said that the European draft
resolution had been rushed to a vote rather than
allowing the needed time to accommodate the serious
concerns raised by members about it. (Transcript, p.
11-12)
V – Votes of Nations Sponsoring the Draft
Resolution
Explaining their votes in favor of the resolution,
France, the U.K., Germany and Portugal portrayed
what is happening in Syria mainly as a movement for
“freedom and democracy” essentially denying that
there have been violent attacks against the Syrian
government or foreign intervention which encourages
these attacks. Their response to the concerns raised by
Russia and China and other Council members was to
dismiss the issues that they raised. The four European
members brought their draft resolution to a vote
without resolving the disagreements. While it is likely
they had anticipated a veto, they claimed to be sur-
prised at the results of the vote. U.K. Ambassador Sir
Mark Lyall Grant maintained that their text “contained
nothing that any member of this Council should have
Page 4
felt the need to oppose.” (Transcript, p. 7)
VI – Other Council Members Voting in
Favor Draft Resolution
The U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said that the
U.S. was “outraged” by the action of the Council.
(Transcript, p. 8) The U.S. offered no specific re-
sponses to concerns raised by other council members
about the resolution, such as Ambassador Churkin’s
concern about how the words of the Libyan resolution
were turned into their opposites, or the South African
concern that the draft European resolution on Syria
would be used for actions far beyond any mandates
intended by all members of the Council. Ambassador
Rice merely said that the resolution against Syria was
“not about military intervention” or about Libya.
Nowhere in her comments was there any response
to the problem other Council members raised about
alleged foreign intervention, like that of Turkey and
other states which are repeating with Syria the pattern
of what NATO nations had done in the case of Libya.
Colombia and Bosnia expressed their support for the
resolution condemning the Syrian government. Gabon
and Nigeria did not speak to explain why they voted in
favor of the European resolution.
VII – Syrian Comments to the Council
After all of the Council members who had asked
to speak, had been given the floor, Syrian Ambassador
Ja’afari was called on to present his comments to the
Council. It is the usual Security Council practice to
allow a UN member with a material interest in an issue
being considered, to present its position, but only after
a vote is taken.
The Syrian Ambassador proposed that the reason
the NATO countries are targeting his country for
hostile action is not because of any humanitarian
concerns. The basis for their hostile actions, he said, is
“due to our independent political position which does
not conform to the agendas of those capitals.” (Tran-
script, p. 12) Pointing to massacres and human rights
violations by the U.S. and other western nations in
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Algeria, many African
countries, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, Ja’afari said he
did not see how anyone could ignore these. The
implication was that the nations bringing the draft
resolution to the Council had a double standard about
whose human rights violations they asked the Council
to condemn. While he acknowledged the need and
desire of the Syrian people and government for eco-
nomic, political and social reforms, he denounced the
misuse of such demands to try “to facilitate external
opposition,” and to “pave the way for external interven-
tion.”
He proposed that, “encouraging the radical de-
mands of the opposition in Syria to topple the govern-
ment by force of arms, violence and terrorism amounts
to a coup supported by outside powers….” (Transcript,
p. 14)
He argued that “the intervention of the Security
Council in Syrian internal affairs further aggravates the
situation and sends a message to extremists and
terrorists – that their acts of deliberate sabotage and
violence…are encouraged and supported by the
Security Council.” (Transcript, p. 14)
Concluding his comments, he expressed his
appreciation to the States that had rejected what he
characterized as abuse of the Council. “If we are
optimistic about the Council,” he said, “it is because
we continue to hear the voice of the wise echoing in
the Chamber.”
The Security Council meeting ended at 7:45 p.m.
VIII – Some Examples of Netizen Com-
ments on the Resolution
While much of the mainstream Western media
portrayed the October 4 Security Council meeting in
the terms offered by the U.S. and European members
of the Council, several responses posted on the Internet
demonstrated that there are many people who oppose
the actions of the western members of the Security
Council.
4
For example, in one response to media reports that
Ambassador Rice said the U.S. was “outraged” by the
Russian and Chinese vetoes of the European draft
resolution, one netizen asked, “Where is all the outrage
over U.S. and Europe’s cracking down on their protest-
ers? Where is the UN resolution on all that?”
A number of netizens applauded Russia and China
for vetoing the European resolution against Syria.
Some netizens wrote that Russia and China
“should also have vetoed the Libyan resolution.” One
netizen explained the view that “they (Russia and
China) just allowed NATO to kill Libyans, and destroy
the country so they can make big money in reconstruc-
tion contracts.”
A U.S. netizen who expressed a similar view said,
referring to the U.S. President Obama, “So I guess our
Page 5
Nobel Peace Prize winner wants to spread more peace
around the globe. He will have to do it Bush style
without UN approval.”
Another netizen said that such a veto a few
months ago in the Libyan situation would have pre-
vented the “now ongoing genocide and catastrophe
that the U.S., France and so-called U.K. have brought
the Libyan nation via NATO bombings and flagrant –
shameless support of armed revolt. Perhaps there’s still
a chance for the ‘United Nations’ to vindicate itself
historically and salvage its long lost credibility and
honorable standing.”
Expressing a similar viewpoint, a netizen ended
his comment, “If a ‘no-fly zone’ is interpreted by
Obama and Sarkozy as six months of unlimited bomb-
ing (of Libya), how could China and Russia risk
allowing any kind of resolution on another country.”
IX – Conclusion
Comparing the October 4 Security Council meet-
ing which rejected the hostile European draft resolu-
tion against Syria with the March 17 meeting approv-
ing Resolution 1973 against Libya, what stands out is
that on October 4, some members of the Security
Council acknowledged the violent actions of some of
the internal opposition against the Syrian government.
In March the Council had failed to acknowledge the
armed insurrection against the Libyan government.
One lesson that several members of the Council
appear to have drawn from the Security Council action
on Libya, was the need to avoid passing a vague or
hostile resolution which could be abused by powerful
nations as a pretext to carry out a hidden agenda of
regime change.
The opposition on the Security Council to the
European draft demonstrated a determination to
prevent a NATO type intervention against Syria,
similar to that which had been carried out by the U.S.,
France, and the U.K. against Libya using NATO. The
Libyan experience had shown that these powerful
western governments would do as they wished using a
Security Council resolution as a pretext and the Secu-
rity Council had no means to stop such abuse of its
resolutions.
The UN Charter obligation of the Security Council
is to work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts
affecting peace and security in the international arena.
The situation in Syria, as it was in Libya, is a domestic
affair complicated by foreign intervention. The fact
that many Libyan civilians have been and continued to
be killed by NATO bombing missions in Libya as the
Council considered a similar resolution against Syria,
offered a grotesque backdrop to the fact that some
NATO members who are members of the Security
Council have continued to try to use the Security
Council to claim legal authority for their clearly illegal
attack on the sovereignty of UN member nations.
5
Netizen comments in response to western media
reports in support of such illegal actions demonstrate
a rejection by these netizens of the kind of action
NATO has undertaken against Libya. The effort of
NATO members of the Security Council to use the
Libya resolution as a model to support their attack on
Syria, was met by a double veto and four abstentions
in the Security Council. It was also met by netizens
posting articles and comments on the Internet to
oppose NATO’s actions and to welcome the Russian
and Chinese vetoes of the European draft resolution.
Notes
1. S/2011/612, Security Council Draft Resolution (Not approved)
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/612
2. Rule 37 of the “Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security
Council”
http://www.un.org/en/sc/inc/pages/pdf/rules.pdf
“Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the
Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the
Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of
any question brought before the Security Council when the
Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are
specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the
attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35 (1)
of the Charter.”
3. S/PV.6627, The Security Council Meeting of Oct 4, 2011. I
refer to this UN document as “Transcript” in the text of the article.
A URL for the document at the UN website is:
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6627
4. Comments in response to an article in the Washington Post.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-
china-block-syria-resolution-at-un/2011/10/04/gIQArCFBML_
allComments.html#comments
5. See, for example, an excerpt from a talk given by John Pilger
at the October 8, 2011 protest in Trafalgar Square, U.K.
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/pilger101011.html
“(T)he United States, Britain, and France are bombing a city in
Libya called Sirte. There are 100,000 people. Day and night,
residential buildings, clinics, schools have been hit with fragmen-
tation bombs and Hellfire missiles…. The media refer to Sirte as
a true Gaddafi stronghold. The Channel 4 reporter in Libya
describes the attacks as “cutting off the head of the snake.” For
such heroic journalists, there are two types of humanity in war:
there are worthy victims and unworthy victims. The people of
Sirte are unworthy victims, and therefore they are expendable
both as people and as news. In Iraq the people of Fallujah were
also unworthy victims. American Marines, helped by the British,
Page 6
killed some 5,000 people there…. As Harold Pinter would
say…none of it happened. It didn’t happen even as it was
happening. It didn’t matter…. We’ve had ten years of such crimes
that didn’t happen, that didn’t matter…. The war on Afghanistan
was a fraud right from the beginning, just as the attack on Iraq
was a fraud and the invasion of Libya is a fraud.”
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Dec14, 2011 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/12/14/lessons-fr
om-unscr-1973-on-libya/]
Lessons from UN Security
Council Implementation of
Resolution 1973 on Libya
by Ronda Hauben
I – Introduction
As is customary, a press conference was held by
Ambassador Vitaly Churkin to mark the beginning of
the Russian Federation’s Presidency of the Security
Council for the month of December, 2011. Ambassa-
dor Churkin’s comments in this press conference
provide insight into an important problem in the
structure of the Security Council that became evident
in the course of the implementation of the Security
Council resolutions against Libya.
The press conference was held on December 2.
There is video of the press conference for those who
are interested in viewing the conference itself.
1
Though other issues were brought up, many of the
questions asked by journalists related to the Russian
Federation’s views concerning Security Council action
on Libya and Syria.
II – Critique of Implementation of SCR
1973 on Libya
During the press conference Ambassador Churkin
revealed that NATO had been asked for a “final
report…summing up their view of their complying or
not complying, of performing or not performing under
the resolutions of the Security Council.” But no
summary had been received from NATO. Ambassador
Churkin said it was his understanding that NATO was
not planning to send the Security Council any sum-
mary.
The importance of this revelation is that during its
military action against Libya, NATO claimed it was
acting under the authorization of UN SC Resolution
1973 (SCR 1973). Yet when asked to provide the
Security Council with an evaluation of how its Libyan
campaign complied with the actual resolution, appar-
ently NATO did not see itself as being held account-
able to the Security Council.
This situation reinforces the observation made by
some inside and others outside the Council.
2
The
Council passed SCR 1973, but it had no means of
monitoring or controlling how this resolution was
implemented. Thus the implementation of this Security
Council resolution on Libya reveals a serious flaw in
the structure of the Council itself.
Some members maintained that the resolution
called for a cease fire and political settlement of the
conflict in Libya.
Other Security Council members began bombing
Libyan targets, and brought NATO in to carry out a
bombing campaign against military, civilian and
infrastructure targets in Libya. Ironically, NATO
claimed such bombing was about the protection of
civilians.
3
Similarly a self appointed “Contact Group”
on Libya set as its goal, regime change in Libya.
Members of the Security Council who expressed
opposition to these activities, arguing they were
contrary to SCR 1973, had no means to stop such
usurpation of Security Council control over the imple-
mentation of the resolution.
The December 2 press conference with Ambassa-
dor Churkin helped to illustrate and examine this
problem.
In an earlier Security Council meeting, Brazil had
indicated it was planning to do a concept paper on the
“responsibility while protecting” under the Responsi-
bility to Protect (R2P) concept.
4
Brazil’s two year term
on the Security Council will be over at the end of
December, but no such concept paper has yet been
presented. When Churkin was asked what he could tell
journalists about the progress on this paper, he said,
“My understanding is that it is going to be a serious
process, a fundamental process of revisiting those
things.”
On the issue of the Security Council’s summary of
what had happened in the course of implementing
Resolution 1973 against Libya, Ambassador Churkin
explained the dilemma this posed for the Council. “As
to lessons learned, this is a much broader issue which
unfortunately I think we cannot put together as council
Page 7
members. It is something for round tables, academics,
politicians to discuss in various flora. We discussed
that. We have had a number of discussions of the
various lessons we have learned, and the things we
need to do or not to do.”
He recommended looking back at the Security
Council meetings held in open chambers, particularly
at the statements he had made in his capacity as the
Russian Federation Permanent Representative. “I
minced no words about some of the conclusions that
need to be drawn from our Libyan experience,” he
said. “But I am sure the Libyan experience is some-
thing that will have an impact of such importance that
this will be a subject of attention for years to come.”
Asked whether the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
concept had been misused by the Security Council,
Ambassador Churkin responded, “This is a very
dangerous thing.” This was not only the view of his
delegation, but also of others both on the council and
outside of the council, he explained.
“That is something that makes the life and work
on the Security Council very difficult because words
are no longer what they used to be. They have different
meanings,” he said, offering as an example the imple-
mentation of the No-Fly Zone on Libya contained in
SCR 1973.
He described how, “No-Fly Zone in the good old
world, used to mean that nobody’s flying. That you
prevent aircraft from being used against civilians.”
“In the brave new world,” though, said Churkin,
“No-Fly Zone means freewheeling bombing of the
targets you choose to bomb in whatever modality and
mode you want to bomb. Close air support, OK.
Bombing a television station, OK. And that is a matter
of grave concern.”
The significance of there being such a big differ-
ence in how words are being used, Churkin explained,
was that, “Now we have to think not only about the
words and concepts, but about the enormous ability of
some of our colleagues to interpret the world out of
them. And this is a very serious issue.”
“We need to return to the Council, to our interac-
tion and cooperation with our colleagues, a clear
understanding of what we mean,” maintained Churkin.
Demonstrating the significance of this discrepancy
between how different members of the Council inter-
preted the words of resolutions, Churkin pointed out
that in the case of Libya, there had been reports that
the Gaddafi regime was using airplanes to bomb
civilians. (But no evidence was ever presented to
support these claims, at the time, or since. -ed)
5
There were, however, no such reports about Syria.
How then could there be “such uncritical enthusiasm”
for setting up a No-Fly Zone for Syria, Churkin
wondered. Where was this enthusiasm coming from?
“Is it,” he asked, “an indication that in fact when
they are saying that they don’t plan any military action
(against Syria -ed), they don’t really mean it? When
they talk about a no-fly zone, they are already planning
targets to bomb in Syria?”
Referring to the implication of this problem,
Churkin noted, “On various issues which can have
dramatic repercussions for regions and countries, and
unfortunately this is clearly the case about Syria and
about Iran and about some other issues, so it is not a
perfect day for diplomacy, a perfect day to work in the
Security Council.”
III – Security Council Action Against Syria
In response to several questions from journalists
asking about the Russian Federation’s view of what
action was appropriate with respect to Syria, Churkin
explained the principles that should guide such action.
“We think it’s the role of the international com-
munity to try to help resolve internal crises by promot-
ing dialogue,” Churkin told journalists, “This is what
we have been doing with our contacts with the Syrian
authorities, opposition, and the Arab League.”
Referring to the proposal of the Arab League to
conduct a monitoring mission in Syria, he explained,
“We think that the Arab League has a unique opportu-
nity to play a constructive role in Syria.”
This required, however, that the Arab League be
willing to consider Syria’s proposed amendments to
the Arab League proposal, rather than just offering
Syria an ultimatum that it had to accept the Arab
League proposal with no negotiations over it, said
Churkin.
“We think the Syrian government’s proposed
amendments to that plan could have been considered,”
he explained. “Personally I looked at the two texts. I
haven’t seen in the texts anything which couldn’t have
been bridged there with some negotiations on the
modalities of the deployment of that mission.”
Concerned that, “this opportunity to really medi-
ate between the government and the opposition is not
lost,” Churkin proposed that the Arab League eco-
nomic sanctions imposed on Syria were “counterpro-
ductive.”
Comparing Security Council action on Syria with
Page 8
its action on Yemen, Churkin said that Russia was able
to “exercise our position of principle” in Security
Council Resolution 2014 (2011) about Yemen, “by
encouraging dialogue and political accommodation on
the basis of the Gulf States initiative.”
6
In the case of
Yemen, Churkin noted, the Security Council and the
international community had rallied in support of the
action that Russia proposed.
But when it came to Syria, he described how
Russia and China had proposed a resolution that “had
many of the same elements which were contained in
the resolution which was adopted on…Yemen.” In the
case of Syria, however, the Russian-Chinese sponsored
Resolution, was not supported by several other mem-
bers of the Council.
7
“So I think in Yemen the international community
can be proud that even in a situation with bloodshed
and very serious conflict in a country we were giving
a strong signal in favor of dialogue and of political
accommodation and this is what we achieved,” said
Churkin.
“What we don’t understand,” he noted, “is why if
that can be done in Yemen, why that can’t apply to
Syria.”
Furthermore, in the case of Syria, he said, the
Security Council met with opposition from some of the
capitals, to any form of dialogue to resolve the Syrian
conflict. The governments opposed to dialogue, he
reported, took the position that there was, “no way
dialogue can help. That those who go into dialogue
they should stop it immediately,” and that “there is no
future in the Arab League initiative.”
Such action is, he proposed “something very
counterproductive. And this is something that has
acerbated the situation in Syria.”
While maintaining that there is “no [one] prescrip-
tion for different countries” since they are all struc-
tured differently with regard to their traditions and
political set up, Churkin proposed that there is a
general attitude and principles that can be applied in a
general way. This is that “the international community
is not there to smell blood and to fan confrontation.
But the international community is there to prevent
further bloodshed and to encourage dialogue.”
Reflecting on the importance of such an interna-
tional effort in favor of domestic dialogue, Churkin
said, “This is what the United Nations is all about. This
is what the Security Council is about.”
IV – Concerns about Libya
With respect to Gaddafi, Churkin said “members
of the council, including Russia, thought that what
happened to Gaddafi is something that shouldn’t have
happened.”
Ambassador Churkin was asked whether the
Security Council was concerned about the conditions
in Libya for those who had supported the Gaddafi
government and particularly, about the situation of
Saif al Islam Gaddafi and whether it was conceivable
he could get a fair trial in Libya when there was no
functioning legal system in the country.
