ET1999 ⁽⁷⁾

Jagdish Bhagwati had warned even as the Round was approaching closure that appeals to overly optimistic predictions could undermine future trade liberalization. Economic Times, August 25, 1999 In June 1993, Peter Sutherland succeeded Arthur Dunkel as the Director General of GATT and finally brought the Uruguay Round (UR) to a close. One of the arguments he used to persuade member countries to conclude the Round was that, according to the numerical predictions by researchers, the Dunkel Draft promised welfare gains worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Rubens Ricupero, Secretary General, UNCTAD, has recently questioned these predictions, characterizing them as “extravagant”. Many observers, familiar with the UR Agreement and the studies that made the extravagant predictions, share the Secretary General’s view. Indeed, economist Jagdish Bhagwati had warned even as the Round was approaching closure that appeals to overly optimistic predictions could undermine future trade liberalization. I have consistently maintained that trade liberalization, whether multilateral or unilateral, is beneficial to the liberalizing countries. Yet, in scholarly work, it is important to limit claims to what is justified by careful analysis and evidence.

Given where the round was heading, even pro-free-trade economists such as myself are relieved for the moment Economic Times, December 13, 1999 Talking to the Seattle Post-Intelligencer during his visit to Seattle, Bill Clinton decided to take a long leap from his original demand for a WTO working group on labour standards and proceeded to tell the newspaper that the working group should define core standards, which should then be part of every trade agreement. “And ultimately,” he continued, “I would favour a system in which sanctions would come for violating any provision of a trade agreement.” According to many, this statement was the last straw that broke the camel’s back and sealed the fate of the negotiations. Truth be told, neither Clinton’s statement nor the (un) civil society groups to which it catered did any such thing. The camel had arrived Seattle with an already broken back. It was only the United States Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky who refused to confront the looming failure, painting an overly optimistic picture prior to the conference. But within a week, as the…

With the Seattle Ministerial meeting right around the corner, the United States has tabled a proposal for a working group on labour standards at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Economic Times, November 6, 1999 With the Seattle Ministerial meeting right around the corner, the United States has tabled a proposal for a working group on labour standards at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States wants the working group to prepare a report in two years on the relationship between international trade and employment, social protection and the so-called core labour standards that include child labour. It also wants the proposed working group to study the impact of derogations from national labour standards in export processing zones. Three years ago, at the conclusion of the Singapore Ministerial meeting, developing countries had taken a sigh of relief that the issue of labour standards had at last been delegated to the International Labour Organization. The Singapore Declaration, signed by all WTO members including the United States, provided ample grounds for this sense of relief. The sole paragraph dealing with labor standards…

Even large developing countries such as India seem to lack the capacity for systematic research on how best to promote their interests in trade negotiations. Economic Times, October 20, 1999 Located in Geneva, WTO is far and away from most developing-country capitals. Immediate, day-to-day domestic concerns in these capitals leave little room for long-term thinking on issues that continuously simmer at the WTO. Even large developing countries such as India seem to lack the capacity for systematic research on how best to promote their interests in trade negotiations. As a result, while developed countries gear up to launch yet another round of negotiations, our reaction is to oppose it entirely rather than shape its agenda according to our interests. Given the far-reaching implications of the decisions made under the auspices of the WTO, the need for conducting research on a continuous basis and developing long-term strategies cannot be overemphasized. Developed country members of WTO such as the United States and the European Union take this research very seriously. By the time they are ready to place a subject on the…

Defining the agenda is the first stage of a negotiating game, which every player must take with utmost seriousness. Economic Times, September 22, 1999 From November 30 to December 3, 1999, representatives of the 134 member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) will meet in Seattle for the 3rd WTO Ministerial Conference. Unlike its predecessor, this is not a routine Conference: it will define the agenda for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations and, thus, influence the future course of the global trading system. Defining the agenda is the first stage of a negotiating game, which every player must take with utmost seriousness. Seasoned players such as the United States carefully choose their opening moves to ascertain that the outcome is the one desired by them. In the same vein, it is crucial for developing countries to arrive at an agenda that will serve their interests and forcefully push for it at Seattle. Under the current circumstances, it is best to limit the Seattle Round agenda to liberalization in industrial products plus the Uruguay Round (UR) built-in agenda.