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JOURNAL ARTICLES
- Comment on `Why Selective Colleges Should Become Less Selective-And Get Better Students' (by Barry Schwartz),
Capitalism and Society (2016), Vol. 11:Iss 2, Article 5.
- Supplement to the paper.
- Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under Asymmetric Information (with Levent Kockesen),
Review of Economic Design (2015), 19 (3), 173-209.
- Supplement to the paper.
- A version of this paper with more result (2013) is available here or at at RePEc .
- Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts (with Levent Kockesen),
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: (2012) Vol. 12: Iss. 1 (Advances), Article 23.
- A previous working paper version (2009) is available at RePEc with the title ``Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts'', WP 0908 Tusiad-Koc University Economic Research Forum, September 2009.
- An older version (2008) of this paper analyzes delegation games rather than games with side contracts:
``Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts'' (with Levent Kockesen), WP 0803 Tusiad-Koc University Economic Research Forum, April 2008. Available at RePEc
WORKING PAPERS
- Games with Externalities and Delegation to a Common Agent, working paper (2007).
- Labor Markets with On the Job-Search and Wage Posting:
Equilibrium Wage and Welfare Implications (with Lalith Munasinghe), working paper (2005).
WORK IN PROGRESS
- Partial Commitment (with Alex Citanna).
- Credible Contracts to Achieve Fiscal Discipline (with Levent Kockesen)