Churkin responded that these concerns about the
situation in Libya had been discussed very often and
the delegation of the Russian Federation and of a
number of other countries had raised these concerns.
Also he spoke to concern over the plight of migrant
workers in Libya. “We directed the UN mission in
Libya to pay proper attention to these issues,” he said.
He indicated that they would continue to follow
these issues closely.
V – Conclusion
Ambassador Churkin’s press conference was an
important and all too rare example of a press confer-
ence held by a member of the Security Council which
helps to shed light on the workings of the Council. All
too often the problems that develop in the course of
Security Council activity are shrouded in shadows and
kept from public view. This is contrary to the obliga-
tions of the Council, which is obliged to report on its
actions to the General Assembly in annual and special
reports under the UN Charter, Article 15(1). Members
of the General Assembly responding to the annual
report from the Security Council ask for more analyti-
cal reports, rather than just summaries of the activities
that have gone on over the year.
In his December 2 press conference, Ambassador
Churkin shared some of the problems that developed
in the Security Council over the course of the imple-
mentation of the resolutions on Libya. In the process
he has helped clarify what future difficulties in the
Security Council will be, given a failure to understand
and resolve the problems he has outlined. By helping
to reveal the difficulties in the functioning of the
Security Council, Ambassador Churkin has provided
important details that need further attention and
consideration.
Page 9
Notes
1. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the
Russian Federation and President of the Security Council for the
month of December, 2011 on the Programme of Work of the
Security Council for the month.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/12/press-confere
nce-ambassador-vitaly-churkin-president-of-the-security-counci
l.html
2. See for example the critique of Resolution 1973 by the Con-
cerned Africans, “An Open Letter to the Peoples of Africa and the
World from Concerned Africans,” July, 2011.
http://www.concernedafricans.co.za/
See also Mahmood Mamdani, “A Ugandan’s Perspective: What
Does Gaddafi’s Fall Mean for Africa.”
http://www.unaatimes.com/2011/10/
3. For some of the examples of NATO’s bombing of civilians that
went on during its military campaign against Libya see: Global
Civilians for Peace in Libya
http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/tag/bombing/
“Libya: War Without End” by Stephen Lendmain, ThePeoples-
Voice.org, October 30, 2011.
http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/10/30/l
ibya-war-without-end
4. See Nov. 9, 2011 meeting of the Security Council on Protecting
Civilians in the Situation of Armed Struggle, S/PV.6650, p. 16
Ambassador Viotti said: “The Brazilian delegation will shortly
circulate a concept paper. It elaborates on the idea that the
international community, as it exercises its responsibility to
protect, must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while
protecting.”
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N11/585/43/PD
F/N1158543.pdf?OpenElement
5. Actually no evidence was ever presented that airplanes were
ever used to bomb civilians under the Gaddafi government. It was
only under NATO that there is evidence that airplanes were used
resulting in the bombing of civilians. See for example:
http://globalciviliansforpeace.com/reports
“Despite detailed investigation we could not find any evidence
that the three regions of Tripoli cited in UN resolution 1973 had
been subjected to government forces bombardment nor that their
had been fighting between government troops and the people, we
received many testimonies to the contrary.”
6. See SCR 2014 (passed October 21, 2011)
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/201
4(2011)
7. See for example Ronda Hauben, “UN Security Council
Challenges Hidden Agenda on Syria,” taz.de
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2011/10/27/security_council_vet
o_on_syria/
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Jan 31, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/01/31/observer-
mission-report-syria/]
AL Observer Report Corrects
Media Narratives About Syria
by Ronda Hauben
The Arab League Observer Mission succeeded in
providing a different perspective from that of the
mainstream western media about what has been
happening on the ground in Syria. After a resolution
by the Arab League which was worked out in an
agreement with the Syrian government, Observers
from the League went to Syria and provided a means
of investigating what was happening.
The report of the Observers mission that was
concluded on January 19, noted several important
observations.
1
1. The mission noted that there were false reports
being made of explosions or violence and when the
observers went to the location, they found that the
reports were unfounded.
2. The mission found that media accounts were exag-
gerated about the nature of incidents or numbers of
people killed in incidents and protests.
3. There were discrepancies in the lists the Mission
received of people in detention. Names were repeated,
or information was missing or inaccurate about detain-
ees.
4. The Mission observed armed groups committing
acts of violence against Government forces, resulting
in the death and injury of the forces being attacked.
Some of the armed groups were using flares and
armor-piercing projectiles.
5. A French journalist who was killed and a Belgium
journalist who was injured were the victims of opposi-
tion mortar shells.
6. The mission was the target of a hostile media
campaign with media publishing untrue statements,
distorting the truth, and attributing statements to the
Page 10
head of the mission which were never made.
7. Such accounts by the media undermined the work of
the observer mission and seemed to be aimed toward
making the mission fail.
8. The Observer mission was able to fulfill its man-
date.
The most important observation was as the Report
stated, that it had “determined that there is an armed
entity” that had not been mentioned in the protocol
setting up the mission. This armed opposition entity
was a force that needed to be taken into account in
structuring the mission. The report listed a number of
violent incidents, some of which were carried out by
the Free Syrian Army and some of the other armed
opposition groups, stating that such incidents would
widen the gap and increase the bitterness in the situa-
tion.
The observers requested the continuation of the
mission, but with proper equipment and numbers, for
another month. The committee in charge approved the
request. The mission was to be extended. But sud-
denly, a different agenda was put into action, an
agenda calling for regime change in Syria. Similarly,
armed attacks against the government were stepped up
and government forces sought to stem these attacks.
What had been a promising beginning for a
contribution to a peaceful settlement of the conflict,
was hijacked by forces intent on imposing a military
solution of regime change on Syria.
Subsequently, pressure was put on the UN Secu-
rity Council, pressure from both inside and outside the
Council to authorize a proposal for regime change in
Syria and for foreign intervention against Syria. The
scenario is to play out with a high level meeting at the
Security Council on Tuesday, January 31, of Foreign
Ministers of some of the nations on the Council.
Also there was a report at Voltaire Network that
on Sunday night, January 29, the Secretary General of
the Gulf Cooperation Council, Abdul Al-Zayani, went
to Brussels to meet with the Secretary General of
NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen.
2
Recent information is that the Arab League
Secretary-General decided to freeze the Observer
Mission which had been renewed for another month by
the League’s Ad Hoc Ministerial Council. The Com-
mittee, according to an article at Voltaire Network is
“an Arab Plan follow-up organism consisting of five
States out of 22 (Algeria, Egypt, Oman, Qatar,
Sudan).
3
This Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee adopted
the observer’s report by a vote of four votes in favor
(Algeria, Egypt, Oman and Sudan), one against (Qa-
tar). Little media coverage was given to this vote.
Voltaire Network also reported that the Secretary
General of the Arab League, Nabil Al-Arabi took the
view that the observers were jeopardized after “the
spiritual leader of the Syrian Salafists, Sheikh Adnan
Al-Arouri announced over Al-Arabiya airwaves that it
was lawful to kill the Arab observers.”
4
The decision to support the regime change plan by
the Arab League was also made by a vote of the Ad
Hoc Ministerial Council. According to the Voltaire
Network, this vote was three in favor (Egypt, Oman
and Qatar), one against (Sudan) and one abstention
(Algeria). On the basis of this vote of three members
of the Arab League, the Prime Minister of Qatar and
the Secretary General of the Arab League were going
to the UN to ask the Security Council to back their
plan for regime change in Syria.
5
On Friday, January 27, a new resolution drawn up
by some of the members of the council and presented
by Morocco, was introduced to the Security Council
diverting the discussion from focusing on the positive
results of the Arab League Observer Mission and how
to support its continuation.
The hijacking of the Security Council Agenda
from a discussion on continuing the process begun by
the Observer Mission to a regime change resolution
against Syria was a process that received little media
attention, but much media hype reminiscent of the
media pressure on the Security Council which resulted
in its resolutions against Libya.
While there has been the claim of great media
concern over unverified reports of 5000 casualties in
Syria over an eight month period, there was compara-
tively no media attention to the estimated 60,000 or
more casualties of the NATO bombing and armed
rebels attacks in Libya over a comparable period.
The buildup of pressure on the United Nations to
undertake support for using the Security Council to
provide legitimacy for military and political action
against Syria is a challenge to the obligation of the UN
Charter to support peaceful solutions to conflict
situations and to respect the sovereignty of nations.
Page 11
Notes:
1. “League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Report of
the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria
for the period from December 24, 2011 to January 18, 2012?
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_O
bserver_Mission.pdf
2. “The GCC and Turkey Turn to NATO,” Voltaire Network,
January 29, 2012,
http:// www.voltairenet.org/a172551
3. “Media confusion around the Arab League meeting,” Voltaire
Network, January 23, 2012,
http://www.voltairenet.org/a172476
4. “The GCC and Turkey Turn to NATO,” Voltaire Network,
January 29, 2012,
http://www.voltairenet.org/a172551
5. “Media confusion around the Arab League meeting,” Voltaire
Network, January 23, 2012,
http://www.voltairenet.org/a172476
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Feb 11, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/02/11/defending
-the-un-charter/]
Defending the UN Charter by
Use of the Veto: The SC
Resolution on Syria
by Ronda Hauben
Up until the Arab League Observer Mission had
been sent to Syria on December 24, 2011, there had
been two main narratives describing what was happen-
ing in Syria. One was that the violence in Syria was by
the government against its people. The other was that
the violence was also perpetrated by armed groups
attempting to destabilize Syria. There had been no
independent way to judge between these two narra-
tives. The Observer Mission Report of January 22
provided such an independent judgment.
1
The Observer Mission determined that there were
armed opposition elements in Syria. (Paragraph 71)
The original protocol setting up the Observer Mission
did not take into account this aspect of the situation.
By detailed observations in the Report, the Observer
Mission documented that there were armed opposition
elements attacking civilians and government officials,
blowing up trains and pipelines, civilian buses and
killing not only Syrian civilians but also a French
journalist.
2
(Paragraphs 25, 26, 27, 44, 75)
The Observer Mission Report noted that as a
result of the Mission’s insistence on a complete end to
violence, the problem of violence by the Government
forces and exchange of gunfire with armed elements in
Homs and Hama had receded. “The most recent
reports of the Mission,” the Report stated, “point to a
considerable calming of the situation and restraint on
the part of those forces.”
The Report documented that the Observer Mission
witnessed peaceful demonstrations by both the opposi-
tion and the supporters of the government while the
Mission was on the ground. (Paragraph 30)
Also, the Report said that, “The most important
point in this regard is the commitment by ‘all sides’ to
cease all aspects of violence thereby allowing the
Mission to complete its tasks and ultimately lay the
groundwork for the political process.” (Paragraph 79)
The Report warned that discontinuing the Mission
“could lead to chaos on the ground.” (Paragraph 81)
To seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict in
Syria, the continuation of something like the Observer
Mission would be needed. The Report concluded that
there needed to be an “expansion of and a change in
the Mission’s mandate.” (paragraph 79) Also the
Mission needed political, media and technical support
to fulfill its mandate. (Paragraphs 80, and 82)
The dominant states in the Arab League, however
did not support changing the protocol to include the
problem represented by the armed groups in Syria, as
recommended by the Report. Instead, the Arab League
introduced a plan to require President Assad of Syria
to step down and to turn over power to the Vice
President to fulfill a plan drafted without the Syrian
government’s agreement.
3
This ignored the recommen-
dations of the Report of the Observer Mission, and
substituted the imposition of an Arab League political
plan for Syria in place of the recommended modifica-
tion and continuation of the Observer Mission. The
Arab League political plan had as its aim the removal
of the Syrian president, as opposed to creating a
peaceful solution so that the Syrian people could make
the political changes they desired in a Syrian deter-
mined process.
The Arab League brought their regime change
political plan to the UN Secretary General asking him
to submit it to the Security Council. The Arab League
was seeking the UN’s endorsement for its plan.
The Arab League submitted a letter to the UN
Secretary General requesting a meeting of the Security
Council. The letter listed several enclosures.
Though the Report of the Observer’s Mission
(Report) to the UN was listed as one of the enclosures,
Page 12
this document was not included in the material origi-
nally sent to the UN.
The Russian Ambassador, however, insisted that
the Report be submitted to the UN Security Council.
No Security Council discussion of the Arab League
plan was to be held until the Report was submitted to
the Security Council. Also it was to be treated as an
official document of the UN and translated into the six
official languages as is customary of official docu-
ments.
Russia had requested that the Security Council
hold a session to discuss the Report. Russia also
requested that the head of the Observer Mission,
General Mohammed Al-Dabi, be invited to the Secu-
rity Council to discuss the Report. Russia’s request to
the Security Council to discuss the Report was not
accepted, even though there were other Security
Council members who agreed about the importance of
the report. Instead some members of the Council
wanted to schedule the Security Council to discuss the
Arab League plan on Monday, January 30. Other
members wanted the meeting on Tuesday, January 31
to give Security Council members time to read the
Report.
4
On January 31, as part of the Security Council
meeting, the Report was officially circulated in Eng-
lish and Arabic along with the letter from the Arab
League to the Secretary General. The Arab League,
represented by its Secretary General Nabil Elaraby and
the current rotating chairman of the League, Prime
Minister Al-Thani of Qatar, presented its plan to the
Security Council. They discouraged the Security
Council from asking to meet with Al Dabi. Though
some members of the Security Council recognized the
importance of the Report, the discussion in the Council
was diverted to the Arab League plan for Syria.
Subsequently, a draft Security Council resolution
was submitted by Morocco. Though Russia also had
submitted a revised version of the Resolution it had
submitted weeks before, the discussion turned to the
Moroccan draft.
5
The issue in contention over this draft
was whether the Council would agree to “fully sup-
port” the Arab League plan for regime change in Syria.
The recommendations of the Observer Report
presented the need to expand the protocol agreed to by
the Syrian government and the Arab League to include
a provision related to the presence of armed groups
and the violence perpetuated by them. The Arab
League proposal for regime change in Syria ignored
this issue. The Security Council members differed on
the need to make an independent judgment about
whether the Arab League plan fit the criteria of Chap-
ter VIII in the UN Charter. This provision of the
Charter requires that regional actions supported by the
Security Council be consistent with the Purposes and
Principles of the United Nations. (Article 52(1))
On Saturday, February 4, the Russian Federation
submitted several amendments to the draft resolution,
amendments it said would enable Russia to support a
resolution on Syria.
6
It asked that these amendments be
discussed before taking a vote on the draft resolution.
To deal with the problem of armed groups and
violence perpetuated by them, Russia proposed that a
line be added to the Security Council Resolution that
would not only demand the withdrawal of the govern-
ment’s military forces from conflict areas, but in
conjunction would require that armed groups be
prevented from taking advantage of the vacuum to
occupy those areas.
7
Also the Russian Federation identified another
important loophole in the draft Security Council
resolution. The Arab League plan required that Presi-
dent Assad step down and turn over negotiations for a
political transition to his vice president. This is essen-
tially a call for Assad to agree to a forced regime
change for Syria. If Assad were to resist, which one
would expect of the head of State of a nation being
attacked by armed insurgents who are killing civilians
and destroying infrastructure. Then what? The arbi-
trary and mandatory time deadlines would provide a
pretext for the advocates of foreign intervention to
claim that the UN supports intervention into the
internal affairs of Syria. This is what had been done
with Libya. The Russian amendments proposed the
need to change the mandatory time deadlines in the
Arab League timetable to make the deadlines advisory,
instead of mandatory. Mandatory time deadlines could
be used as a pretext to violate the UN Charter which
prohibits foreign interference in the internal affair of a
member state. (UN Charter, Article 2(7))
The request for time to discuss the amendments
was denied, leading to a vote on the draft resolution at
a public meeting of the Council on February 4. Russia
and China as expected by all, vetoed the resolution.
Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong supported Russia’s
request for continued consultations as “reasonable.”
8
He said that it was “regrettable” that Russia’s request
for a few days of discussion on its proposed amend-
ments had not been honored.
Referring to the Charter to explain why China
Page 13
vetoed the resolution, Li Baodong said: “(T)he sover-
eignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria
should be fully respected. The actions of the Security
Council on the Syrian issue should comply with the
purposes and principles of the UN Charter….”
“Under these principles,” he said, “China has
taken an active part in the consultations on the draft
resolution, and supported the efforts made by the Arab
League to facilitate a political settlement of the Syria
issue and maintain stability in the region. Like many
Council members, China maintains that, under the
current circumstances, to put undue emphasis on
pressuring the Syrian government, prejudge the result
of the dialogue or impose any solution will not help
resolve the Syrian issue, but instead may further
complicate the situation.”
Talking to journalists at a media stakeout at the
UN, Russian Ambassador Vitaly Churkin described
some of what led to his nation’s veto of the proposed
Security Council resolution.
9
“As Syrian forces were
pulling out, armed groups were moving in. We were
trying to address that situation,” he explained. To
support a peaceful political solution to the crisis in
Syria as required by the UN Charter, both sides capa-
ble of substantial violence had to be observed and
called on to be restrained and to cease all acts of
violence, thereby allowing the Mission to complete its
tasks and, ultimately lay the groundwork for a political
solution.
Commenting on the impact on Russia of the
Security Council action on Libya, a columnist for
Russia Today (RT), Fyodor Lukyanov, explains that,
“Russia has drawn lessons in Libya last year after
Moscow refrained from using its veto in the UN SC,
paving the way for ‘humanitarian intervention’ by
NATO. The ‘no-fly’ mandate was almost immediately
shifted into a regime change operation led by France
and Britain. Russia felt its cooperation had been
abused.”
The result of this experience, Lukyanov argues, is
that, “Russia opposes any call for Bashar al-Assad to
resign because ultimatums of this kind will mean
entering onto a path whose final destination is inva-
sion. This is because the UNSC will not allow its
demand to be ignored, while it is unlikely that Assad
will be in any hurry to fulfill it.”
