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Looking
Into the Future: Two Possible Scenarios
Likely Scenario I: Political Discontent
with the Distribution of the Oil Revenues
The greatest risk to political order is related to citizen discontent
stemming from the impact of oil revenues on politics. In weakly
developed political environments, politicians who cherish their
power eschew transparency and avoid public accountability. The oil
consortium is committed to minimizing its impact on local communities
by creating a sealed compound and building an underground pipeline
with an offshore loading facility. It is convinced its technology
will forestall any serious environmental impact. Isolation from
the community will also shield the company and its installation
from vandalism. The practices of both the government and the oil
consortium discourage public scrutiny. This situation raises many
human rights concerns.
- How can communities have access to information on practices
that may affect their lives?
- How will freedom of speech for individuals be protected to enable
them to voice public discontent should they believe that revenues
are not being properly distributed or being distributed unevenly
or wastefully (Article 19 of the ICCPR)?
- Will local communities enjoy freedom of assembly and association
for public advocacy if oil production leads to environmental hazards
and revenues collected by the government are not fully accounted
for or distributed to local communities and well administered
by local officials?
- Will political opposition be protected (Articles 21 and 22 of
the ICCPR)?
In the past when the people have taken up public measures to pressure
political officials for change, the government has responded with
police powers without judicial scrutiny. Poorly trained government
security personnel have been brought in and have used unreasonable
force and extra-judicial measures against the civilians. In the
face of political unrest, how will the government protect the property
of the oil consortium? Given its past record, how will the government
avoid human rights violations such as:
- Torture (Article 7 of the ICCPR)
- Loss of life and extrajudicial executions (Article 5 of the
ICCPR)
- Arbitrary and prolonged detention (Article 9 of the ICCPR)
- Unequal and arbitrary application of the law in court of tribunal
proceedings (Article 14)
This problem has arisen frequently in other parts of the world;
see complaints against the multinational mining corporation Freeport
McMoRan human rights abuses in Irian Jaya related to property protection
measures of its extraction operations, http://diana.law.yale.edu/diana/db/42098-18.html
and Shell Oil in Rivers State in Nigeria, http://www.kabissa.org/ndwj/deltawomenforjustice.
An example of local tension leading to citizen protest against
oil operations, vandalism and kidnappings to which the government
may respond to with force occurred in Mobil Oils activities
in Aceh Indonesia, http://www.gn.apc.org/dte/39mob.htm
Governments have also used oil revenues to militarize their ruling
power for purposes of silencing or eliminating political opposition.
On this subject see the following reports on the Sudan and Angola:
Likely Scenario II: The Absence of Significant
Economic Betterment
The development of Chads oil is generating a new public revenue
stream for investment in health, education and public works (i.e.
roads and clean water). The World Bank has publicly stated that
its involvement in the project is predicated on the need to promote
government expenditures on poverty alleviation and economic growth
through private sector led development. To ensure that such aspirations
materialize, the World Bank required that the government of Chad
adopt a Revenue Management Plan (RMP) to govern distribution of
the oil revenues. Popular expectations in the oil producing region
have been raised partly on account of the efforts of the consortium
seeking local support through promising of substantial economic
betterment. [To view the text of this law, see Volume IV, Part II,
of Chads Environmental Assessment Report, which can be found
at either the EssoChad web site under Documentation, http://www.essochad.com/eaff/essochad/index.html,
or the World Banks web site at, http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj/project/pro_document.htm]
The RMP specifically stipulates that 80% of the oil revenues shall
be allocated to priority sectors that include public
health, social services, education, infrastructure, rural development
(agriculture and livestock), the environment, and water (Article
7). The remaining revenues shall be allocated as follows, 5% for
state administrative costs (for the first five years), ten percent
to be held for future generations and five percent to the oil-producing
region. In January 1999, the President of Chad enacted the RMP into
law. This law stipulates how the money will be collected, allocated
and disbursed, inter alia. Moreover it establishes a monitoring
Committee (Section 1) to oversee the control and supervision of
the funds. Further, the World Bank has put in place an International
Advisory Group to advise it, and the governments of Chad and Cameroon,
on the overall progress on the projects implementation, http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/news/pressrelease.nsf/673fa6c5a2d50a678
52565e200692a79/bb11ccb26fafcaa2852569fa0068ff14?OpenDocument
[See Hernandez-Ruiz, Harvard Human Rights Journal 2001]
Implementation of the RMP facilitates corresponds to governments
responsibility to progressively fulfill various rights enunciated
in the treaty covenant it has ratified on economic and social rights
(ICESCR).
The stage and the actors are thus set to show whether the promised
can be filled. How will the revenue be spent? How will the 5% for
the oil-producing region be distributed? Some of the possible problems
can be anticipated on the basis of pest problems in other oil-producing
regions. For a comparable oil revenue monitoring agreement, see
that arrangement put in place between the government of Angola and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2000, which will
be supervised by the World Bank. http://www.hrw.org/press/2000/06/ango-0623-back.htm
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