Navin Kartik Professor, Department of Economics Email    :   Address:   1033 IAB, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 Phone   :   212-854-3926

Bio          Curriculum Vitae          Google Scholar

Ph.D. Students on the 2020-21 Job Market

• Duarte Goncalves

• Dilip Ravindran

Unpublished Papers and Work in Progress

• Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games, with Sidartha Gordon, Melody Pei-yu Lo, Wojciech Olszewski, and Joel Sobel, March 2021.
  • Supplementary Excel file.

• Observational Learning with Ordered States, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport, March 2021.

• Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van Weelden, revised November 2020.  Slides.

• Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport, revised October 2019.  Slides.

• Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn, revised April 2015.  Slides.

• A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012.

• On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007.

Published Papers

1. Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with Alex Frankel, February 2021, forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association.

2. Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, July 2020, forthcoming in American Economic Review: Insights.
   • An earlier version with a different emphasis and leading application: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games.    

3. Muddled Information, with Alex Frankel, Journal of Political Economy, August 2019.

4. Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van Weelden, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2019.

5. Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van Weelden, Review of Economic Studies, March 2019.
   • Supplementary Appendix.

6. What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with Alex Frankel, Theoretical Economics, May 2018.
   • An earlier version with a different focus was circulated under the title What Kind of Transparency?

7. Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust, with Alessandra Casella, Luis Sanchez, and Sébastien Turban, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 2018.
   • Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version.

8. Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton, American Journal of Political Science, October 2017.
   • Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version.

9. Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Journal of Political Economy, October 2017.
   • Supplementary Appendix.

10. Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2017.

11. Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Review of Economic Studies, July 2016.
    • Supplementary Appendix.   Clarifications.

12. Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew Rabin, Games and Economic Behavior, September 2014.

13. Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2014.
    • Supplementary Appendix. An earlier version was circulated under the title "Of Candidates and Character."

14. Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux, Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014.

15. Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein, American Economic Review, February 2013.
    • Supplementary Appendix.

16. Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali, Economic Theory, November 2012.
    • Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections."

17. Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux, Theoretical Economics, May 2012.

18. A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria, Economics Letters, May 2011.

19. Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che, Journal of Political Economy, October 2009.
    • Supplementary Appendix.

20. Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, Review of Economic Studies, October 2009.
    • Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk," the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria."

21. Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens, Experimental Economics, June 2009.
    • Appendix 1 (Calculations).   Appendix 2 (Subjects' Instructions).

22. Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008.

23. Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel, Econometrica, January 2008.

24. A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007.
    • An earlier version, On Cheap Talk and Burned Money, contains additional results.

25. Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee, American Economic Review, June 2007.
    • Supplementary Appendix.   Dilbert cartoon.

26. Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani, Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007.

Teaching

• Spring 2021: Applications of Game Theory (Micro Seminar) (GU4911); course materials are available at Courseworks.