Biography

I am an Associate Professor of Business at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, and a research scientist at Google Research. My research develops novel methodological approaches that combine dynamic optimization, stochastic modeling, and game theory to address fundamental problems in the digital economy. My work tackles central problems in internet advertising while making methodological contributions to the area of large-scale sequential decision-making in the face of uncertainty and dynamic optimization with incentives. My research has been recognized by multiple awards including an early career award and a best dissertation award, and numerous best paper awards. I am also the Research Director of the Deming Center. I am a graduate of University of Buenos Aires and received my Ph.D. from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business in 2013. Before joining Columbia, I was on the faculty at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University.

Journal Papers

  1. On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
  2. Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
  3. Survey of Dynamic Resource Constrained Reward Collection Problems: Unified Model and Analysis
  4. Incentive-Compatible Assortment Optimization for Sponsored Products
  5. Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning
  6. Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility
  7. The Best of Many Worlds: Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems
  8. Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best
  9. On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
  10. Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks
  11. Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
  12. Multi-Stage Intermediation in Online Advertising
  13. Online Display Advertising Markets: A Literature Review and Future Directions
  14. Multi-agent Mechanism Design without Money
  15. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
  16. Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment
  17. Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality
  18. Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
  19. Static Routing in Stochastic Scheduling: Performance Guarantees and Asymptotic Optimality
  20. Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising
  21. Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
  22. Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design
  23. Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
  24. An Ant Colony Algorithm hybridized with insertion heuristics for the Time Dependent Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows

Conference Proceedings

  1. A Field Guide for Pacing Budget and ROS Constraints
  2. Uniformly Bounded Regret in Dynamic Fair Allocation
  3. Robust Auction Design with Support Information
  4. Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice
  5. Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample
  6. Online Resource Allocation under Horizon Uncertainty
  7. On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design
  8. Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees
  9. Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping
  10. Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
  11. Regularized Online Allocation Problems: Fairness and Beyond
  12. The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization
  13. Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design
  14. Dual Mirror Descent for Online Allocation Problems
  15. Budget-Constrained Incentive Compatibility for Stationary Mechanisms
  16. Contextual Bandits with Cross-Learning
  17. Dynamic Pricing of Relocating Resources in Large Networks
  18. Dynamic Double Auctions: Towards First Best
  19. Dynamic Revenue Sharing
  20. Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium
  21. Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions
  22. Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities
  23. Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment
  24. Auctions for Online Display Advertising Exchanges: Approximations and Design
  25. Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange
  26. Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability

Working Papers

  1. The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing
  2. Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets
  3. Analysis of Dual-Based PID Controllers through Convolutional Mirror Descent
  4. Dynamic Pricing for Reusable Resources: The Power of Two Prices

Awards

  1. Donald P. Gaver, Jr. Early Career Award for Excellence in Operations Research, 2023.
  2. Revenue Management and Pricing Section Prize, 2023.
  3. Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize, Finalist, 2023 (Entrant: R. Kumar).
  4. George Nicholson Student Paper Competition, Finalist, 2022 (Entrant: J. Anunrojwong).
  5. Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize, 2022 (Entrant: H. Lu).
  6. Revenue Management and Pricing Section Student Paper Prize, 2019 (Entrant: C. Chen).
  7. Junior Faculty Interest Group Best Paper Award, Honorable Mention, 2018.
  8. Google Faculty Research Award, Summer 2015. Amount: $64,000.
  9. George B. Dantzig Dissertation Award, First Place, 2014.
  10. George Nicholson Student Paper Competition, Honorable Mention, 2014.
  11. Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (NET) Institute Summer Grant, 2012. Amount: $7500.
  12. Deming Doctoral Fellowship, Columbia University, 2011. Amount: $10,000.
  13. Google Engineering Intern Scholarship, 2010. Amount: $10,000.
  14. Full Tuition and Fellowship, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, 2008-2013.