10
At a media stakeout after he spoke with the
Security Council on Wednesday, February 8, Ban
Ki-moon said that he had told the Security Council that
the Arab League Secretary General had spoken with
him on the phone and asked the UN Secretary General
about setting up some sort of Observer Mission in
Syria in conjunction with the UN. The question this
raises is whether such a possible joint Observer Mis-
sion would take into account the recommendations of
the January 22 Observer Mission Report. The obliga-
tions of the UN Charter require that the UN Security
Council act in line with the UN Charter, rather than
just endorsing the actions of regional organizations
even if such actions are in violation of the UN
Charter.
11
The struggle continues at the UN Security Council
to find a way to support a peaceful resolution to the
conflict in Syria without violating the Purposes and
Principles of the UN Charter. The February 4 veto was
in the words of the Foreign Minister of the Russian
Federation Sergey Lavrov, “the (United Nations)
Charter at work.”
Notes
1. “League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Report of
the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria
for the period from December 24, 2011 to January 18, 2012?”
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_O
bserver_Mission.pdf
The official UN document distributed January 31, 2012 at the UN
contained the Observer Report as Enclosure 4 of S/2012/71
2. See for example, Ronda Hauben, Al Observer Report Corrects
Media Narratives about Syria, taz.de January 31, 2012
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/01/31/observer-mission-rep
ort-syria/
3. Security Council S/2012/71, Enclosure 1 “Elements of Arab
Plan to Resolve the Syrian Crisis,” January 30, 2012 Enclosure 1
listed the following steps to be taken in Syria:
A. Govt. of national unity formed within two months. The
President should grant his Vice-President full powers to fulfill
transition phase
B. Within three months of its formation free and fair elections
should be held for a constituent assembly
C. This should prepare a new draft constitution for approval by
popular referendum and an electoral based on that draft constitu-
tion
4. I was told that Security Council members received a copy of
the Observer Mission Report sometime on Friday, January 27.
5. Draft resolution S/2012/77
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/223/75/P
DF/N1222375.pdf?OpenElement vetoed on February 4, 2012
6. Mathew Lee, “Russian Amendments Condemn Armed Groups,
Only ‘Take Into Account’ AL,” Inner City Press, February 4,
2012
http://www.innercitypress.com/syria1rusam020412.html
7. Change proposed by Russia from the text of the Resolution on
Syria. Resolution said: 5d) withdraw all Syrian military and armed
forces from cities and towns, and return them to their original
home barrack; Russia’s requested change: Requested change said:
Page 14
5d) withdraw all Syrian military and armed forces from cities and
towns, and return them to their original home barrack; in conjunc-
tion with the end of attacks by armed groups against State
institutions and quarters and towns.
8. UN Transcript, Security Council Meeting on Middle East
Situation (February 4, 2012) – Syria, S/PV.6711, p. 9-10
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N12/223/56/PD
F/N1222356.pdf?OpenElement
9. Stakeout, Vitaly L. Churkin (Russian Federation) on Syria,
Security Council Media Stakeout, February 4, 2012
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/h-e-mr-vitaly
-i-churkin-russian-federation-on-the-situation-in-syria-security-
council-media-stakeout-2.html
10. Fyodor Lukyanov, “Why is Russia so Resolute on Syria?,”
RT, February 3, 2012
http://rt.com/politics/columns/unpredictable-world-foreign-luky
anov/russia-syria-assad-un/
11. Ban Ki Moon at stakeout at Security Council on February 8,
2012.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/un-secretary-
general-ban-ki-moon-on-the-middle-east-security-council-medi
a-stakeout.html
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on Feb 19, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/02/19/un-ga-me
eting-syria/]
Using the UN GA to Endorse
the AL Regime Change
Agenda for Syria
by Ronda Hauben
Part I – The Monday meeting
Why did the current president of the UN General
Assembly (GA), Ambassador Nassir Abdulaziz al-
Nasser of Qatar, call a special meeting of the General
Assembly on February 13, a meeting, as several
nations noted, outside the regular procedures of the
General Assembly?
The notice for the GA meeting was unusually
short, as UN members were only notified on the
Thursday night before for a meeting the following
Monday morning. So it was not surprising that there
were a number of complaints that in addition to proce-
dural violations, normal consultation channels for
calling a GA meeting had not been followed.
As the meeting unfolded on Monday, several
delegations provided explanations of the customary
procedures that had been violated, suggesting that the
President of the GA was using his office to manipulate
a procedure at the UN to further the political goals of
his nation. Also, several of those speaking at the GA
on Monday referred to the precedent this was setting
for GA meetings in the future. Such a precedent would
make it more likely that future Presidents of the GA
will call meetings contrary to GA procedures when the
person in the presidency has a political purpose.
The meeting went on all day on Monday with
several speaking for and against the GA President’s
purpose for the meeting to condemn Syria for its
clampdown on allegedly “peaceful protest.” Several of
those speaking made clear their view that the violent
acts of armed opposition and foreign forces who are
acting in Syria cannot be considered acts of “peaceful
protest.”
Several who spoke referred to the Arab League
Observer Mission Report which had verified the
presence of armed groups and the Syrian Free Army,
and that these armed insurgents were responsible for
violent actions against the Syrian government and
civilians.
The proposal of the Observer Mission to continue
for another month and to work toward a political
solution had been quickly dismissed by the Qatar
Presidency of the Arab League, just as now the Qatar
President of the GA failed to mention the important
contribution of the Observer Mission to the under-
standing of what is happening in Syria.
1
In his statement to the GA on Monday, the Rus-
sian Ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, explained that his
nation “regretted the ending of the Observer Mission”
and took note of this fact.
Similarly others speaking referred to the impor-
tance of this mission.
One of the most comprehensive statements of
what is happening both in Syria and at the United
Nations was presented by Ambassador Maria Rubiales
de Chamorro of Nicaragua on Monday.
2
Her statement
deserves serious attention. Following is a summary of
her presentation.
The Nicaraguan Ambassador explained that at a
Summit meeting of ALBA in early February, an
analysis of the situation in Syria was discussed and a
condemnation was issued of the policy of the interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of Syria, as well as the
effort to destabilize Syria.
Also ALBA condemned what it called “armed
violence by irregular groups supported by foreign
Page 15
powers against the Syrian people.”
Calling for a return to calm in Syria and support
for peaceful reform and national dialogue, she referred
to the steps being taken by the government of Syria to
arrive at a political solution to the conflict.
But what is interfering with such efforts, she
explained, is the fact that the “same script that the
forces of NATO and their allies implemented in
Libya” is now being applied to Syria.
Ambassador Rubiales de Chamorro pointed to the
actions of NATO and its allies against Libya where
“these same actors carried out the same practices and
policies.”
The “play” in process against Syria that she
described, included several acts. She listed these acts
as:
1. Provocation.
2. Arming of Terrorists.
3. Military Intervention.
4. Destruction of the Country.
5. Juicy Contracts for the Reconstruction of that
country that they themselves have destroyed.
The Ambassador called on other members of the
UN to make clear that “we do not share the hypocriti-
cal view of life that is now being labeled R2P.” (Re-
sponsibility to Protect)
R2P, she said, “cannot be allowed to become a
devious argument to justify foreign intervention in the
domestic affairs of states.”
She explained that the Arab League Observer
Mission Report had documented that Syria had com-
plied with the protocol setting up the mission and the
Arab Plan of Action.
3
The Syrian government withdrew members of the
military from the streets. It released thousands of
detainees who had not been involved in acts of vio-
lence. It facilitated the work of the foreign media. But
yet the very report documenting these conclusions is
“now being swept under the carpet,” she noted.
Similarly, the Nicaraguan Ambassador expressed
her nation’s appreciation for the initiative of the
Russian Federation to offer to mediate a diplomatic,
political and peaceful solution to the crisis. She con-
veyed the full support from her President, Daniel
Ortega, to Russia and China for the work they had
done in the Security Council in favor of negotiations
and a peaceful resolution of the conflict and against
instigating a war against Syria.
Despite the fact that several other nations had
spoken at Monday’s meeting against the imposition of
a regime change program by the Arab League for
Syria, when the GA President ended Monday’s meet-
ing, he only summed up the sentiments of those
supporting the Arab League program.
The impact of these abuses of UN GA precedents
and procedures is that not only the people and govern-
ment of Syria, but also the very integrity of the UN
system itself, are being undermined and jeopardized.
The actions of the subsequent meeting that followed
on Thursday demonstrated this abuse ever more
clearly.
Part II – The Thursday Meeting
At the Monday GA meeting, Bashar al-Jafari, the
Syrian Ambassador effectively challenged not only the
substance of the meeting, but also the abuse of the
precedent under which it was called. The meeting had
allegedly been called for the GA to discuss a Human
Rights Report issued by the Human Rights Council in
December of 2011. The Syrian Ambassador pointed
out that this was an inappropriate activity as the GA
Resolution governing how Human Rights reports from
the Human Rights Council were brought to the GA
was violated.
The procedure established in Resolution
A/Res/65/281 (July 20, 2011) was that the Human
Rights Council Report to the GA was to be presented
in the 3
rd
Committee of the GA and subsequently in the
GA The Report would cover the period of the prior
year from October 1 to September 30 of the current
year.
4
The presentation of a December, 2011 Human
Rights Council Report to a GA Plenary meeting in
February, 2012 was violating the mandate set in the
GA Resolution. Hence holding the GA meeting on
Monday, February 13 in violation of the procedures
contained in A/Res/65/281 was an illegal activity by
the GA President. The Syrian Ambassador had asked
that the Monday meeting be suspended to await an
impartial decision by the UN Secretariat Legal Council
on the actions being taken by the GA President.
The GA President refused to accommodate this
request and just continued with his plan for the Mon-
day meeting.
When the Thursday meeting was held, however,
in recognition of the correctness of the Syrian Ambassa-
dor’s legal objection, the GA Agenda designation for
the meeting was changed. The new Agenda designa-
tion was under the GA agenda item 34, “Prevention of
Armed Conflict.”
Such maneuvers help to demonstrate that the very
Page 16
holding of the GA meeting itself was not in line with
the procedures or provisions for General Assembly
activity.
If the GA is acting outside of its processes and
procedures, then the stage is set for it to go on to
endorse a resolution contrary to the Charter of the UN.
The Charter of the UN clearly states that if the
Security Council is exercising the functions it is
assigned with regard to any dispute, the General
Assembly cannot “make any recommendation with
regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security
Council so requests.” (Chapter II, Article 12(1))
Yet practically the same resolution that was
vetoed at the Security Council on February 4, was
brought to the GA for a vote on February 16. The
Russian Federation asked to amend the resolution with
the amendments it had proposed in the Security
Council so that the resolution would conform to the
requirements of the UN Charter.
These amendments included a provision to not
only require that Syrian government military and
armed forces withdraw from cities and towns, but that
this happen “in conjunction with the end of attacks by
armed groups against state institutions and quarters of
cities and towns.”
Another provision of the Russian amendments
was to replace the requirement of meeting a time table
set by the Arab League with the provision that the
process would “take into account” the time table set by
the Arab League, adding that this would be done
“without prejudging the outcome.”
Such amendments could help to prevent the Arab
League process from becoming a process in support of
the armed insurgents against the Syrian government,
and hence a mechanism for regime change, in violation
of the obligations of the Charter to respect the sover-
eignty, and the territorial integrity of Syria. The
sponsors of the GA Resolution refused to consider the
Russian Federation’s requested amendments.
At the GA meeting on Thursday to consider the
resolution against Syria under the Agenda item
“Prevention of Armed Conflict,” the representatives of
several nations spoke against the resolution, objecting
to the fact that it did not take into account that there is
an armed insurgency operating against the Syrian
government and people.
Instead of the resolution recognizing this problem,
as the Arab League Observer’s Mission had recom-
mended, the GA Resolution supported the armed
insurgency by requiring the Syrian government to
cease military action against that insurgency, but not
providing any other means to prevent the actions of the
insurgents against the government or people of Syria.
Speaking against the GA Resolution, the Venezue-
lan Ambassador, Jorge Valero explained
5
: “The Draft
resolution denies the Syrian State its right to protect its
population and to ensure internal peace and security.
The draft asks it to give up the privileges granted to it
by the Constitution for ensuring the country’s stability.
The draft does not call for – as proposed in the amend-
ment submitted by the Russian Federation, and I quote,
it does not call for – ‘all sections of the Syrian opposi-
tion to dissociate themselves from armed groups
engaged in acts of violence’ nor does it, and I continue
to quote from the Russian amendment, nor does it
‘urge Member States and all those in a position to do
so to use their influence to prevent continued violence
by such groups.’”
Ambassador Valero pointed out the mechanisms
of the Arab League plan for Syria that are a violation
of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and
pointed to how the Resolution supported the armed
insurgency against the Syrian government and people.
This, he explained, was but a repeat of the acts taken
by the UN against Libya. Also he expressed his
support for the initiatives of the Russian Federation
and China, “which have prevented the Security Coun-
cil from being used to violate the sovereignty of the
Syrian Arab Republic.”
Several others who spoke against the draft resolu-
tion, either before or after the vote, expressed similar
objections, as well as the disappointment that the
Russian Federation amendments had not been accepted
by the sponsors of the GA resolution.
The vote was taken. More than one quarter of the
UN members either did not vote at all, or voted against
or abstained. Even some of those who voted in favor of
the resolution expressed their support for the Russian
amendments.
6
Speaking after the vote, the Syrian Ambassador
expressed his concern not only for his nation, but also
for the UN as a whole. He expressed the concern that
if the UN continues to send the “erroneous message”
that it is acceptable to violate the sovereignty of
member states, then this will impact the UN itself
morally and politically. “And we will have destroyed
the large body of normative efforts for the past 60
years,” he warned.
Watching the process first at the UN Security
Council with the draft resolution against Syria, and
Page 17
then at the GA with the draft resolution against Syria,
what is surprising is that in this situation, the veto
protected the Principles of the Charter at the Security
Council, while at the GA, the members could not
prevent the abuse of their procedures and subsequently
of the Charter.
Under an agenda item for “Prevention of Armed
Conflict” many members voted to support an armed
insurgency against a member nation in clear violation
of the Charter. One member expressed her hope that
the warning given by those who opposed the resolution
would not prove true. Grenada’s Ambassador said that
she was voting for the resolution to provide diplomatic
support to help the government and people of Syria
end all the bloodshed. She said she was not voting on
or for a resolution that directly or indirectly or through
interpretation or reinterpretation would be used as the
basis for the removal of government, military interven-
tion or other acts against the Charter of the UN in letter
or in spirit. She said that she was expressing these
understandings with a prayer and a hope. She didn’t
acknowledge, however, the abuse of Libya that had
occurred under Security Council resolutions, or the
difficulty of reversing the support for the armed
insurgency in Syria that some nations would claim
they had license to provide based on this GA resolu-
tion.
What was important about her statement, how-
ever, was that she demonstrated that at least she had
heard the objections to the resolution. Though she
voted in support of the resolution, she acknowledged
that if the objections proved true, such a use of the
resolution would not be in accord with why she voted
in favor of it. Though she said that her vote was not
intended to provide a pretext for regime change or
foreign intervention in Syria, unfortunately such a vote
does little to protect a fraternal member nation of the
UN from abuse.
Notes
1. For background see Ronda Hauben, “Defending the UN Charter
by Use of the Veto: the SC Resolution on Syria, February 11,
2012, taz.de
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/02/11/defending-the-un-ch
arter/
2. General Assembly Meeting on February 13, 2012
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/96th-plenary
-meeting-general-assembly-meeting.html
The statement by Nicaragua starts at 42:50
3. “League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Report of
the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria
for the period from December 24, 2011 to January 18, 2012?”
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_O
bserver_Mission.pdf
The official UN document distributed January 31, 2012 at the UN
contained the Observer Report as Enclosure 4 of S/2012/71
4. General Assembly Resolution A/Res/65/281
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/
285
July 20, 2011 “6. Decides also to continue its practice of allocat-
ing the agenda item entitled ‘Report of the Human Rights Coun-
cil’ to the plenary of the General Assembly and to the Third
Committee, in accordance with its decision 65/503 A, with the
additional understanding that the President of the Council will
present the report in her or his capacity as President to the plenary
of the General Assembly and the Third Committee and that the
Third Committee will hold an interactive dialogue with the
President of the Council at the time of her or his presentation of
the report of the Council to the Third Committee; 7. Decides
further that the annual report of the Human Rights Council shall
cover the period from October 1 to September 30, including the
regular September session of the Council.”
5. General Assembly Meeting on February 16, 2012
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/97th-plenary
-meeting-general-assembly.html
The statement by Venezuela starts at 34:23
6. The Draft Resolution on Syria A66/L.36 “The Situation in the
Syrian Arab Republic”
http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/_pr
/press-releases/2012/20120216-syria-resolution-ga.html?archiv
e=2990092
Vote totals announced on Thursday, February 16, 2012:
For 137
Against 12
Abstaining 17
Vote problems 3
Not voting 24
(Total not voting, abstaining, or voting against 53)
Total members 193
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on March 3, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/03/04/kofi-anna
ns-role-in-syrian-conflict/]
The UN Charter and
Kofi Annan’s Role in the
Syrian Conflict
by Ronda Hauben
In line with the non-binding UN General Assem-
bly resolution A/Res/66/253 approved at the UN on
February 16, 2012, Ban Ki-moon has appointed Kofi
Page 18
Annan, former UN Secretary General as the joint
UN-Arab League envoy to Syria.
1
Mr. Annan came to the UN on Wednesday,
February 29, to begin the assumption of his role in the
Syrian situation. Speaking to journalists at a press
stakeout on Wednesday evening, Ban Ki-moon pre-
sented Mr. Annan to the media. As this was the first
chance for UN journalists and the public to hear from
Mr. Annan about the role he envisions playing in the
Syrian conflict, it was disappointing that the Spokes-
man for the Secretary General only allowed three
questions from journalists at this press encounter.
Clearly Mr. Annan is no stranger to the UN
Charter as he served for 10 years as UN Secretary
General. Yet his new appointment represents a signifi-
cant dilemma with which he will need to come to grips
if he is to be able to act in a manner consistent with the
principles of the UN Charter.
The position he has accepted is under the umbrella
of two institutions, namely that of the United Nations
which is supposed to adhere to the principles of the
UN Charter, and the Arab League which has its own
mandates and political realities. Will the former UN
Secretary General recognize the need to place adhering
to the principles of the UN Charter as the higher
authority for his joint appointment? Or will he take the
road of accommodating the political pressures from
Arab League and UN member nations who have
ignored the UN charter in their actions connected with
the Syrian conflict.
Two questions I had for Mr. Annan which I was
not able to ask were, [1] Were there any conditions
that you put on taking this position? [2] Were you
familiar with the content and conclusions of the Arab
League Observer Mission Report on Syria?
With no opportunity to ask these questions, it is
only possible to consider Mr. Annan’s remarks to the
press on Wednesday, February 29, and subsequent
comments from Ban Ki-moon on Friday, March 2 to
see if there is any indication of how Mr Annan might
have responded to these questions.
The first question is one that Mr. Annan appeared
to address in his opening statement on Wednesday
evening. He said “(L)et me say one thing. If we are
going to succeed, it is extremely important that we all
accept there should be one process of moderation….
(O)ne single unitary process, and it is when the inter-
national community speaks with one voice, that voice
is powerful.”
2
Since the spokesperson did not allow sufficient
time for questions, no journalist was able to ask Mr.
Annan what other possible “process of moderation” he
was referring to.
One journalist tried to ask Martin Nesirky, the
Spokesperson for the Secretary General, the question
the next day at the noon briefing. Later in the day, the
same journalist tried to pose this question to the U.K.
Ambassador who had just assumed the position of
acting President of the Security Council for the month
of March. There was no answer to the question from
either of these parties, and no means indicated to get
an answer.
The UN member nation that had publicly offered
to provide a means to support dialogue among the
different parties in the Syrian conflict is the Russian
Federation. While the Russian Federation did not offer
to mediate the conflict, it has offered to provide a
venue for the different sides to the conflict to come to
speak with each other as a means of encouraging
dialogue to resolve the conflict. If Mr. Annan has
indeed set out to limit the efforts of the Russian
Federation to help support a peaceful settlement of the
conflict, this would appear to be in contradiction to the
need to welcome all to help resolve the problem.
Recently, Deputy Foreign Minister Gatilov of the
Russian Federation indicated that he invited Mr.
Annan to Russia for consultations on the situation.
Since Mr. Annan has promised “to consult broadly
with all actors,” Mr. Annan response to the invitation
will help indicate if he will fulfill his promise.
Also striking is the fact that Mr. Annan spoke
about the international community “speaking with one
voice” over the conflict in Syria. He is clearly aware
that there is a significant conflict among the permanent
members of the Security Council over what is needed
to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, or even if
a peaceful resolution is possible. Two members of the
Security Council are opposed to foreign intervention
into the domestic affairs of Syria, in line with the
obligations of the UN Charter. They also oppose the
UN Security Council dictating a solution involving
regime change in Syria. To do so, is also contrary to
the Charter. Other permanent members of the Security
Council, however, are supporters of both foreign
intervention in Syria and regime change, despite the
prohibitions against such actions in the UN Charter.
At a press conference with Ban Ki-moon on
Friday, March 2, one journalist asked Mr Ban if Mr
Annan’s mandate stemmed from the Arab League’s
prescription for a political transition in Syria which
Page 19
required the removal of the Syrian President from the
process. The Secretary General’s response was that
there is a distinction between the “broader guidelines
on the mandate for the Special Envoy” contained in the
General Assembly resolution of February 16, and the
Arab League’s position in their resolution of January
22.
Explaining this distinction, Ban told journalists
3
:
“SG: The General Assembly has adopted a resolution
giving a broader guideline of the mandate of the
Special Envoy, and of course, as you said, the League
of Arab States has adopted a resolution on January 22,
having their own position there. But I believe at this
time, to have a political dialogue with Syrian authori-
ties, he should be given broader flexibility, a broader
framework. This is what we have agreed [to]. Rather
than sticking to any specific points, as you mentioned
in the resolution of the League of Arab States. So, it’s
up to Mr. Annan’s very able diplomatic skill to draw
out, first of all, and to [end] all violence and to bring
about the political solution of these issues and also
help create some humanitarian space. This is a broader,
broader framework and mandate, so he will have much
more flexibility.”
Ban indicated that this was the mandate agreed to
during a half hour three way teleconference on Thurs-
day conversation between himself, Kofi Annan and
[Nabil] El-Araby of the Arab League.
While there have been some clues to what Mr.
Annan’s response would have been to the first question
I would have asked, what his response might have
been to the second question is more difficult to deter-
mine. The issues raised by the conclusions of the Arab
League Observer Mission Report referred to the need
to overtly address the problem of the armed insurgency
against the Syrian government and civilians.
4
Despite false media or opposition claims, what is
going on in Syria is not that the government is attack-
ing peaceful civilian protesters.
5
To the contrary, there
is an armed insurgency, fueled by foreign intervention
and support, that the Syrian government is endeavoring
to defeat. To call the Syrian government to stop the
action against the armed insurgency, while not provid-
ing a mechanism to protect civilians and the govern-
ment from the violent actions of these armed insur-
gents, presents a support for the violent actions of the
insurgents. Such a situation would require the Syrian
government to fail to fulfill its obligation to civilians
and state institutions to protect them from foreign and
internal violent attacks. The Observer Mission Report
recognized this problem, as have the Ambassadors of
the Russia Federation, China, and several other UN
members. Mr. Annan did not give any clear indication
of whether or not he recognized this problem.
In his opening statement to the press, Mr. Annan
did refer to the need for a peaceful resolution to the
Syrian conflict, as opposed to those who openly call
for regime change or foreign intervention. While Mr.
Annan appears to have overtly discouraged any other
efforts toward a peaceful solution to the Syrian con-
flict, he has only gently and obliquely referred to the
fact that there are those who advocate foreign interven-
tion and violence to determine the outcome of the
Syrian conflict. While Mr. Annan has advocated
“dialogue between all actors in Syria” he only
obliquely noted, “I know there are people who have
other ideas that dialogue may not be the way to go and
one should use other means.” The rationale he offers
to counter the armed insurgency is a weak one. He
explains, “But I think, for the sake of the people, for
the Syrian people who are caught in the middle, a
peaceful solution through dialogue and a speedy one is
the way to go.”
While it is early in the process, one can only
wonder how Mr. Annan expects to accomplish “a
peaceful solution through dialogue and a speedy one,”
when one of the parties to the conflict is an armed
insurgency backed by at least some NATO members
and the Gulf Cooperation Council. These are UN
member nations whose intervention in the domestic
affairs of Syria is clearly contrary to the principles of
the UN Charter. Other parties to the conflict are the
Syrian government and its supporters, and the nonvio-
lent internal opposition that is opposed to foreign
intervention in the conflict. Any process that leaves out
the Syrian government or dictates who that govern-
ment is, is a process only aimed at dictating regime
change in a sovereign UN member state, a process
which would be in clear violation of the UN Charter.
In addition to the actions of Russia and China, the
fact that the mandate for Mr Annan’s mission has been
broadened and focused on ending all violence and
initiating a political dialogue is one of the few optimis-
tic signs yet to emerge from the UN in its efforts to
help to find a solution to the Syrian conflict. Ban
Ki-moon’s statement that Kofi Annan is to have a
broader framework and much more flexibility than any
particularities in the Arab League resolution is a
commitment to be watched as the process undertaken
by Mr Annan unfolds. Can the principles of the UN
Page 20
Charter begin to function as a guide for a negotiation
process in Syria? Is there a means to stop the foreign
intervention and encouragement and support for armed
insurrection against the Syrian government and civil-
ians? If such conditions are met, will the Syrian
government be able to carry out a reform process to
meet legitimate demands of opposition forces while
protecting the safety and political rights of other
segments of the Syrian population. These are some of
the questions that the conflict in Syria and the role
played by the UN raises. The good offices mission of
Mr. Annan will be watched by people around the
world as a test of the UN and its ability to contribute to
a peaceful resolution of a conflict that has been intensi-
fied by the intervention of foreign powers.
Notes
1. UN GA Resolution G/Res/66/253 “The Situation in the Syrian
Arab Republic” Adopted February 16, 2012, See also, Ronda
Hauben, “Using the UN GA to Endorse the AL Regime Change
Agenda for Syria”, February 19, 2012.
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/02/19/un-ga-meeting-syria/
2. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and UAW-Arab League
Joint Special Envoy for Syria, Kofi Annan on Syria-Joint Media
Stakeout, February 29, 2012. Video and transcript:
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/02/secretary-gen
eral-ban-ki-moon-and-kofi-annan-on-syria-media-stakeout.html
3. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon Press Conference, March 2,
2012 Video and transcript:
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/03/un-secretary-
general-ban-ki-moon-press-conference-2.html
Ban Ki-moon told journalists: “The mandate will be based on the
General Assembly resolution. Yesterday, I had a trilateral tele-
conference involving myself, Kofi Annan and [Nabil] El-Araby
of the League of Arab States for about half an hour – what the
mandate and terms of reference of the Joint Special Envoy would
be. We have an agreement on that. Basically, his mission and his
activities will be guided by this General Assembly resolution to
have a good offices role and try to have a cease-fire, an end to
violence and to help [find a] political solution [to] this issue in an
inclusive way.”
4. “League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria: Report of
the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria
for the period from December 24, 2011 to January 18, 2012?”
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_O
bserver_Mission.pdf
5. See for example, Sharmine Narwani, “Questioning the Syrian
‘Casualty List’,” Akhabar English, February 28, 2012
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/questioning-syrian-%E2%
80%9Ccasualty-list%E2%80%9D
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on April 7, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/04/07/against-p
arallel-track-to-un-syria-plan/]
Struggle at the UN against
Parallel Track to Annan Syria
Plan
by Ronda Hauben
The Presidency of the General Assembly (PGA)
at the United Nations this year is held by the former
Ambassador from Qatar, Nassir Abdulaziz al Nasser.
On Thursday, April 5, the President (PGA) held an
informal plenary meeting of the General Assembly.
Often an informal meeting is called when the meeting
will be closed to the press and the public. But in this
situation, the spokesperson for the PGA sent journal-
ists e-mail inviting them to the meeting and informing
them “Please be advised this will be an OPEN meeting
on UNTV and webcast.” (E-mail to journalists from
Nihal Saad, April 4)
The meeting was to hear a report via a live satel-
lite link from Mr Kofi Annan, the UN Envoy for Syria,
about the progress of his six point peace plan for Syria.
The meeting was called to order and was webcast for
journalists and the public.
After Mr. Annan’s live video presentation, the GA
President announced that members could speak but
should limit their comments to three minutes. He then
called on the Syrian Ambassador. As the Syrian
Ambassador began to speak, the UNTV coverage of
the webcast and press access were suddenly ended.
This was in violation of the previous announcements
to the press that the meeting would be open and
available via a webcast.
1
In response, Ambassador Bashar Ja’afari, the
Syrian Ambassador to the UN called a press confer-
ence later that afternoon. At the press conference, he
said that such action is a serious violation of UN
General Assembly procedures and norms and in his
estimation an example of “diplomatic and media
terrorism.” He pointed to the e-mail that the Spokes-
person for the PGA had sent out announcing that the
meeting was an OPEN meeting. The Ambassador
explained that after the webcast had been turned off
and the meeting closed to journalists, only selected
Page 21
speakers were allowed to speak, specifically the
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia and the European Union
Representative.
The Syrian Ambassador said that multiple re-
quests he made to speak were denied. He also reported
that a point of order that the Russian Ambassador
asked to be considered was not responded to. Ambas-
sador Ja’afari described how the European Union
Representative had been granted time to speak before
the Russia’s representative, in violation of procedures
of the GA requiring that member nations be called on
before the EU Representative.
Why would the President of the GA announce that
member delegations could speak for three minutes and
then close the meeting, and deny all but a few chosen
members the right to speak?
This is a serious question as the United Nations is
the one multilateral organization which includes 193
member states. If the processes of the UN General
Assembly are being administered with no regard for
customary procedures and traditions, then the integrity
of the organization itself is in jeopardy.
During the press conference with the Syrian
Ambassador, he was asked for his understanding of
why the PGA would be involved with such activity?
Ambassador Ja’afari explained that he believed that
the PGA was using his position as President of the UN
General Assembly to carry out the foreign policy of his
government, Qatar, rather than acting to carry out the
duties of the presidency as a neutral officer of the UN
to facilitate the decisions of the member states.
After Kofi Annan had made his presentation,
Syria’s Ambassador explained that he had asked to
speak because he had wanted to present the Syrian
government’s official position of support for the Kofi
Annan mission. His government, he explained had
agreed by a letter sent to Mr. Annan, to pull back troop
concentrations and to stop the use and presence of
heavy weapons in population centers by April 10.
The action of the President of the General Assem-
bly, however, had objectively functioned to prevent
such a public explanation of the position of the Syrian
government during the General Assembly meeting.
Syria’s Ambassador explained that Mr. Annan had
not indicated the receipt of any such official notifica-
tion from the armed opposition that it would comply
with its obligations to honor a cease fire.
“What would happen if the army withdrew from
the hotspots and the armed opposition did not give up
their fighting?” asked Ambassador Ja’afari.
This is exactly what happened this past January
when Arab League observers were withdrawn by the
Gulf states after having documented the on-the-
ground-presence in Syria of armed insurgents attack-
ing government troops, civilians and the public infra-
structure. But in the situation in January, there were
Arab League Observers on the ground while the Syrian
government was withdrawing its armed forces from
population centers, so it could be clear who was
breaking the cease fire efforts.
In the case of Mr. Annan’s peace proposal, how-
ever, there is no such observer force on the ground to
monitor the movements toward a cease fire. In addi-
tion, the armed insurgents are not being asked to honor
a cease fire until 48 hours after the Syrian government
has completed the withdrawal of its forces. Ambassa-
dor Ja’afari explained that Syria was asking Mr. Annan
to provide guarantees that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey
and other nations arming the insurgents would stop
their economic, military and logistical support for the
armed insurgents fighting against the government of
Syria.
The Syrian Ambassador pointed out that on March
25 the Syrian government had officially agreed to Kofi
Annan’s six point proposal. One week later, on April
1, countries engaged in the illegal intervention in
Syria’s domestic affairs, had organized a meeting in
Istanbul, where they agreed to fund the armed insur-
gency by providing it with economic, military and
logistic support. Instead of providing support for the
Annan mission, these countries acted to create a
parallel track to undermine the peace process being
carried out by Mr. Annan. Providing arms to the
insurgents who are fighting to overthrow the Syrian
government is against international law. Ambassador
Ja’afari said, “Somebody should stop them.”
The UN is being put in a contradictory position.
Can the UN help to settle the conflict in Syria, when
some of its member nations are financing and arming
insurgents to commit violent acts against the govern-
ment, civilians and the public infrastructure of Syria in
violation of the UN charter? If the actions of some
members of the UN at its meetings make it impossible
to maintain the integrity of the procedures and princi-
ples of the UN, the actions of the UN are more likely
to intensify the conflict in Syria, rather than helping to
resolve it. Such actions will also undermine the very
integrity of the UN itself. It was helpful that Ambassa-
dor Ja’afari raised these issues in the press conference
he held on Thursday, April 5. To challenge the distor-
Page 22
tions and procedural violations at the UN is an impor-
tant step toward maintaining the integrity of the UN so
it can contribute to resolving conflicts rather than
deepening them.
Notes
1. A description of this violation was given later that day by the
Syrian Ambassador at a press conference he called. Video of the
Press conference by Bashar Ja’afari, April 5, 2012
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/04/press-confere
nce-bashar-jaafari-syria-on-the-situation-in-syria.html
A helpful written summary for the April 5, 2012 Press Conference
by the Permanent Representative of Syria is available at the UN
website.
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs//2012/120405_Syria.do
c.htm
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on April 23, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/04/23/unsc-appr
oves-90-day-observer-mission-to-syria/]
Second Track Challenged as
UN SC Approves 90 day
Observer Mission to Syria
by Ronda Hauben
I – Security Council Authorizes UN Ob-
server Mission
At a stakeout for journalists on Saturday after the
vote on Security Council Resolution 2043, Russia’s
UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin explained that the text
was carefully worded to signal all, including the
opposition, to refrain from violence and to support the
implementation of Special Envoy Kofi Annan’s six-
point plan. This resolution (S/RES/2043(2012))
provides the authorization for up to 300 UN observers
to be sent to Syria for a period of up to 90 days.
1
The
resolution states that the “mandate of the Mission shall
be to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its
forms by all parties and support the full implementa-
tion of the Envoy’s six-point proposal.”
Differences about some of the provisions of the
resolution had been resolved by changes made to the
draft resolution in a 3-1/2 hour consultation held by
Security Council members on Friday evening. Ambas-
sador Churkin expressed satisfaction that the Security
Council resolution he had initiated provided the basis
for the resolution approved by the Security Council on
Saturday in a unanimous vote of all 15 members.
II – Statements After the Vote
Statements made by several of the members of the
Security Council after the vote help to shed light on
the situation the UN observer mission can expect to
encounter in Syria. In his statement, South African
Ambassador Baso Sangqu referred to a letter to the
Security Council members received earlier in the
week. In that letter, the UN Secretary General reported
that the Syrian government had welcomed the Ad-
vance Team of the observer mission, and that “despite
some challenges, the Advance Team has enjoyed
freedom of movement and has not observed major
military concentrations or conflict.”
“We welcome the news,” Ambassador Sangqu
said, “that the advance team has been able to visit
hotspots of the conflict, including Homs and that they
have observed calm and an end to major hostilities.”
He noted that, “The deployment of the advance team
has already proven to be a calming influence as
violence has decreased during its presence. This
marked decrease in violence should now be sustained.”
