Professor, Department of Economics
Address:   1033 IAB, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027
Phone   :   212-854-3926
Bio          Curriculum Vitae          Google Scholar
Unpublished Papers and Work in Progress
Effective Communication in Cheap Talk Games, with Sidartha Gordon, Melody Pei-yu Lo, Wojciech Olszewski, and Joel Sobel, March 2021.
- Observational Learning with Ordered States, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport, revised April 2021.  Slides.
- Single-Crossing Differences on Distributions, with SangMok Lee and Daniel Rappoport, revised October 2019.  Slides.
- Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn, revised April 2015.  Slides.
- A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012.
- On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007.
- Delegation in Veto Bargaining, with Andreas Kleiner and Richard Van Weelden, July 2021, forthcoming in American Economic Review.
- Improving Information from Manipulable Data, with Alex Frankel, February 2021, forthcoming in Journal of the European Economic Association.
- Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, American Economic Review: Insights, June 2021.
- Muddled Information, with Alex Frankel, Journal of Political Economy, August 2019.
- Reputation Effects and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van Weelden, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2019.
- Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van Weelden, Review of Economic Studies, March 2019.
- What Kind of Central Bank Competence?, with Alex Frankel, Theoretical Economics, May 2018.
- Communication in Context: Interpreting Promises in an Experiment on Competition and Trust, with Alessandra Casella, Luis Sanchez, and Sébastien Turban, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, January 2018.
- Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above early-edition version.
- Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton, American Journal of Political Science, October 2017.
- Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version.
- Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Journal of Political Economy, October 2017.
- Investment in Concealable Information by Biased Experts, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, RAND Journal of Economics, Spring 2017.
- Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Review of Economic Studies, July 2016.
- Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew Rabin, Games and Economic Behavior, September 2014.
- Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2014.
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux, Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014.
- Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein, American Economic Review, February 2013.
- Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali, Economic Theory, November 2012.
- Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections."
- Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux, Theoretical Economics, May 2012.
- A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria, Economics Letters, May 2011.
- Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che, Journal of Political Economy, October 2009.
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, Review of Economic Studies, October 2009.
- Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk," the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria."
- Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens, Experimental Economics, June 2009.
- Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008.
Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel, Econometrica, January 2008.
- A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007.
- Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee, American Economic Review, June 2007.
Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani, Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007.
- Fall 2021: Advanced Micro I (GR6218); course materials are available at Courseworks.