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He did not yield. Then the message went back--assuming this is
what he did--from both Eleanor Roosevelt and Mayor La Guardia that
Randolph was firm.
That's what I heard. From my conversation with Randolph I
could say that there were these back and forth discussions, and that
Randolph felt the only chance that he would have to get the executive
order would be to persist, and not to make any even hint of
compromise on the march. In spite of the fact that he laughed when
he told me “I don't know what I would've done. I don't know whether
we'd been able to carry it off.” Twenty years later they did.
Of course, that was also wartime. Civil disobedience could have
brought in the military, could it not?
Sure. By the way, it's interesting that Randolph didn't
share with me any such threat from the White House, of the military.
But an awareness that it could happen presumably was there.
But apparently it was salient enough for him--at that time,
it was four hours between New York and Washington, and we had all
that time in which for him to reminisce.
Let me ask a footnote; maybe it's a devil's advocacy question
here. You made reference to Roy Wilkin's and Whitney Young's
opposition to the march approach. Would their fund-raising have been
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