In his statement after the vote, Indian Ambassador
Hardeep Singh Puri thanked the Russian delegation for
introducing the resolution. “This is a significant step in
the Council’s collective support for the efforts of the
joint Special Envoy, Mr. Kofi Annan,” said Ambassa-
dor Puri.
The Indian Ambassador observed, “it is a matter
of satisfaction that Mr. Annan’s efforts over the last
seven weeks have resulted in an improvement in the
situation in Syria. Even though there have been reports
of violations, the cease-fire that came into force on 12
April has been observed by all parties in a large part of
Syria.“ Ambassador Puri called for an expeditious
deployment of the United Nations Supervision Mission
in Syria (UNSMIS) which the Security Council had
just authorized.
China’s Ambassador Li Baodong expressed the
hope that, “the Supervision Mission will fully respect
Syria’s sovereignty and dignity, act in strict accor-
dance with the authorization of the Security Council,
adhere to the principles of neutrality, objectivity and
impartiality, and play an active and constructive role in
pushing for a sustained cessation of violence in Syria.”
Page 23
In his comments after the vote, Ambassador
Churkin, expressed his view that, “The resolution
establishes a clear framework of responsibilities for all
parties to end the Syrian violence and for the need for
cooperation with the UN observer mission and the
Special Envoy.” He called upon the “external players
involved in the Syrian question” to behave “responsi-
bly” and to act in accordance with the provisions of
resolutions adopted by the Security Council. In that
regard, he pointed to the fact that the UN Security
Council is the body which holds primary responsibility
for matters of international peace and security. Other
formats like the “groups of friends” that met in Tunis,
Istanbul or Paris, should follow the resolutions of the
Security Council and not undermine its work, he said.
Similarly, he expressed the sentiment that “the Libyan
model of action should remain forever in the past.”
While other delegations on the Security Council
like those of Portugal, Pakistan, and Morocco pointed
to the obligations of all in the Syrian conflict to honor
the cease fire and cease violent acts, the U.S. Ambas-
sador Susan Rice focused her criticism solely on what
she referred to as the “Assad regime.” And she threat-
ened that if the Syrian government did not provide for
“full freedom of movement for UN personnel” and
other demands that she enumerated, the U.S. would
“pursue measures against the Syrian government.”
The text of the resolution, however, contains no
provision for “full freedom of movement for UN
personnel” to be provided, as Ambassador Rice
demanded. To the contrary, the resolution calls on the
Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of
UNSMIS by ensuring that unimpeded and immediate
freedom of movement and access as necessary “to
fulfill its mandate.” The mandate is not open ended but
is specifically written. The mandate is “to monitor a
cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all
parties and support the full implementation of the
Envoy’s six-point proposal.”
After all Council members who had asked to
speak had been called on, the Syrian Ambassador
Bashar al-Jaafari made a statement to the Council. He
noted that there were statements made in the Security
Council session in support of the resolution and
statements contrary to it. He pointed to the fact that
there was no reference in the resolution to the “Assad
regime” as the U.S. Ambassador had mischaracterized
the Syrian government. Similarly, he noted the mis-
characterizations of the violence in Syria. He pointed
out that such mischaracterization had been critiqued in
the Arab League Observer Report. (para 30 Arab
League Observer Report)
2
Examples presented in the Report provided
convincing evidence that there were armed militants
carrying out violent acts in Syria. Also the Arab
League Observers noted in their Report that while they
were in Syria, peaceful opposition protests that they
observed had not been disrupted by the Syrian govern-
ment. (para 71 Arab League Observer Report)
Ambassador Jaafari characterized as topsy turvey
blaming crimes by armed insurgents on the Syrian
government. He hoped that the UN Observer Mission
would help to dispel the media misinformation about
the situation on the ground in Syria, as the Arab
League Observer Mission Report had done.
III – Safety Issues and Lessons from Arab
League Observer Mission
During the stakeout held by the Russian Ambassa-
dor after the Security Council meeting, one journalist
asked a question referring to the danger of sabotage of
the UN Observer Mission as had happened with the
Arab League Observer Mission. This earlier mission
was discontinued just as it documented the actual
existence of an armed insurgency that was responsible
for substantial violence in the Syrian conflict.
The Russian Ambassador acknowledged that the
UN observers going to Syria would be facing a
“daunting task.” He was concerned for their safety and
noted that Russian observers would be part of the UN
Mission. It would be their duty to report objectively,
he explained, and he hoped that the international
community would support their objective reporting.
In the Security Council process of planning for
this Second Observer Mission to be sent to Syria, there
appears to have been little attention paid to building on
the lessons described in the Arab League Observers
Report. The Report of the Arab League Observers was
included as Enclosure Number 4 in the document
S/2012/71 (p. 11-46) distributed at the January 31,
2012 meeting of the Security Council. In the Report,
problems of the insufficiency of transportation and
communication equipment were particularly noted, as
was the need to make available adequate “administra-
tive and logistic support” and “media and political
support to create an appropriate environment that will
enable it to fulfill its mandate in the required manner.”
(Para 83) (See Also Para 64, 65,68 and 69, VIII)
The Report describes the experience of the Arab
Page 24
League Observers, both their successes and the prob-
lems they faced. In so doing it provides a basis to
predict what problems will need to be solved and what
difficulties can be expected for the UN Observer
Mission to Syria. Ambassador Churkin and several
other members of the Security Council recognized the
challenges that the UN Observer Mission will face, but
the frequent distractions presented by those govern-
ments that are hopeful they can bring about regime
change in Syria appear to hinder the needed consider-
ation in the Security Council of how to build on the
lessons of the Arab League Observer Mission.
IV – Netizen Comments
In an online discussion of a report on RT (Russia
Today TV and streaming video) about the most recent
Security Council Resolution authorizing the UN to
provide for the observer mission in Syria, one netizen
pointed to the problem of foreign support for the
armed insurgency in Syria.
3
As part of a longer com-
ment, this netizen criticized the UN saying: “The UN
has failed in its duties to protect Syria from outside
interference by remaining silent on the continued
arming/funding of the ‘opposition’ by the
U.S./U.K./Israel/Turkey and their Arab allies.” (Anon,
April 22. 00:08)
Another netizen commenting on the need for
accurate reporting about the role of the armed insur-
gents wrote: “Let’s hope the monitors have the guts to
tell the UN the role that the terrorist opposition plays
in the mayhem. Unlike Ban-Ki-Moon, who blames it
all on the govt. forces.” (CON, April 21, 2012. 19:49)
A netizen comment on the irony represented by
media reports which are in sharp contrast to the reality
on the ground: “Despite the UN’s ‘peace plan’ being
fully rejected by both the Syrian rebels and their
Western and Arab League backers who have openly
pledged cash, weapons, and support for them to
continue fighting in full violation of the proposed
cease fire, the Western media has instead accused the
Syrian government of failing to meet its
obligations….” (Tony Cartalucci, April 21, 2012.
23:12)
Yet another netizen pointed to the lack of logic of
much of Western reporting about the armed insurgents
in Syria: “It is absurd to try to enforce a cease fire,
when only (the) Government has signed the accord.
The militants did not bother. And in the meantime, all
Western governments are concerned about is the “right
of Syrians to protest.” Fantastic. Let them just get in
the streets, so that the bombers can blow them up and
blame the Government. Militants are giving interviews
in (the) Western press – Der Spiegel – about their
executions of civilians suspected of supporting (the)
regime!… If anywhere on (the) planet such armed
extremists try to take over neighborhoods, the entire
force of that country will be brought to bear on them,
and nobody would shed a tear if they all get blasted
into oblivious. But in Syria, we glorify them? And
why? I am not sure, but it seems to me that Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf do not like the fact that in Syria
EVERYBODY can practice openly any religion – and
is safe….” (Bianca, April 22, 2012. 06:54)
4
Responding to such comments, another netizen
wrote, “…I salute the discerning readers of this
thread.” (Igor, April 22, 2012. 13:38)
Such extracts from comments of netizens discuss-
ing the UN Security Council activities demonstrate
that the situation in Syria is of concern to people
around the world.
Security Council Resolution 2043, some of the
statements made in the Security Council after the vote,
and the Arab League Observer Mission Report paint a
more accurate than usual picture of the crisis in Syria.
Considered in light of sample netizen comments and
other articles
5
on the Internet critiquing mainstream
media coverage of this crisis, a more accurate view of
the crisis emerges which will be needed if the means
is to be found to resolve the conflict.
Notes
1. S/RES/2043 (2012) “The situation in the Middle East”
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/204
3(2012)
The draft resolution was S/2012/245
http://un-report.blogspot.com/2012/04/final-draft-resolution-on-
syria.html
2. The Arab League Observer Report
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2012/71
“Letter dated January 24, 2012 from the Secretary-General
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Enclosure 4
League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria “Report of Head
of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria for the
period from December 24, 2011 to January 18, 2012, p. 11-22.”
3.
http://rt.com/news/un-security-council-monitors-syria-635/-
comments/
4. “Ulrike Putz, An Executioner for Syria’s Rebels Tells his
Story,” Der Spiegel, March 29, 2012
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,824603,00. html
5. A couple of other recent articles documenting media misrepre-
sentations of what is happening in Syria include:
http://english.al-akhbar.com/blogs/sandbox/surprise-video-chan
Page 25
ges-syria-timeline
http://www.syrianews.cc/syria-security-council-unsc-increases-
observers-607.html
http://tunisianquestfortruth.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/samples-
of-media-distortion-of-facts-about-syria-1-fake-pictures/ (contains
some disturbing images)
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on April 26, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/04/26/kofi-anna
n-briefing/]
Kofi Annan tells UN “We
Need Eyes and Ears on the
Ground”
by Ronda Hauben
In his briefing to the UN Security Council on
Tuesday April 24, Kofi Annan noted the important
impact that the UN Observer Mission was having on
the ground even though there had only been a few UN
observers deployed thus far.
1
He reported that there
had been a marked decrease in the level of violence
since the April 12 cease fire in Syria. “Without com-
prehensive monitoring of the situation,” he said, “it is
difficult to assess the level of violence, but the avail-
able reports suggest that, taken as a whole the level of
violence has decreased across the period since April
12….” (Kofi Annan Briefing, Para 7 )
He noted that the importance of having observers
was not only to “see what is going on.” More signifi-
cantly, he pointed out that “their presence has the
potential to change the political dynamics.” (Kofi
Annan Briefing, Para 21)
His goal is not to “freeze the situation” he ex-
plained, but to move toward what he calls an “enabling
environment” that will facilitate “a genuine political
process.”
Annan spoke to the crucial role that accurate
information must play in helping to ease the crisis in
Syria. “We continue to be hampered by the lack of
verified information in assessing the situation,” he
said. “We need eyes and ears on the ground,” he
emphasized. “This will provide the incontrovertible
basis the international community needs to act in an
effective and unified manner, increasing the momen-
tum for a cessation of violence to be implemented by
all sides,” he explains. (Kofi Annan Briefing, Para 20)
Such a statement fails to acknowledge that there
are those in what he calls the “international commu-
nity” who are hostile to his peace mission. Instead they
are working for regime change in Syria, a goal con-
trary to the UN charter. Accurate information is, in
fact, as he emphasized, critical to the success of his
mission in Syria.
A significant weakness of what he is doing ap-
pears to be the fact that he does not acknowledge the
harmful effect that the unverified reporting of claims
of the opposition has played in the Syrian crisis.
The January 2012 Report of the Arab League
Observers Mission contained several references to the
harmful role played by inaccurate media reports of
what is happening in Syria.
2
In Section E of that
Report “The Media,” there is a summary of this role.
Quoting this section: “Since it began its work, the
Mission has been the target of a vicious media cam-
paign. Some media outlets have published unfounded
statements, which they attributed to the Head of the
Mission. They have also grossly exaggerated events,
thereby distorting the truth.” (Report of Arab League
Observer Mission, Para 68)
“Such contrived reports have helped to increase
tensions among the Syrian people and undermined the
observers’ work. Some media organizations were
exploited in order to defame the Mission and its Head
and cause the Mission to fail.” (Report of Arab League
Observer Mission, Para 69)
In considering such past experience of an Ob-
server Mission in Syria, it is to be expected that again
there will be exaggerated media reports that will
distort the truth. In his briefing to the Security Council,
however, Annan refers to some unverified reports as
having led him to be “particularly alarmed.” Though
he admits that such reports have not been “confirmed,”
he doesn’t warn that such reports must be suspect until
after a verification process has occurred. (Kofi Annan
Briefing, Para 9) Not surprisingly many western media
reports about Annan’s briefing to the Security Council
focused on Annan’s statement of alarm, rather than
cautioning that such alarm is premature in the absence
of verification.
While the Arab League Observer Mission was
able to quickly put 166 monitors from 13 Arab coun-
tries and six relevant Arab organizations on the
ground, the Security Council is being told that it will
take up to a month to send 100 of the 300 UNSMIS
Page 26
observers to Syria. Such a slow pace for fulfilling the
mandate provided by the Security Council in its
approval of UNSMIS (S/RES/2043(2012)) is being
criticized by some Security Council members. In his
presentation to the Council, Annan asked that the
“momentum generated” by the Council quickly ap-
proving the mandate for the Observer Mission not be
lost.
Reports from on the ground are that there are
eleven UN observers already in Syria, and that by the
end of April the thirty observers for the initial contin-
gent should be deployed. Despite such small numbers
of observers, the early phase this represents in the
mission, and the positive nature of Annan’s briefing to
the Security Council, there are media reports quoting
various sources that proclaim that the mission has
failed.
3
Such misleading media reports are to be expected
as there is a media war against the sovereignty of Syria
and in support of the armed insurgency. One mecha-
nism of this media warfare is constant reference to
unverified reports from the opposition from such
questionable sources as the Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights which is in the U.K. Several exposures
of this organization have been written showing that not
only do two rival groups claim they are the legitimate
representatives of this entity, but neither of the groups
has a basis to verify the reports that are issued in its
name. Yet many media organizations around the
world, especially in the West, continually refer to
claims by this London based organization as the basis
for the casualty figures they blame on the Syrian
government. Similarly, more reliable information
including names of victims among both government or
civilian sectors caused by the armed insurgency are not
reported in these mainstream media sources. Recently,
a number of journalists have resigned from Aljazeera
claiming that the political thrust of the news organiza-
tion would not allow these journalists to report on the
evidence of violence by the armed insurgents.
In every war, media is a major weapon. Annan’s
six point plan is part of a peace mission. How the UN
Observer Mission will respond to the media warfare
against the Annan plan is a critical question that will
determine how effectively UNSMIS can perform as a
force in Syria.
Notes
1. Kofi Annan Briefing to the Security Council, April 24, 2012.
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0ByLPNZ-eSjJdbVRrTE4xb3F0
RDQ/edit?pli=1
2. Report of the Arab League Observer Mission to Syria, January,
2012, S/2012/71
http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=s/2012/71
(The title of the UN document is “Letter dated January 24, 2012
from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the
Security Council, Enclosure 4. League of Arab States Observer
Mission to Syria ‘Report of Head of the League of Arab States
Observer Mission to Syria for the period from December 24, 2011
to January 18, 2012, p. 11-22’.”)
3. See for example: Ariel Zirulnick, “Observers in Syria Having
an Impact but only 11 on the Ground So Far,” Christian Science
Monitor, April 25, 2012
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2012/0425
/Observers-in-Syria-having-an-impact-but-only-11-on-the-grou
nd-so-far
Ian Black, “Kofi Annan offers bleak progress report on Syria,”
The Guardian, April 25, 2012
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/25/kofi-annan-bleak
-report-syria?newsfeed=true
4. RT, “Russia questions credibility of Syrian Observatory for
Human Rights,” February 25, 2012
http://rt.com/news/syrian-observatory-human-rights-reliability-
223/
RT, “Deaths in Syria: Counting them (politically) correctly,”
February 9, 2012
http://rt.com/news/syria-death-count-political-875/
“Al Jazeera reporter resigns over ‘biased’ Syria coverage”
http://english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-jazeera-reporter-resigns-
over-biased-syria-coverage
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared on
the netizenblog on June 12, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/06/12/un-and-h
oula-massacre/]
UN and Houla Massacre: The
Information Battlefield
by Ronda Hauben
At a press conference held on June 4 marking the
beginning of China’s presidency of the UN Security
Council for the month of June, Li Baodong, China’s
Ambassador to the UN, observed that there are differ-
ent versions of the facts of the Houla Massacre. “Now
we have different stories from different angles,” he
noted. “Now we have the story from the Syrian gov-
Page 27
ernment, and from the opposition parties, and from
different sources.”
Since the Security Council has “a team…on the
ground,” he said, “We want to see first-hand informa-
tion from our own people.” He hoped this would make
it possible to put the different pieces of information
together and to come “to our own conclusion with our
own judgment.”
1
The expectation was that Joint UN-Arab League
Envoy Kofi Annan would be able to provide further
information from the UNSMIS Observer mission when
he came to speak with the Security Council on Thurs-
day, June 7. It was anticipated that Annan’s presenta-
tion would help to clarify the facts of the massacre.
2
On June 7, however, instead of providing new
information from such an investigation, UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-moon and several of the other speak-
ers at the Informal General Assembly (GA) meeting
put the responsibility for the Houla Massacre on the
Assad government. This was also the dominant re-
sponse of the nations that spoke at the informal GA
meeting even though there had not yet been any
adequate investigation into facts of the situation.
3
Also,
there were claims of a new massacre.
Some of the member nations that spoke at the
informal GA meeting, however, objected to coming to
such a conclusion, especially, in the absence of an
adequate investigation.
In his comments referring to the massacres in
Houla and on the outskirts of Hama, the Russian
Ambassador to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, said, “Clearly
these are the most serious crimes that require a reliable
detailed investigation.”
Other nations including Venezuela, India, Cuba
and Nicaragua expressed similar views. The Venezue-
lan Representative told the Informal GA meeting, “We
suspect the fact that these criminal acts happen to
coincide with these debates at the UN. We have to
wonder who does this benefit at this time?” He urged
that, “an independent and transparent investigation into
these massacres must take place and we must find
convincing clarity.”
