Bond Business School
14 University Dr 
Robina QLD
Australia 4226


Published Papers

Teh, T.-L. and Woolnough, C. (2019), A Better Trigger: Indicies for Insurance, Journal of Risk and Insurance 86(4): 861-885.
Teh, T.-L.
(2017), Insurance Design in the Presence of Safety Nets, Journal of Public Economics, 149,47-58.
Clarke, D., Mahul, O., Poulter, R., Teh, T.-L. (2017), Evaluating Sovereign Disaster Risk Financing Strategies: A Framework, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 42(2), 565-584.
T.-L. Teh (2015). Sovereign disaster risk financing and insurance impact appraisal, British Actuarial Journal, 20, 241-256.
M. Norton, D. Osgood, M. Madajewicz, E. Holthaus, N. Peterson, R. Diro, C. Mullally, T.-L. Teh and M. Gebremichael (2014). Evidence of Demand for Index Insurance: Experimental Games and Commercial Transactions in Ethiopia, Journal of Development Studies, 50(5):630-634.
T.-L. Teh (2014). Motivation and Definition of the Impact Appraisal Approach, World Bank Background Paper
T.-L. Teh (2014). Counterfactuals for the Appraisal of DRFI Strategies, World Bank Background Paper

    Work in Progress

The Influence of Culture and Group Formation on Cooperation (with Dr Nan Zhong, Xiamen University, China) paper

Problems that cross institutional boundaries are often difficult to solve because they require cooperation between numerous actors. Willingness to cooperate is affected by a multitude of factors, including personality, socio-economic circumstances, cultural background and policy awareness. This proposed study focuses on three aspects: culture, subjective beliefs and group formation. Our study uses an experimental game to measure individual willingness to cooperate in two countries of differing culture and economic development, China and the United Kingdom.

You Incomplete Me: Safety Nets and Insurance (with Dr Christopher Woolnough, Maastricht University, Netherlands) paper
The existence or expectation of assistance following a loss can modify insurance demand and the type of insurance contracts demanded. This paper examines what type of insurance contracts are offered when insurance exists alongside ex-post safety net assistance. The optimal contract from the perspective of the assistance provider and the insurance consumer both exclude large losses, but not at the same level of exclusion. In a realistic market where any type of insurance contract is available and the assistance provider does not have dictatorial power, we demonstrate that subsidisation by an assistance provider can improve welfare outcomes. Further benefits arise from mandating a set of insurance contracts to be made available. Our findings are reflected in markets of natural disaster insurance and health insurance.

Optimal Natural Disaster Risk Financing

This paper explores the optimal financing options for a benevolent government facing exogenous shocks due to natural disasters. The paper finds that in a stylised economy citizens' welfare is improved by ex-ante tax policy to provide insurance over natural disasters.

Learning in Rare Risks and Asset Price Implications paper

Natural disaster risks represent inherent uncertainty and a challenge for risk transfer. Financial markets support immense capital funds capable of absorbing this risk. The differences in rare and common risks are modelled to illustrate the impact of risk class on asset prices. This paper illustrates persistent benefits in the issuance of disaggregated transfer assets with implications for policy makers.