Navin Kartik Professor, Department of Economics Email    :   Address:   1033 IAB, 420 W. 118th Street, New York, NY 10027 Phones  :   212-854-3926 (voice); 212-854-8059 (fax)

Curriculum Vitae (updated Sept. 2013)

Published Papers

• Simple Mechanisms and Preferences for Honesty, with Richard Holden and Olivier Tercieux, Games and Economic Behavior, January 2014.

• Candidates, Character, and Corruption, with Doug Bernheim, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming.
  • Supplementary Appendix. An earlier version was circulated under the title "Of Candidates and Character."

• Pandering to Persuade, with Yeon-Koo Che and Wouter Dessein, American Economic Review, February 2013.
  • Supplementary Appendix.

• Herding with Collective Preferences, with Nageeb Ali, Economic Theory, November 2012.
  • Supersedes an earlier working paper "Social Learning in Elections."

• Implementation with Evidence, with Olivier Tercieux, Theoretical Economics, May 2012.

• A Note on Undominated Bertrand Equilibria, Economics Letters, May 2011.

• Opinions as Incentives, with Yeon-Koo Che, Journal of Political Economy, October 2009.
  • Supplementary Appendix.

• Strategic Communication with Lying Costs, Review of Economic Studies, October 2009.
  • Subsumes portions of an earlier working paper "Information Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk," the other portions of which are subsumed by "Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria."

• Would I Lie to You? On Social Preferences and Lying Aversion, with Sjaak Hurkens, Experimental Economics, June 2009.
  • Appendix 1 (Calculations).   Appendix 2 (Subjects' Instructions).

• Information Aggregation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees, with Nageeb Ali, Jacob Goeree, and Thomas Palfrey, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, May 2008.

• Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria, with Ying Chen and Joel Sobel, Econometrica, January 2008.

• A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money, Journal of Economic Theory, September 2007.
  • An earlier version, On Cheap Talk and Burned Money, contains additional results.

• Signaling Character in Electoral Competition, with Preston McAfee, American Economic Review, June 2007.
  • Supplementary Appendix.   Dilbert cartoon.

• Credulity, Lies, and Costly Talk, with Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani, Journal of Economic Theory, May 2007.

Unpublished Papers and Work in Progress

• Multi-Sender Disclosure of Verifiable Information, with Wing Suen and Frances Xu. Coming soon; email me for an early draft.

• Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, with Marina Halac and Qingmin Liu. Revised September 2013.

• Congested Observational Learning, with Erik Eyster, Andrea Galeotti, and Matthew Rabin. Revised August 2013.

• Information Revelation and Pandering in Elections, with Francesco Squintani and Katrin Tinn. Revised March 2013.

• A Note on Mixed-Nash Implementation, with Olivier Tercieux. January 2012.

• On Optimal Voting Rules under Homogeneous Preferences, with Arnaud Costinot. Revised August 2007.

Teaching

• Spring 2014: Undergraduate Microeconomics seminar (W4911) and Ph.D. Microeconomics Analysis II (G6212); course materials will be available at Courseworks.