India’s Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh
Puri, noted that the attacks against civilians and
security forces in Syria “have intensified over the last
few weeks and have taken a significant toll.” Also he
drew attention to the sharp increase in the number of
terrorist attacks in different parts of the country.” He
“condemned all violence, irrespective of who the
perpetrators are,” and called for the “cessation of all
outside support for armed groups and serious action
against the terrorist groups in Syria.” And he asked
that the crimes, “including the recent incident in El
Houleh, are fully investigated and their perpetrators
brought to justice.”
After comparing what has happened in Syria with
what had happened in Libya, the Nicaraguan Repre-
sentative called for “an exhaustive investigation of
these crimes and to bring the guilty to justice.”
The Cuban Ambassador noted that the “informa-
tion is fragmented, imprecise and the object of fre-
quent manipulation.” He denounced what he saw as
the “complicity of the major broadcast media which
are used to confusing reality and not accepting the
responsibility for their acts.”
During his comments, which were twice cut off by
the UN video transmission system, Ambassador Bashir
Ja’afari, the Syrian Ambassador, asked how the
Secretary General of the League of Arab States could
render a judgment about who is responsible for the
Houla massacre when such a judgment contradicts the
report of the United Nations observers on the ground,
and investigations of that atrocious massacre have not
yet been completed. The massacre, he emphasized, had
been condemned by the Syrian government.
Ambassador Ja’afari announced that, “Syria is
ready to receive a commission of inquiry of states
known for their independence and for their respect for
the UN charter and for their refusal to interfere in
Syrian internal affairs.”
Later in the afternoon, after the Security Council’s
informal briefing with Kofi Annan, there was a media
stakeout at the Security Council. One journalist asked
Ban Ki moon, “Mr. Secretary General, what steps have
you taken to comply with the request of the Security
Council on 27
th
of May through the press statement to
investigate fully, independently and transparently the
killing in El Houleh?” The UN Secretary General did
not answer the question.
4
It is notable that as Ambassador Li Baodong had
recognized during his press conference on June 4,
several different narratives have been used to describe
the Houla massacre. These offer different explanations
of the circumstances under which it happened and
therefore what the implications are for the future of the
Kofi Annan six-point peace plan.
Those nations encouraging an investigation into
the details of the Houla massacre want to determine
the lessons from it toward solving the crisis in Syria.
Those who were quick to jump to conclusions based
Page 28
on superficial information are helping to fan the flames
of the conflict.
What are these major competing narratives?
Western and Arab Media Narrative
The narrative that is being spread by much of the
mainstream western and Arab satellite media is a
narrative that blames the Assad government for the
Houla massacre. At first that media claimed that the
people killed, including the women and children, had
been killed by shelling from Syrian troops attacking
the town.
In examining the videos and photos put online or
provided by the opposition making these claims,
however, it became evident that many of the victims,
particularly the women and children, had been killed
at close range by bullets and knives and not by the
shelling of heavy weapons by the Syrian military.
It soon became obvious that only 20 of the 108
who were killed may have been killed in combat
fighting over the checkpoint and that the circumstances
of these deaths were not yet determined.
The opposition and the western and Arab media
supporting the opposition, like BBC and Aljazeera, etc.
had to quickly change their narrative. They invented a
new force allegedly used by the Syrian government,
the shabbiya, which they claimed is a pro government
militia.
5
The shabbiya allegedly came into the homes
of people and killed them at close range.
Russian News Team Narrative
A Russian news team interviewed people after the
massacre. The explanation compiled from these
interviews represents a very different narrative.
Their account noted that Houla is an administra-
tive area, made up of three villages. It is not the name
of a town. Some of this area had been under control of
armed insurgents for a number of weeks. The Syrian
army maintained certain checkpoints. This account
explains that on the evening of May 24, the Free
Syrian Army launched an operation to take control of
the checkpoints, bringing 600-800 armed insurgents
from different areas.
At the same time that there was the fight over the
checkpoints, several armed insurgents went into
certain homes and massacred the members of several
families. Among the families targeted was a family
related to a recently elected People’s Assembly repre-
sentative. This family and another family that were
killed were said to be families that supported the
Syrian government. “Other victims included the family
of two journalists for Top News and New Orient
Express, press agencies associated with Voltaire
Network,” reports the news and analysis site
Voltairenet.
6
Template for Media Warfare
At a press conference held in Damascus shortly
after the Houla massacre by Joint UN-Arab League
envoy Kofi Annan, a question was asked which
provides an important context to keep in mind when
trying to determine what happened in Houla.
The journalist asked: I am a Russian living in
Syria and reporting for various Russian online sites.
What is happening in Syria reminds me of what
happened in Yugoslavia that led to its division. We
have sources that tell us that the Pentagon is preparing
for war. If that happens, what do we do? What do
Syrians do and what does the Government do?
7
Annan’s response was that he had no information
of the Pentagon “preparing for war.” Nor did he have
any indication that what was happening in Syria would
be a repeat of “what happened in Yugoslavia.” Despite
the fact that Annan dismissed the journalist’s question,
the question provides an important perspective toward
understanding what is happening in Syria.
Looking back at the form of media warfare used
to prepare public opinion for the NATO aggression
against the former Yugoslavia, a template emerges that
reflects a pattern in these events.
In this media warfare, the mainstream western
media was used to spread stories about the alleged
“responsibility for” massacres in order to demonize
certain forces. This demonization served to justify the
NATO bombing of their country. Hence the Russian
journalist’s question to Kofi Annan raised an important
and serious concern.
In his book “Liar’s Poker,” which analyzes the
role of the media in the Yugoslav war, Michel Collon
writes “Information is already a battlefield, which is
part of war.” He writes that in 1991 the Slovenian
government created a “media center which unleashed
a flood of disinformation to international correspon-
dents.”
8
This disinformation created a false narrative
about what was happening and about who was respon-
sible for the violent acts that killed many innocent
people. The false narrative was then used to provide
the justification for foreign intervention on one side of
the conflict.
Page 29
Also Collon documents the use of U.S. public
relations agencies to help mold public opinion in favor
of the Croatian and Muslim nationalists and as media
warfare against the Serbs. In a striking way, Collon
shows how “a massacre happens unexpectedly each
time certain Western powers plan to escalate measures
against the Serbs.”
9
He proposes what could be consid-
ered as the template used to create the climate of
public opinion justifying the escalation of the attack on
Yugoslavia.
Here are the components of the template he
presents
10
:
Step 1: Preparation of a more or less hidden agenda
Step 2: Images that shock Public Opinion
Step 3: Groundless and Wild Media Accusations
Without Investigation
Step 4: Western Objectives are Achieved
Step 5: Corrections to Erroneous News Reporting: Too
Late and No Impact
Collon argues that shocking events were “staged”
for the international media so as to make possible a
planned escalation of the attack on Serbia. The Houla
massacre bears a striking resemblance to the incidents
that Collon refers to in the 1990s that set a basis for the
escalation of the aggression against the Serbian gov-
ernment.
Is this current rush to judgment, both at the UN,
and in the mainstream western and Arab media but
another example of support and encouragement for
armed aggression against a sovereign nation, as in the
Yugoslavian situation? Is it but a signal to the armed
insurgents willing to carry out horrific deeds to
achieve their goal of foreign intervention, that they
should go ahead with their cruel agenda? These are
questions that need to be asked as they may help to
explain the underlying motives of one of the narra-
tives.
The failure of mainstream western and Arab
satellite media and of a number of nations at the UN to
acknowledge that there are different views of the
underlying cause and implementation of the Houla
massacre impedes the urgency with which the needed
investigation and analysis are to be organized.
11
Such
an investigation is critical to identify the actual prob-
lems and to understand what is needed to solve them.
It is important to acknowledge that there are two
major narratives about the events of the Houla massa-
cre. Such an acknowledgment recognizes, as Ambassa-
dor Li Baodong did, the need for evidence to deter-
mine what is an accurate narrative of the Houla Massa-
cre. There are a number of blogs and news sites on the
Internet where netizens contribute articles and com-
ments that are helpful toward analyzing what is hap-
pening in Syria and at the UN and whether the actions
at the UN are helpful or harmful for resolving the
crisis in a way that is in line with the principles of the
UN charter. There are examples of a substantial new
netizen journalism developing on the Internet which is
taking up the needed work to investigate the facts of
the Syrian conflict so as to understand what is needed
to contribute to a peaceful resolution.
12
Notes
1. Video of Press Conference marking the beginning of the
Chinese presidency of the Security Council for the month of June.
http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/security-council/watch/li-b
aodong-china-president-of-the-security-council-on-the-program
me-of-work-for-the-month-of-june-2012-press-conference/1672
822951001
2. The press statement issued by the UN Security Council on May
27 called for the Secretary General and UNSMIS “to continue to
investigate these attacks and report the findings to the Security
Council.”
3. See for example the summary by Moon of Alabama,
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2012/06/the-syria-discussion-at
-the-un-general-assembly.html
4. “Joint press encounter with UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon, Kofi A. Annan, Joint UN-Arab League Special Envoy
on Syria and Nabil El-Araby, Secretary General of the League of
Arab States.”
5. See for example the account by AP: “The assault came nearly
a week after 108 people, many of them women and children, were
killed in the area. Activists said government forces first shelled
the area on Friday, then pro-regime fighters known as shabiha
stormed the villages. The Syrian government denied its troops
were behind the killings and blamed ‘armed terrorists’.”
http://calgary.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20120531/UN-c
hief-warns-syria-houla-120531/20120531/?hub=CalgaryHome
6. See for example: Thierry Meyssan, “The Houla Affair High-
lights Western Intelligence Gap in Syria,”
http://www.voltairenet.org/The-Houla-affair-highlights
See also: Wassim Raad, “The Set Up Massacre and the American
Fingerprint”
http://www.voltairenet.org/The-set-up-massacre-and-the
In German see for example Mathias Broeckers, “Der Hula-Hoax”
http://www.broeckers.com/2012/06/05/der-hula-hoax/
and Rainer Hermann, “Again massacre in Syria,” the Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, June 7, 2012.
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/neue-erkenntnisse-zu-getoetet
en-von-hula-abermals-massaker-in-syrien-11776496.html
(An English translation FAZ is available at Moon of Alabama
blog:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/2012/06/prime-german-paper-s
yrian-rebels-committed-houla-massacre.html)
7. Transcript of JSE Press Conference in Damascus, May 29,
Page 30
2012, p. 4. For video see:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unsmis/
8. Michel Collon, Liar’s Poker, International Action Center, New
York, 2002 p. 45. (This is an English translation of the book
which was originally published in French.)
9. Ibid., p. 28
10. Ibid., p. 26.
11. The Human Rights Council has passed a resolution calling for
an investigation into the Houla Massacre. Several sources,
however, document that the Human Rights Council only considers
information supplied by activists in support of the armed opposi-
tion. See for example “UN Commissions report on Houla? But
they only talk to Syrian opposition – by phone,” May 31, 2012
“Anti-war campaigner Marinella Corregia worries the HR
commissioner talks only to its sources: the opposition.”
http://www.rt.com/news/houla-massacre-un-syria-635/
12. A few of the English language web sites providing news and
analysis of the Syrian conflict toward a directed peaceful resolu-
tion include:
Moon of Alabama:
http://www.moonofalabama.org/
Centre for Research on Globalization:
http://www.globalresearch.ca/
VoltaireNet: http://www.voltairenet.org/en
Syria News: http://www.syrianews.cc/
Syria360: http://syria360.wordpress.com/
The 4
th
Media: http://www.4thmedia.org/
[Editor’s Note: This article is taken from a talk given
in Beijing in July 22, 2012 at a program sponsored
by April Media. The whole talk is available at:
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/beijing2012/r-
china2012-april-cafe.doc.]
The United Nations and
Journalism in the Era of the
Netizen
by Ronda Hauben
I – The Global Political Situation
The current international situation raises impor-
tant questions for discussion and analysis. In a com-
plex world, how can one have a means to understand
what is happening. While the mainstream western
media often project one view of the world, online
discussion and analysis have begun to play an ever
more important role in offering alternative view-
points and analysis.
Around the world there has been a recognition
that the mainstream western media can play a harm-
ful role for those trying to develop an accurate un-
derstanding of the events of our times. This problem
is often obvious in online comments and articles by
netizens.
One such situation occurred in 2003 when the
U.S. media promoted the false claim that Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. used this
false claim as the pretext to invade Iraq. But there
were no such weapons in Iraq.
The question was raised among scholars in the
U.S. about the poor quality of U.S. journalism.
How would it be possible to prevent the U.S.
media from making similar false claims in the fu-
ture? One answer was to recognize that there is a
serious problem with much of the mainstream U.S.
media. Instead of the U.S. media presenting the de-
bate of different viewpoints on an issue, or acting as
a watchdog over the U.S. government, this media
presents only the dominant viewpoint of those in
power. In so doing the mainstream U.S. media helps
to strengthen those in power even more.
1
Exploring a similar problem, Michael Hauben
wrote an article titled, “The Effect of the Net on the
Professional News Media.”
2
He considered what the
effect of both the netizen and the Internet would be
on the future of the news and news media. He recog-
nized that a new form of news was in its infancy.
Michael saw that this new form of news was
evolving into a new paradigm which would include
both the contributions of netizens and the capabili-
ties of the Internet. Describing the frustration of
many netizens with the traditional media that they
had to rely on before the Internet, Michael wrote,
“Today, similarly, the need for a broader and more
cooperative gathering and reporting of the News has
helped create the new online media that is gradually
supplanting traditional forms of journalism.” What is
this new form of news and what are its characteris-
tics?
With the creation and the spread of the Internet,
the emergence of a new form of citizenship, known
as netizenship, has developed. Along with this new
form of citizenship, a critical and vibrant form of
online journalism is emerging. I call this journalism
netizen journalism. I propose that this new journal-
ism has at least two important aspects.
One is that it encourages serious research into
the background, context and political significance of
the conflicts of our times, conflicts like those in
Libya or Syria. Another important aspect of this new
Page 31
form of journalism is the application of this research
to the writing of articles or to comments in online
discussions on issues of public concern, and in re-
sponse to both mainstream and alternative media
articles. Often the comments by netizens on these
issues include criticism of false claims like the claim
that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Video news and oral interviews can also be exam-
ples of netizen journalism if they meet the above
criteria.
At a conference held in Russia last March,
Dmitry Medvedev, who is now the Prime Minister of
the Russia Federation, presented a speech describing
the need to recognize the problem of media manipu-
lation of public opinion in the international arena.
3
Medvedev particularly referred to the Syrian
situation. “A very active media campaign unfolded
with respect to Syria,” he explained. “I will not now
discuss the nature of these events,” he said, “but
what is clear is that this media campaign has little to
do with the task of ending violence as rapidly as
possible and facilitating the national dialogue that
we all want to see.”
4
Medvedev proposed that such a media campaign
against a country presents “the new security dimen-
sion.” Such a security danger needs to be recognized
and exposed.
“Today we are witness to persistent attempts,”
he explained, “to make mass manipulation of public
opinion a tool in international relations.”
A somewhat different approach to the problem
Medvedev has pointed out is offered by the political
scientist Karl Deutsch.
In his book Nerves of Government, Deutsch ex-
plores problems of communication that develop in
politics. He proposes that it is helpful to look at the
problems that develop in government or in the gov-
ernance of other political organizations as if such
organizations are a nervous system consisting of
channels of communication and feedback. Deutsch
writes, “Men have long and often concerned them-
selves with the power of governments, much as
some observers try to assess the muscle power of a
horse or an athlete. Others have described the laws
and institutions of states,…as the skeleton or organs
of a body. This book,” Deutsch explains, “concerns
itself less with the bones or muscles of the body poli-
tic than with its nerves – its channels of communica-
tion and decision.”
5
Deutsch goes on to explain that “it might be
profitable to look upon government somewhat less
as a problem of power and somewhat more as a
problem of steering and communication.” He main-
tains that, “It is communication, that is, the ability to
transmit messages and to react to them, that makes
organizations….” He proposes that this is true for
the cells in the human body as it is for the “organi-
zation of thinking human beings in social groups.”
Deutsch raises the question “To what extent are
failures in the steering (i.e. of the problems that
develop) of an organization due to the absence of
some crucial communication link not to the presence
of some evil elements?”
While Deutsch is allowing for the situation
where a problem in communication is responsible
for a failure in the functioning of an organization,
Medvedev is presenting the problem of media ma-
nipulation in international relations as a problem
where the “security” danger must be recognized.
Considering Medvedev’s warning about the se-
curity danger presented by media manipulation, and
Deutsch’s warning that a communication problem
can lead to a breakdown in an organization, I want to
look at some examples of United Nations Security
Council experience and consider the significance of
the problems in communication reflected in these
examples.
The example I will focus most on, is that of the
role of the UN in what is happening in Syria.
In my treatment of Syria, I want to focus on the
Houla massacre as the situation to analyze in order
to understand the media war at the UN over Syria.
The Houla massacre occurred in Syria on May
24, 2012.
This was but a few days before Kofi Annan, the
joint Arab League-UN envoy, was planning a visit to
Syria.
Immediately after the massacre there was a me-
dia campaign to blame the Syrian government for
the deaths (there were over 100 deaths). A short time
later, an alternative account was made available by a
Russian online media group Anna News.
6
This news
team for an online site visited the area where the
massacre occurred the following day. Their report
appeared on a number of alternative news sites soon
after the massacre.
The reports from the Anna News team, and
other netizen news reports, challenged the main-
Page 32
stream western media claims that the Syrian govern-
ment was responsible for the killings.
Similarly, the Syrian government conducted a
preliminary investigation. They provided witnesses
that the massacre was carried out by armed insur-
gents and criminal elements.
If one were to read or hear mainstream western
media accounts of the massacre, however, they
mainly present what they claim is happening from
the point of view of the armed opposition in Syria.
The armed opposition presents an account of events
which demonizes the Syrian government. There have
been a number of instances when the accounts from
the armed opposition have been shown to be false.
