Email
tteh@bond.edu.au
Postal
Bond Business School
14 University Dr
Robina QLD
Australia 4226
Papers
Published
Papers
Teh, T.-L. and Woolnough,
C. (2019), A
Better Trigger: Indicies for Insurance, Journal
of Risk and Insurance 86(4): 861-885.
Teh, T.-L. (2017), Insurance
Design in the Presence of Safety Nets, Journal
of Public Economics, 149,47-58.
Clarke, D., Mahul, O.,
Poulter, R., Teh, T.-L. (2017), Evaluating
Sovereign Disaster Risk Financing Strategies: A
Framework, The Geneva Papers on Risk and
Insurance, 42(2), 565-584.
T.-L. Teh (2015). Sovereign
disaster risk financing and insurance impact appraisal,
British Actuarial Journal, 20, 241-256.
M. Norton, D. Osgood, M. Madajewicz, E. Holthaus, N.
Peterson, R. Diro, C. Mullally, T.-L. Teh and M.
Gebremichael (2014). Evidence
of Demand for Index Insurance: Experimental Games and
Commercial Transactions in Ethiopia, Journal of
Development Studies, 50(5):630-634.
T.-L. Teh (2014). Motivation
and Definition of the Impact Appraisal Approach, World
Bank Background Paper
T.-L. Teh (2014). Counterfactuals
for the Appraisal of DRFI Strategies, World Bank
Background Paper
The Influence of Culture and Group Formation on Cooperation (with Dr Nan Zhong, Xiamen University, China) paper
Problems that cross institutional boundaries are often
difficult to solve because they require cooperation between
numerous actors. Willingness to cooperate is affected by a
multitude of factors, including personality, socio-economic
circumstances, cultural background and policy awareness.
This proposed study focuses on three aspects: culture,
subjective beliefs and group formation. Our study uses an
experimental game to measure individual willingness to
cooperate in two countries of differing culture and economic
development, China and the United Kingdom.
You Incomplete Me: Safety Nets and
Insurance (with Dr Christopher Woolnough,
Maastricht University, Netherlands) paper
The existence
or expectation of assistance following a loss can
modify insurance demand and the type of insurance
contracts demanded. This paper examines what type
of insurance contracts are offered when insurance
exists alongside ex-post safety net assistance.
The optimal contract from the perspective of the
assistance provider and the insurance consumer
both exclude large losses, but not at the same
level of exclusion. In a realistic market where
any type of insurance contract is available and
the assistance provider does not have dictatorial
power, we demonstrate that subsidisation by an
assistance provider can improve welfare outcomes.
Further benefits arise from mandating a set of
insurance contracts to be made available. Our
findings are reflected in markets of natural
disaster insurance and health insurance.
Optimal Natural
Disaster Risk Financing
This paper explores the optimal financing options for a
benevolent government facing exogenous shocks due to
natural disasters. The paper finds that in a stylised
economy citizens' welfare is improved by ex-ante tax
policy to provide insurance over natural disasters.
Learning in Rare Risks and Asset
Price Implications paper
Natural disaster risks represent inherent uncertainty and a
challenge for risk transfer. Financial markets support
immense capital funds capable of absorbing this risk. The
differences in rare and common risks are modelled to
illustrate the impact of risk class on asset prices. This
paper illustrates persistent benefits in the issuance of
disaggregated transfer assets with implications for policy
makers.