Biography

I am the George E. Warren Professor of Business at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and a research scientist at Google Research. My research develops novel methodological approaches that combine dynamic optimization, stochastic modeling, and game theory to address fundamental problems in the digital economy. My work tackles central problems in internet advertising while making methodological contributions to the area of large-scale sequential decision-making in the face of uncertainty and dynamic optimization with incentives. My research has been recognized by multiple awards including an early career award and a best dissertation award, and numerous best paper awards. I am also the Research Director of the Deming Center I am a graduate of University of Buenos Aires and received my Ph.D. from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business in 2013. Before joining Columbia, I was on the faculty at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.

Journal Papers

  1. Dynamic Pricing for Reusable Resources: The Power of Two Prices
  2. Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice
  3. Robust Auction Design with Support Information
  4. Regularized Online Allocation Problems: Fairness and Beyond
    •  with H. Lu and V. Mirrokni
    •  Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (May-Jun, 2025)
  5. On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
  6. Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
  7. Survey of Dynamic Resource Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis
    •  with O. Besbes and D. Pizarro
    •  Operations Research (Sep-Oct, 2024)
  8. Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products
    •  with A. Desir
    •  Management Science (Aug, 2023)
  9. Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning
  10. Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility
  11. The Best of Many Worlds: Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems
  12. Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best
  13. On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
  14. Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks
  15. Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
  16. Multi-Stage Intermediation in Online Advertising
    •  with O. Candogan and H. Gurkan
    •  Manufacturing & Service Operations Management (May–Jun, 2021)
  17. Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions
    •  with H. Choi, C.F. Mela, and A. Leary
    •  Information Systems Research (June, 2020)
  18. Multi-agent Mechanism Design without Money
    •  with H. Gurkan and P. Sun
    •  Operations Research (Sep-Oct, 2019)
  19. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
    •  with Y. Gur
    •  Management Science (Sep, 2019)
  20. Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment
  21. Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality
    •  with D.B. Brown
    •  Operations Research (Mar–Apr, 2019)
  22. Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
  23. Static Routing in Stochastic Scheduling: Performance Guarantees and Asymptotic Optimality
  24. Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising
    •  with O. Candogan
    •  Operations Research (Jul-Aug, 2017)
  25. Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
  26. Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design
  27. Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
  28. An Ant Colony Algorithm hybridized with insertion heuristics for the Time Dependent Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows
    •  with I. Loiseau, and J. Ramonet
    •  Computers & Operations Research (Jun, 2011)
    •  Data files

Conference Proceedings

  1. Optimal and Stable Distributed Bipartite Load Balancing
  2. Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions
    •  with J. Anunrojwong and O.Besbes
    •  Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Palo Alto, CA, 2025.
  3. Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets
  4. A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints
  5. Uniformly Bounded Regret in Dynamic Fair Allocation
    •  with S. Xia
    •  Third ACM conference on Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO), Boston, MA, 2023
  6. Robust Auction Design with Support Information
    •  with J. Anunrojwong and O.Besbes
    •  Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), London, UK, 2023
  7. Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice
    •  with C. Kroer and R. Kumar
    •  Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), London, UK, 2023
  8. Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample
  9. Online Resource Allocation under Horizon Uncertainty
    •  with C. Kroer and R. Kumar
    •  ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS), Orlando, FL, 2023
  10. On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
    •  with J. Anunrojwong and O.Besbes
    •  Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Boulder, CO, 2022
  11. Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
    •  with C. Kroer and R. Kumar
    •  Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Boulder, CO, 2022
  12. Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
  13. Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
  14. Regularized Online Allocation Problems: Fairness and Beyond
    •  with H. Lu and V. Mirrokni
    •  Proceedings of the 38th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), Virtual, 2021
  15. The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization
  16. Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design
  17. Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems
    •  with H. Lu and V. Mirrokni
    •  Proceedings of the 37th International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML), Vienna, Austria, 2020
  18. Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms
    •  with A. Kim, M. Mahdian, and V. Mirrokni
    •  Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), Budapest, Hungary, 2020
  19. Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning
  20. Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks
    •  with D.B. Brown and C. Chen
    •  Abstracts of the ACM International Conference on Measurement and Modeling of Computer Systems (SIGMETRICS), Phoeniz, AZ, 2019
  21. Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best
  22. Dynamic Revenue Sharing
    •  with Max Lin, V. Mirrokni, R. Paes Leme, and S. Zuo
    •  Proceedings of the Thirty-first Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), Long Beach, CA, 2017
  23. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
    •  with Y. Gur
    •  Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Cambridge, MA, 2017
  24. Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
    •  with A. Kim, M. Mahdian, and V. Mirrokni
    •  Proceedings of the 26th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW), Perth, Australia, 2017
  25. Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
    •  with V. Mirrokni and R. Paes Leme
    •  Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Cambridge, MA, 2017
  26. Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment
    •  with O.Besbes and G. Weintraub
    •  Proceedings of the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), Maastricht, the Netherlands, 2016
  27. Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design
    •  with O. Besbes and G. Weintraub
    •  Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), Philadelphia, PA, 2013
  28. Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
  29. Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
    •  with F. Balmaceda, J.R. Correa, and N.E Stier
    •  Proceedings of the 6th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE), Stanford, CA, 2010

Other Articles

  1. Auto-Bidding and Auctions in Online Advertising: A Survey
    •  with Google Research
    •  ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2024
  2. Intermediation in Online Advertising
    •  with O. Candogan and H. Gurkan
    •  Sharing Economy: Making Supply Meet Demand, 2019

Working Papers

  1. Load Balancing with Network Latencies via Distributed Gradient Descent
  2. The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing
  3. Analysis of Dual-Based PID Controllers through Convolutional Mirror Descent
  4. Position Auctions in AI-Generated Content

Awards

  1. Donald P. Gaver, Jr. Early Career Award for Excellence in Operations Research, 2023.
  2. Revenue Management and Pricing Section Prize, 2023.
  3. Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize, Finalist, 2023 (Entrant: R. Kumar).
  4. George Nicholson Student Paper Competition, Finalist, 2022 (Entrant: J. Anunrojwong).
  5. Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize, 2022 (Entrant: H. Lu).
  6. Revenue Management and Pricing Section Student Paper Prize, 2019 (Entrant: C. Chen).
  7. Junior Faculty Interest Group Best Paper Award, Honorable Mention, 2018.
  8. Google Faculty Research Award, Summer 2015. Amount: $64,000.
  9. George B. Dantzig Dissertation Award, First Place, 2014.
  10. George Nicholson Student Paper Competition, Honorable Mention, 2014.
  11. Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (NET) Institute Summer Grant, 2012. Amount: $7500.
  12. Deming Doctoral Fellowship, Columbia University, 2011. Amount: $10,000.
  13. Google Engineering Intern Scholarship, 2010. Amount: $10,000.
  14. Full Tuition and Fellowship, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 2008-2013.