Along with the different set of information pre-
sented by the Syrian government, there is the infor-
mation in the alternative media that I refer to as
netizen journalism. Netizen journalism will
challenge distortions and other problems in the news
coverage provided by the mainstream western me-
dia. In the aftermath of the Houla massacre, a num-
ber of articles documenting the role of the armed
insurgents in carrying out the Houla massacre ap-
peared on alternative media sites.
I want to propose that this form of alternative
media which I call netizen journalism, is setting up a
communication channel different from that of the
mainstream western media.
What has been interesting has been to not only
consider the two different channels that these differ-
ent forms of news represent, but also to look at how
the different actors at the UN relate to these different
communication channels.
Three months ago the UN Security Council au-
thorized a mission of 300 unarmed observers to
monitor what is happening in Syria and to try to en-
courage a cease fire of the conflicting parties. This
mission is called the UN Supervisory Mission in
Syria or for short (UNSMIS). When the Houla mas-
sacre first occurred, UNSMIS went to investigate the
massacre. The initial response of UNSMIS was that
there were two views of what had occurred and who
was responsible presented to them.
Then in response to a request from the UN Se-
curity Council that UNSMIS do an investigation,
Major General Mood, the commander of UNSMIS
said that a report had been prepared in June.
7
He submitted the report to Ban Ki Moon.
In his article “General Mood: ‘Two Versions’ of
the Houla Massacre” posted by John Rosenthal, June
26, 2012, Rosenthal writes that “At the June 15 press
conference General Mood went on to say that the
mission had assembled a report about the massacre,
including the details of witness interviews and that
this report had been submitted to UN headquarters in
New York. This raises an obvious question,” writes
John Rosenthal, “Why has this report not been ren-
dered public?”
8
Similarly, UN Security Council members report
that they have not received the report.
When journalists asked the Secretary-General’s
spokesperson what happened to Mood’s report and
why it wasn’t given to the Security Council, they
were told that it had been given to various members
of the UN Secretariat. But as journalists at the UN
asked, “Why not to the Security Council?”
One of the original purposes for the UNSMIS
mission, according to Kofi Annan, was “to see what
is going on” so as to be able to “change the dynam-
ics.”
9
This past April, Annan said, “We continue to be
hampered by the lack of verified information in as-
sessing the situation…. We need eyes and ears on
the ground. This will provide the incontrovertible
basis the international community needs to act in an
effective and unified manner, increasing the
momentum for a cessation of violence to be imple-
mented by all sides.”
Yet when UNSMIS did create a report, it was
withheld from the Security Council by the Secretary
General of the UN.
At a press conference to mark the beginning of
the Chinese Presidency of the Security Council for
the month of June, China’s Ambassador Li Baodong,
referring to the Houla massacre, said
10
: “Now we
have different stories from different angles. Now we
have the story from the Syrian government, and from
the opposition parties, and from different sources.”
Since the Security Council “has a team…on the
ground,” he said referring to UNSMIS, “We want to
see first-hand information from our own people” He
hoped this would make it possible to put the differ-
ent pieces of information together and to come “to
our own conclusion with our own judgment.”
This acknowledgment that there are different
views of what had happened in the Houla massacre
and that there is a need to get accurate information
from an on the ground investigation is an important
step for a member of the Security Council to make.
This challenges the armed opposition claims that
Page 33
their account is the only account of what is happen-
ing in Syria.
In a recent paper I am working on titled, “The
Role of Netizen Journalism in the Media War at the
United Nations”
11
I document some of the various
forms netizen journalism has taken in the media war
on Syria.
There are many articles and videos posted on a
number of web sites challenging the mainstream me-
dia version of the events in Houla and explaining the
facts that demonstrated that the massacre had been
carried out by the armed insurgents and local crimi-
nals.
With these articles acting as a catalyst, the main-
stream German newspaper, the Frankfurter
Allgemeiner Zeitung carried two articles condemning
the armed insurgency for the Houla massacre. The
titles of the articles translated into English were
“Syrian Rebels Committed Houla Massacre” and
“On the Houla Massacre: The Extermination.”
In the longer paper I am working on on the Me-
dia Warfare at the UN, I consider the strength or
weaknesses of the netizen journalism coverage of
two other examples and consider its impact on the
Security Council action in these examples.
II – Conclusion
The issue raised by this preliminary presentation
concerns the need for serious attention to the impor-
tance of facilitating an accurate channel of
communication with respect to the issues being con-
sidered by the Security Council. This will make it
more difficult for the media manipulation that
Medvedev identified as a serious security concern to
succeed.
In the situation of the Syria conflict, the fact that
General Mood’s report on the Houla massacre could
be withheld from the Security Council for more than
a month and that there is not yet any indication of
when it will be given to the Security Council, repre-
sents a serious problem. This indicates that there is a
problem with the communication channels at the UN
with the integrity of these communication channels.
This is an example of what happens when a commu-
nication channel can be blocked.
In a press conference held in March of 2011
when China assumed the month long rotating Secu-
rity Council presidency, Ambassador Li Baodong
referred to the international media as the “16
th
mem-
ber of the Security Council.”
12
While Ambassador Li Baodong was then refer-
ring to the mainstream media, it is important to rec-
ognize that there is a new form of journalism
emerging. This new journalism is being created by
netizens, many of whom are dedicated to doing the
research and analysis to expose the interests and ac-
tions that are too often hidden from view. By reveal-
ing the actual forces at work, netizens are making it
possible to have a more accurate grasp of whose in-
terests are being served and what is at stake in the
events that make up the news. If such a journalism
can help to provide the UN with a more accurate un-
derstanding of the conflicts it is considering, it can
help to make more likely the peaceful resolution of
these conflicts.
Notes
1. W. Lance Bennett, Steven Livingston, Regina G. Lawrence,
When the Press Fails, Chicago, 2008.
2. Michael Hauben, The Effect of the Net on the Professional
News Media: “The Usenet News Collective – The Man-Com-
puter News Symbiosis,” Chapter 13 in Michael Hauben and
Ronda Hauben, Netizens: On the History and Impact of Usenet
and the Internet, Los Alamitos, 1997.
http://www.columbia.edu/~rh120/ch106.x13
3. “Conference organized by the Russian Council for Interna-
tional Affairs,” March 23, 2012, Moscow.
http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/3582
4. He refers to how Libya and more recently Syria have been
the victim of this politics. “How are we to see the mantras re-
peated by particular countries that consider themselves the main
exporters of democracy if, say in the Libyan and now the Syr-
ian cases, countries whose internal political lives are governed
by completely different norms are chosen as models to follow
for democratic development?”
5. Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government, The Free Press, New
York, 1966, p. xxvii.
6. Anna News Houla Report. Early reports were on
Syrianews.cc but later many alternative web sites carried Anna
Reports. Following is one URL for an early report:
http://www.syrianews.cc/syria-what-really-happened-in-al-hula
-homs/
7. Security Council Press Statement on Attacks in Syria, May
27, 2012. “Those responsible for acts of violence must be held
accountable. The members of the Security Council requested
the Secretary-General, with the involvement of UNSMIS
[United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria], to continue to
investigate these attacks and report the findings to the Security
Council.”
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10658.doc.htm
8. John Rosenthal, “General Mood: Two Versions of the Houla
Massacre.” The Western media was quick to blame Assad. But
does an unpublished UN report tell a different story?, June 26,
2012. Rosenthal writes: “What is perhaps most remarkable
Page 34
about General Mood’s comments is that they have been almost
universally ignored and this despite the fact that the video of the
press conference has been made publicly available by UNSMIS
on the mission’s own website.”
http://pjmedia.com/blog/general-mood-two-versions-of-the-hou
la-massacre/
9. See “Kofi Annan tells UN ‘We Need Eyes and Ears on the
Ground’,” April 26, 2012.
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/04/26/kofi-annan-briefing/
10. Video of Li Baodong press conference marking the Chinese
presidency of Security Council for the month of June, June 4,
2012, p. 11.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2012/06/li-baodongch
ina-president-of-the-security-council-on-the-programme-of-
work-for-the-month-of-june-2012-press-conference.html
11. “The Role of Netizen Journalism in the Media War at the
UN.” Draft Paper:
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/beijing2012/r-china2012-pa
per.doc
Talk:
http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/beijing2012/r-china2012-tal
k.doc
12. Press Conference: Li Baodong (China) President of the
Security Council for the month of March, March 2, 2011.
http://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/webcast/2011/03/press-confere
nce-li-baodong-china-president-of-the-security-council-for-the-
month-of-march.html
[Editor’s Note: The following article first appeared
on the netizenblog on Nov 28, 2012 at:
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/11/28/why-is-un
smis-report-missing/]
Why is the UNSMIS Houla
Report Missing?
by Ronda Hauben
I – Conflicting Views on the Human
Rights Council September 28 Resolution
On September 28, the UN’s Human Rights
Council asked for a consensus vote on a resolution
holding the Syrian government responsible for the
violence in Syria. The resolution particularly
referred to the Houla Massacre that took place in
Syria on May 25-26, 2012. The resolution said it
1
:
“Condemns in the strongest terms the massacre of
the village of AL-Houla near Homs, where the
forces of the government of the Syrian Arab Repub-
lic and members of the Shabbiha were found by the
commission of inquiry to be the perpetrators of out-
rageous and heinous crimes and stresses the need to
hold those responsible to account.”
Opposing the call that the resolution be passed
by acclamation, Maria Khodynskaya-Golenischv, the
Representative of the Russian Federation, explained
why her country would vote against the resolution.
Among the several reasons she gave was the objec-
tion that the resolution was inaccurate and biased in
blaming the Syrian government for the massacre.
She explained, “In particular we cannot agree with
the one sided conclusion put out in the resolution
concerning the Commission on the Houla tragedy.”
She noted, “We believe that the question for the at-
tribution of guilt is still open. An investigation
should be carried out thoroughly. One should not
accuse the government if one does not have suffi-
cient evidence therefore.”
2
The Russian Federation Representative also
pointed out the harmful consequences such a resolu-
tion would have in deepening the conflict. “Unfortu-
nately,” she said, “some states are in de facto
encouraging terrorism in Syria. Therefore we have
no doubt that the episode in Houla is definitely being
whipped up in the media and being used to carry out
force against this country.”
China’s Representative said that his nation
would also vote against the resolution. He explained
that putting pressure on only one party to the conflict
would not help to resolve the conflict.
The Cuban delegate also announced that his
country would vote against the resolution. Among
the reasons he gave was the objection that the goal
of some co-sponsors of the resolution was to impose
regime change on the Syrian people through a deci-
sion arrived at by those outside the country. Such a
goal, the Cuban Representative maintained, threat-
ened to send Syria back to the Stone Age.
When the vote was taken, there were 41 votes in
favor of the resolution, three votes against (China,
Cuba and the Russian Federation), and three absten-
tions (Philippines, India and Uganda). The India
Representative, explaining why his country had ab-
stained, said that the obligation of the Human Rights
Council was to act with impartiality and for its reso-
lutions to be balanced and impartial. The implication
of India’s remarks was that the resolution against
Syria was not balanced or impartial.
Though Syria is not a member of the Human
Rights Council, the Representative of Syria, Faysal
Khabbaz Hamoui, was given permission to speak.
Page 35
Among the objections to the resolution that he raised
was that the resolution did not take into account the
report of the Syrian government’s Commission of
Inquiry into the Houla tragedy. He also pointed to
the closed process used by those drawing up the res-
olution. It was a process, he said, that did not accept
any proposals to amend the resolution.
This interaction in the Human Rights Council
takes on added significance when it is viewed in the
context of the earlier Security Council request that
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, with the
involvement of UNSMIS (United Nations Supervi-
sory Mission In Syria), do an investigation of the
Houla massacre and report its findings to the Secu-
rity Council.
3
This request was made in a press state-
ment issued by the Security Council on May 27,
2012. By a rather mysterious process, the Security
Council’s request that an investigation of the Houla
massacre, which was to be carried out with the in-
volvement of UNSMIS, was shifted to a significantly
different process that was carried out by the Human
Rights Council and the Commission of Inquiry it
created, the Independent International Commission
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (hereafter
CoI). How this shift happened and the significance
of this change, merit serious consideration by those
who are concerned about the role the UN is playing
in the conflict in Syria.
II – What Happened to the UNSMIS Re-
port on Houla Investigation?
It will be helpful to review the Security Coun-
cil’s request that there be an investigation of the
Houla massacre with the involvement of UNSMIS.
On May 27, shortly after the Houla Massacre took
place, the UN Security Council issued a press state-
ment. In the statement it said:
4
“The members of the
Security Council requested the Secretary General
with the involvement of UNSMIS (United Nations
Supervision Mission In Syria) to continue to investi-
gate these attacks and report the findings to the Se-
curity Council.”
Note that the Secretary General was to present
the results of the UNSMIS investigation to the Secu-
rity Council.
Similarly relevant is an article by Reuters on
May 29, two days after the Security Council issued
its press statement. In the article, Karen AbuZug, a
Commissioner on the CoI created by the Human
Rights Council, is quoted saying,
5
“We are discuss-
ing with UNSMIS over the next few days to see
whether we can also have a look and maybe corrobo-
rate with information we get from outside the coun-
try.” Such a statement can be considered as an ac-
knowledgment that UNSMIS was to conduct an on
the ground investigation and the CoI would add what
it could from its sources outside the country. The
role assigned to UNSMIS by the Security Council to
be involved in conducting the investigation was at
the time recognized by AbuZug.
At a press conference with journalists in Damas-
cus on June 15, Major-General Robert Mood, head
of UNSMIS, explained the progress of UNSMIS in
carrying out its investigation of the Houla tragedy.
6
He said that UNSMIS had been to Houla with an
investigating team. They did interviews. They inter-
viewed locals who told one story. They interviewed
locals who told another story. But the circumstances
leading up to Houla, the detailed circumstances, the
facts related to the incident still remained unclear to
the UNSMIS investigators. This led General Mood
to say that if there was a decision to support a more
extensive on the ground investigation, UNSMIS
could help to facilitate it.
As a result of its work, he said, UNSMIS put
together the facts it could establish by what the team
saw on the ground, together with the conflicting
statements and witness interviews. UNSMIS sent
that as a report to UN Headquarters in New York.
7
Given this set of events one could logically ex-
pect that the Secretary General would present the
conflicting results of the UNSMIS investigation to
the Security Council, and the Security Council
would consider whether to ask the Secretary General
to establish a more extensive on the ground investi-
gation of the circumstances leading to and occurring
during the Houla massacre. This more extensive on
the ground investigation would be one with access
facilitated by UNSMIS as General Mood indicated
was possible. As part of this more extensive investi-
gation, the Human Right’s Council’s CoI might
corroborate, as AbuZug had proposed in her com-
ments in the Reuters article on May 29, by providing
information from those outside of Syria if that was
relevant.
But this is not what happened.
Instead there was silence at UN Headquarters
about what the Secretary General’s intentions were
Page 36
with respect to transmitting the findings of the
UNSMIS investigation to the Security Council.
Only when journalists raised the question, did
the Spokesperson for the Secretary General give any
indication that the Report had been received.
On June 21, responding to a question from a
journalist, the UN Spokesperson acknowledged the
Secretary General had received the UNSMIS Houla
Report. The Spokesperson for the Secretary General
explained
8
: “Spokesperson: Well, the Mission has
sent its observations on the al-Houla killings to the
Secretary-General for his consideration. The
Secretary-General is in turn sending these observa-
tions to the relevant UN bodies monitoring human
rights in Syria. And once these bodies complete their
work, the findings on what I think everybody agrees
was a terrible incident will be presented by the Sec-
retary General to the Security Council.”
This statement raises the question of why the
findings of UNSMIS were to be diverted to what he
referred to as “UN bodies monitoring human rights”
rather than presented directly to the Security Council
as the Security Council had requested in their May
27 press statement.
The Spokesperson’s statement, however,
acknowledges the UNSMIS Report on Houla was
received by the Secretary General and that the Secre-
tary General had the obligation to present it to the
Security Council. Nevertheless, even several months
later, members of the Security Council said that the
conflicting information gathered from the on the
ground investigatory process by UNSMIS still had
not been presented to Security Council members.
When a question about the missing UNSMIS
Report on Houla was raised again at the Secretary
General’s Spokesperson’s briefing on September 14,
the Deputy Spokesperson promised she would get a
response to the journalist’s question.
9
In an e-mail a
few days later, on September 17, the Deputy
Spokesperson wrote:
10
“(J)ust to follow up on your
question from Friday, the report by UNSMIS (i.e.
Mood’s report) went to the Human Rights Council
and the Security Council. Any further follow-up is in
their hands.”
Yet when the President of the Security Council
for the month of October, Guatemala’s Ambassador
Gert Rosenthal, held a press conference on October
2, he was asked whether the Security Council had
received General Mood’s Report. His response
was
11
: “To the best of my knowledge, the answer is
No.” “I personally (as) a member of the council have
not seen that report,” he said.
Apparently, according to the Guatemalan Am-
bassador, the Security Council members had not
seen the UNSMIS Report on Houla, despite the
Deputy Spokesperson’s e-mail stating that the
UNSMIS Report had gone to the Security Council.
And an e-mail to the Spokesperson for the Hu-
man Rights Council about whether the Human
Rights Council had seen the UNSMIS Report on the
Houla massacre received no response.
Then on October 16, two members of the Inde-
pendent International Commission of Inquiry on
Syria (CoI) appointed by the Human Rights Council
held a press conference at UN Headquarters.
12
At the
press conference, Karen AbuZug, a Commissioner
and Paulo Pinheiro, Chairman of the Commission,
were asked if they had seen the UNSMIS Report on
Houla submitted by General Mood to UN Headquar-
ters. AbuZug responded that she had been given a
briefing on the Report but had not seen the Report
itself. There was no means to ask another question
about this issue during the press conference. After
the press conference ended, AbuZug was asked if
she could say what was presented in the briefing on
General Mood’s report. She responded that the
briefing was confidential.
