Contact

3022 Broadway
Uris Hall 417
New York, NY 10027
srb2155@columbia.edu

Research


Multi-agent Mechanism Design without Money


Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium


Budget Management Strategies in Repeated Auctions


Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities


Static Routing in Stochastic Scheduling: Performance Guarantees and Asymptotic Optimality


Approximations to Stochastic Dynamic Programs via Information Relaxation Duality


Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constrained Buyers under Limited Commitment


Multi-Stage Intermediation in Online Advertising


Optimal Contracts for Intermediaries in Online Advertising


Repeated Auctions with Budgets in Ad Exchanges: Approximations and Design


Yield Optimization of Display Advertising with Ad Exchange


Bounds on the Welfare Loss from Moral Hazard with Limited Liability


Revenue Management of Consumer Options for Sporting Events


An Ant Colony Algorithm hybridized with insertion heuristics for the Time Dependent Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows