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that he had had 35 meetings before he decided to go ahead to do it and he has examined all the possibilities and he realized that neither the UN nor the Organization of American states was effective to stop to situation and that 5000 American lives were being threatened....
That they would not be effective; they couldn't move....
They would not be effective. No, they couldn't move fast enough and they didn't have the facilities to move effectively and he saw nothing to do but to move to save the lives of American ditizens whose lives were being threatened. He said the last communication he had had before he ordered a move was from the American ambassador who was telephoning him from under his desk while tommy guns were being shot in through the window of a building where there were a thousand Americans trying to be sequestered; and he felt that he just had absolutely no choice about it. He also felt that what seemed like a local revolution was being taken advantage of by 50 or 60 Communists trained in Cuba who were going to try, if possible, to turn it to their own advantage. This is, so far as I know, something that hasn't been able to develop. But he also said that since the entrance of American troops,
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