III – CoI Report as a One Sided
Document
The CoI produced both a preliminary report on
Houla of 20 pages on June 26, titled “Oral Update of
the Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic”
(A/HRC/20/CRP.1) (hereafter Oral Update Report)
and a final Report in August titled “Report of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic.” (A/HRC/21/50) (hereaf-
ter August Report). The August Report is 107 pages
but the part about the Houla massacre is
approximately 7 pages (pages 10-12 and 64-67).
These reports by the CoI appear to serve not as a
corroboration of the on the ground investigation by
the UNSMIS team, as AbuZug originally proposed,
but rather as the substitute for the UNSMIS Report.
The UNSMIS Report of conflicting statements and
interviews from locals in Houla, which General
Mood described to journalists on June 15, appears to
have vanished. Instead of the UNSMIS Report of the
Page 37
two conflicting versions of the stories by locals in
Houla indicating the need for a more substantial on
the ground investigation, the CoI, with no actual evi-
dence presented, declared that the Syrian govern-
ment was to blame for the Houla massacre.
In contrast to General Mood’s statement to jour-
nalists that UNSMIS had been on the site of the
Houla massacre with an investigating team, the CoI
made no visits to the site of the Houla massacre.
When asked why the CoI did not include information
from the UNSMIS Report in their CoI Report,
Pinheiro answered that the report only includes the
information the Commission gets from its own in-
vestigators. Such a statement is contradicted in its
own August Report, which does include references
to information from UNSMIS, just not with regard to
the Houla massacre.
In his June 15 press briefing, General Mood said
the UNSMIS Report on Houla included statements
and interviews with locals with one story and state-
ments and interviews with locals with another story.
The August Report of the CoI tells only one story
and claims that they either do not have other infor-
mation or that any other information they know of is
inconsistent, so that they have accepted that there is
only one story. The Reports that the CoI produced
had no onsite interviews or statements, but only tele-
phone or Skype interviews with insurgents or those
supporting the account of Houla presented by the
armed insurgents.
General Mood said the scope of the information
needed was, “the circumstances leading up to el
Houla and the detailed circumstances, the facts re-
lated to the incident itself.” He explained that these
still remained unclear to UNSMIS. This information
is needed to set a basis for a report on the Houla
tragedy that is impartial and balanced, based on an
understanding of the facts of not only what happened
at Houla, but also what led up to this tragedy.
While the scope of the question raised by Gen-
eral Mood and UNSMIS for the Houla investigation
was a question which puts what happened in Houla
into a broader context, the CoI Reports, instead, nar-
row down the question raised so that the broader
context is obscured.
The August Report from the CoI poses as its
critical question, whether the Syrian government had
the ability to have access to the area where the mas-
sacre occurred. The August Report speculates that
the Syrian government maintained control over one
of the checkpoints in the area of a site of a massacre.
Based on this speculation, the August Report claims
that the Syrian government must be responsible for
the massacre.
In general, however, accounts of the events of
the tragedy differ about whether or not the Syrian
military lost control of the checkpoints around the
area where the massacre occurred. Also, there seems
general agreement that the area in question was un-
der the control of the armed insurgents and had been
for a period of time.
The widely held agreement or claim that the
armed insurgents had control of the area where the
massacre took place was even referred to in a letter
to the Security Council by Ban Ki moon shortly after
the massacre occurred. In his letter to the UN Secu-
rity Council, Ban Ki-moon wrote
13
“The villages in
question have been outside of the Government con-
trol, but surrounded by heavy military presence.”
(The Secretary General, May 27, 2012) The CoI Re-
ports dismiss the fact that the area was under the
control of the armed insurgents.
Similarly, in the CoI Reports, there is no motive
given for why the Syrian government would want to
massacre these civilians.
This information is needed to set a basis for a
report on the Houla tragedy that is impartial and bal-
anced, based on an understanding of the facts of not
only what happened at Houla, but also what led up to
this tragedy.
General Mood also explained that there was a
need to understand the facts related to the incident
itself that were unclear even after the UNSMIS in-
vestigation.
The August Report, instead, treats its specula-
tive conclusions as facts, rather than acknowledging
that there are significant facts related to the incident
itself which remain unclear, but which need to be
resolved in order to determine who is responsible.
It is also important to remember that the
UNSMIS investigation came up with conflicting sto-
ries, and conflicting interviews. There remain con-
flicting stories and conflicting interviews about what
happened at Houla. Yet the August Report shows
little recognition that this is true or that there is a
need to not only recognize these conflicting
accounts, but also to propose the need to have a
more extensive investigation that can resolve the
unsettled issues.
Page 38
The CoI Reports complain that their investiga-
tors did not have access to people on the ground in
Syria, and so had to rely on interviews by phone or
Skype. But the failure of the CoI investigators to do
a balanced and impartial investigation explains why
the Syrian government would not be willing to give
them permission to carry out an investigation in
Syria.
The question needs to be raised as to why the
CoI investigators did not identify or contact people
who could present a range of conflicting statements
or interviews as UNSMIS had gathered and
presented to UN headquarters. In addition, there are
a number of potential witnesses that have been iden-
tified by alternative media or NGO sources whose
accounts of the events differ from the conclusion of
the August Report. Some of these alternative media
or NGO sources report that when they tried to offer
information to the CoI, their offers were refused.
14
It
is hard to understand how the CoI could claim it
could accomplish an impartial and balanced investi-
gation without accepting such offers and seeking
such contacts.
Instead, the CoI Reports, particularly the August
Report, are based mainly on the views of the armed
insurgents. The August Report even misrepresents
what the CoI said in the earlier Oral Update Report.
The Oral Update Report allowed for three alternative
possibilities as to who was responsible for the mas-
sacre of civilians.
The Oral Update Report of the CoI says (See for
example, A/HRC/20/CRP.1, para 48-49, 54-55 p.
10-11): “First, that the perpetrators were ‘Shabbiha’
or other local militia from neighbouring villages,
possibly operating together with, or with the acquies-
cence of, the Government security forces; second
that the perpetrators were anti-Government forces
seeking to escalate the conflict while punishing those
that failed to support – or who actively opposed – the
rebellion; or third, foreign groups with unknown affil-
iation.” “With the available evidence,” the Oral Up-
date Report said, “the CoI could not rule out any of
these possibilities.”
A few paragraphs later it added: “The CoI could
not rule out the possibility of the involvement of for-
eign groups with unknown affiliation. The CoI re-
ceived information that the anti-Government armed
groups in Taldou on that day received ‘support from
other groups from neighboring areas.’ Testimony
was also collected that described the perpetrators as
having shaved heads and long beards – descriptions
which have been applied both to foreign groups and
the Shabbiha in other contexts. This information
could not be corroborated by the Commission.”
Based on this statement, the Oral Update Report
stated: “The CoI is unable to determine the identity
of the perpetrators at this time….”
Without providing any substantial new
evidence, the August Report, instead, states that
there is “no doubt the Syrian government was
responsible for the Houla massacre.” (A/HRC/21/50,
para 49, p. 10)
The August Report even misrepresents that the
earlier Oral Update Report offers three alternative
views of who was responsible for the deaths of civil-
ians in Houla. (See A/HRC/21/50, para 41, p. 10)
Somehow between the time of the Oral Update
Report of June 26, and the August Report, the CoI
found a means to trivialize what criteria would deter-
mine who to blame for the massacre. Also the CoI
dismissed the broader issues, the questions and the
obligation to provide a more substantial consider-
ation of the background to the events that had oc-
curred in Houla.
And with no explanation offered, the UNSMIS
Report that Mood said was submitted to UN Head-
quarters, has effectively disappeared. Subsequently,
the UNSMIS mission itself was ended. And the Se-
curity Council request to Ban Ki-moon to report to it
on the findings of the UNSMIS investigation in
Houla has never been fulfilled.
If the Security Council had heard the details of
the conflicting nature of the statements and inter-
views in the UNSMIS Report and had this Report
been available to the media and the public, this could
have provided public pressure for the continuation of
the UNSMIS mission and for the establishment of an
impartial, competent team to conduct an on the
ground investigation facilitated by UNSMIS. But
this did not happen. With the disappearance of the
UNSMIS Report on Houla, the Security Council al-
lowed UNSMIS to be terminated.
Subsequently, the CoI appointed by the Human
Rights Council was allowed to substitute a biased
report lacking any direct knowledge of the details of
what happened in Houla or any face to face inter-
views with witnesses with direct knowledge of the
events to be investigated.
One may ask why such a switch was made from
the UNSMIS Report on Houla with information
Page 39
from an on the ground investigation gathering con-
flicting statements and interviews as requested by
the Security Council, to the substitution of the Hu-
man Rights Council’s CoI Report presenting no ac-
tual evidence, but putting the blame for the Houla
massacre on the Syrian government.
This is a question which needs further investiga-
tion and analysis. An important clue to an answer,
however, is suggested by the June 21 UN Spokes-
man’s response to the question from the journalist
who asked what happened to the UNSMIS Report.
Instead of sending the report directly to the Se-
curity Council as could be expected, the Spokesman
said that the Secretary General was “sending these
observations to the relevant UN bodies monitoring
human rights in Syria.”
But the Security Council’s May 27 press
statement asked the Secretary General with the in-
volvement of UNSMIS to do an investigation of the
Houla massacre, and report the findings to the Secu-
rity Council. There was no Security Council request
that the UNSMIS Report on Houla first be sent to
UN bodies monitoring human rights.
Considering the subsequent developments the
reason for this diversion becomes more apparent.
UNSMIS took as its obligation to maintain a neutral-
ity (See for example General Mood’s July 5 press
conference in Damascus, where he describes how he
worked to maintain an impartiality in the actions of
UNSMIS).
15
The CoI, on the contrary, did not act to
maintain an impartiality in its investigation, but in-
stead took a side in gathering the information it con-
sidered for its investigation and the people it con-
tacted.
The consequence of such a bias in the CoI in-
vestigation resulted in the August Report that has
been justly criticized as presenting one sided conclu-
sions and attributing blame for the Houla massacre
without sufficient evidence.
Furthermore, if one asks UN related officials
about the UNSMIS report on Houla, one is likely
instead to be pointed to the August Report of the
CoI.
16
Thus it appears that by the time the UNSMIS
Report on Houla was submitted to UN Headquarters,
some decision had been made that it would not be
presented to the Security Council, but instead the
CoI would create a substitute report, despite the fact
that this body had no direct access to the facts or to
witnesses to the massacre.
And it appears that this substitution of the Hu-
man Rights appointed CoI Reports for the UNSMIS
Houla Report has received only rare media attention,
though the CoI Reports have been critiqued by some
of the alternative media.
17
For example, Marinella Correggia is an activist
with the Italian No War network-ROMA which
critiqued the CoI Reports. She concludes that given
the Commission’s international mandate, the partial-
ity and one-sidedness of the August Report is both
flabbergasting and disconcerting. She asks, “Has the
UN no internal assessment mechanism to prevent
such abuses in the ‘documentation’ of events upon
which the UN is then required to act?”
18
At the present time, the answer to her question
appears to be that the UN does not have any internal
mechanism to prevent such abuse, except for the few
statements by member nations that are willing to
speak out and make their criticisms, as did the na-
tions that voted against or abstained in the vote at the
Human Rights Council on September 28 Resolution
condemning Syria.
Unfortunately, though, the result of the decision
to substitute a biased CoI Report based on one sided
reasoning and speculative conclusions, for the
UNSMIS Report based on an impartial on the
ground investigation, has significant consequences
for the UN. The obligation of the UN is to be impar-
tial, so as to be able to help resolve conflicts that
threaten international peace and security. If instead
the UN acts as the political proponent of certain
powerful member states intervening in domestic
conflicts of other states to bring about regime
change, then the very essence of the UN is impaired
and put in jeopardy.
Notes
1. A/HCR/21/L.32A. This resolution was passed by the Human
Rights Council Resolution on September 28, 2012 condemning
Syria for the Houla Massacre based on the biased and one sided
Reports of the COI.
http://www.voltairenet.org/article176162.html
2. The proceedings of the September 28, 2012 meeting of the
Human Rights Council are online at the UN website. The URL
for the video is:
http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/human-rights-council/watc
h/l32-vote-item:4-38th-meeting-21st-regular-session-of-human-
rights-council/1865712813001
The Russian Federation’s Representation spoke from min. 4:42
-8:10
Page 40
The Chinese Delegate spoke from min. 13:09-15:50
The Cuban Representative spoke from min. 16:10-18:50
The Syrian Representative can be heard in the video from min.
24:34-35:30
3. Ronda Hauben, “The UN and General Mood’s Missing Re-
port on Conflicting Accounts of the Houla Massacre,” Septem-
ber 10, 2012,
http://blogs.taz.de/netizenblog/2012/09/10/unsmis-report-houla-
massacre/
4. See the wording in the UN Security Council Press Statement
on Houla May 27, 2012
“Those responsible for acts of violence must be held account-
able. The members of the Security Council requested the Secre-
tary-General, with the involvement of UNSMIS [United Na-
tions Supervision Mission in Syria], to continue to investigate
these attacks and report the findings to the Security Council.”
The URL is:
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10658.doc.htm
5. Stephanie Nebehay, “Most Houla victims killed in summary
executions: UN,” Tuesday, May 29, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/29/us-syria-un-idUSBR
E84S10020120529
6. Press Conference with Major General Robert Mood in Da-
mascus, June 15, 2012, Video Part 2. The section where Gen-
eral Mood describes the Report on Houla starts at min: 3:10 to
4:17 . The URL is:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UOTJdHTloLg
7. Describing the investigation by UNSMIS into the Houla
massacre and the report UNSMIS submitted to UN headquar-
ters, General Mood tells journalists, as transcribed from the
video:
“The statement we issued after el Houla is still valid. Which
means we have been there with an investigating team. We have
interviews, interviewed locals with one story, and we have in-
terviewed locals that has another story.
The circumstances leading up to el Houla and the detailed cir-
cumstances, the facts related to the incident itself, still remains
unclear to us.
We have put this together, the facts that we (can) could estab-
lish by what we saw on the ground. We have put together the
statements, the witness interviews and we have sent that as a
report to UN headquarters, New York.
And then the assessment on what’s the way forward. Will there
be a different investigation? (This -ed) is a matter for headquar-
ters in this context. But if we are asked, obviously we are on the
ground, and could help facilitate that.”
8. Press Briefing with UN Spokesperson on June 21, 2012.
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/db120621.doc.ht
m
9. Press Briefing with UN Spokesperson on Sept 14, 2012.
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2012/db120914.doc.ht
m
10. E-mail received from the Deputy Spokesperson on Septem-
ber 17, 2012.
11. Video at the UN website of Oct 2, 2012 – H. E. Mr. Gert
Rosenthal, Permanent Representative of Guatemala to the
United Nations and President of the Security Council for the
month of October, 2012 on the programme of work of the Secu-
rity Council in October. The URL for the video is:
http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/security-council/watch/gert
-rosenthal-guatemala-president-of-the-security-council-on-the-p
rogramme-of-work-for-the-month-of-october-2012-press-confer
ence/1873411152001
12. Press Conference on Oct 16, 2012 – Paulo Pinheiro, Chair
and member of the Independent Commission of Inquiry on
Syria and Karen AbuZayd. The URL of the video on the UN
website is:
http://webtv.un.org/watch/the-latest-findings-on-the-human-rig
hts-situation-in-syria-press-conference/1904479973001
13. S/2012/368. Letter dated May 27, 2012 from the Secretary-
General to the President of the Security Council. The URL is:
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D
27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Syria%20S2012%20368.
pdf
14. See for example: “Anti-war campaigner Marinella Corregia
worries the HR commissioner talks only to its sources: the oppo-
sition.”
http://www.rt.com/news/houla-massacre-un-syria-635/
Thursday, May 31, 2012, “UN report on Houla massacre? But
they only talk to Syrian opposition – by phone, “Uprooted Pales-
tinians.”
http://uprootedpalestinians.blogspot.com/2012/05/river-to-sea-u
prooted-palestinian-views.html
15. General Mood Meets the Press, Damascus, July 5, 2012.
See for example from min. 17:25-19:00
General Mood describes how UNSMIS has established an im-
partial system with “exactly the mechanism that addresses both
sides in the same way.”
16. I have had two experiences when I asked either present or
former UN officials connected for the UNSMIS Report. In both
cases I was referred to the CoI Reports with no indication about
what happened to the UNSMIS Report on Houla.
17. See for example: Marinella Correggia, “The Recent Report
on Syria by the ‘Independent International Commission of
Inquiry’ (CoI) mandated by the Human Rights Council is one-
sided and lacks evidences” The URL is
http://www.sibialiria.org/wordpress/?p=777
See also, in Italian, Marinella Correggia. DOCUMENTO. Le
fonti parziali e le prove mancanti nel rappoto della
“Commissione internazionale indipendente di inchiesta” (CoI)
nominata dall’Onu. The URL is
http://www.sibialiria.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/0
9/CONTRODOCUMENTO.LEFONTIELEACCUSEDELLAC
OMMISSIONEINTERNAZIONALEDIINCHIESTAONUpdf.p
df
Another site that has taken on to examine the issues involved in
the conflict in Syria “A Closer Look On Syria.”
http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Main_Page
See also, in Spanish, “La ONU ‘pierde’ el informe sobre la
masacre de Houla” (The UN ‘loses’ the report on the Houla
Massacre), a video at:
http://ciaramc.org/ciar/boletines/cr_bol477.htm
18. Marinella Correggia, “The Recent Report on Syria by the
“Independent International Commission of Inquiry” (CoI) man-
dated by the Human Rights Council is one-sided and lacks evi-
dences.” The URL is
http://www.sibialiria.org/wordpress/?p=777
Page 41
See also Christof Lehmann, “Italian Peace Movement Criticizes
Report of International Commission on Syria,” Sept 9, 2012,
NSNBC.
http://nsnbc.wordpress.com/tag/marinella-correggia/
EDITORIAL STAFF
Ronda Hauben
William Rohler
Norman O. Thompson
Michael Hauben (1973-2001)
Jay Hauben
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