Professor, Department of Economics
Address:   1033 IAB, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027
Phone   :   212-854-3926
Google Scholar          Curriculum Vitae
- Contests for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Journal of Political Economy, accepted February 2016.
- Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu, Review of Economic Studies, accepted January 2016.
- Supplementary Appendix is contained in the above pre-publication version.
- Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew Rabin, Games and Economic Behavior, September 2014.
- Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, May 2014.
- Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux, Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014.
- Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein, American Economic Review, February 2013.
- Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali, Economic Theory, November 2012.
- Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections."
- Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux, Theoretical Economics, May 2012.
- A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria, Economics Letters, May 2011.
- Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che, Journal of Political Economy, October 2009.
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, Review of Economic Studies, October 2009.
- Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk," the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria."
- Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens, Experimental Economics, June 2009.
- Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008.
Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel, Econometrica, January 2008.
- A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007.
- Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee, American Economic Review, June 2007.
Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani, Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007.
Unpublished Papers and Work in Progress
- A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Signaling Games, with Frances Xu Lee and Wing Suen, In Progress.  Presentation slides.
- Electoral Ambiguity and Political Representation, with Richard Van Weelden and Stephane Wolton, October 2015.  Presentation slides.
- Reputation, Term Limits, and Incumbency (Dis)Advantage, with Richard Van Weelden, October 2015.
- What Kind of Transparency?, with Alex Frankel, revised September 2015.
- Informative Cheap Talk in Elections, with Richard Van Weelden, revised September 2015.  Supplementary Appendix.  Presentation slides.
- Muddled Information, with Alex Frankel, revised January 2016.  Presentation slides.
- Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn, revised April 2015.  Presentation slides.
- A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux, January 2012.
- On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot, revised August 2007.
- Spring 2016: Undergraduate Microeconomics seminar (W4911) and Ph.D. Microeconomic Analysis II (G6212); course materials available at Courseworks.